Edward Lansdale: Difference between revisions

From Citizendium
Jump to navigation Jump to search
imported>David E. Volk
m (subpages)
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz
No edit summary
Line 1: Line 1:
{{subpages}}
{{subpages}}
'''Edward Lansdale''' was a [[United States Air Force]] major general who spent much of his career on assignment to the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]. He is best known as the key advisor to [[Ramon Magsaysay]], initially secretary of defense and then president of the Phillipines, where the [[Hukbalahap]] insurgency was successfully ended.
{{TOC-right}}
'''Edward Lansdale''' was a [[United States Air Force]] major general who was principally assigned to intelligence agencies; the [[Office of Strategic Services]] during the Second World War, military intelligence immediately after the war, and then to the [[Central Intelligence Agency]].  


In 1954, Lansdale was in the original CIA team to Vietnam, the [[CIA activities in Asia-Pacific#Vietnam 1954|Saigon Military Mission]]. While influential at first, and seen originally as the key [[counterinsurgency]] expert in the country, he gradually lost his role and was essentially out of the decision loop by the time of the Kennedy Administration.
He is best known as the key advisor to [[Ramon Magsaysay]], initially secretary of defense and then president of the Phillipines, where the [[Hukbalahap]] insurgency was successfully ended. His there made him the model for the thinly veiled "Colonel Hillandale" character in the book, ''The Ugly American''. <ref>{{citation
| first1= William J. | last1 = Lederer | first2= Eugene | last2= Burdick
| title = The Ugly American
| publisher = W.W. Norton | year = 1999
}}</ref>The title of that book has become much misused, as the title character was a sympathetic character.
 
In addition, however, he was very significantly involved in U.S. policy in the [[Vietnam War]] between 1954 and 1960.
==Phillipines==
==Vietnam==
In 1954, Lansdale was in the original CIA team to Vietnam, the [[CIA activities in Asia-Pacific#Vietnam 1954|Saigon Military Mission]]. While he did not unreservedly approve of President [[Ngo Dinh Diem]], he did [[Vietnam War, Partition and decisions#events|advise Diem]]
 
While influential at first, and seen originally as the key [[counterinsurgency]] expert in the country, he gradually lost his role and was essentially out of the decision loop soon into the [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy Administration]] Kennedy himself liked Landsdale and suggested him as Ambassador to [[South Vietnam]]. To that, the State Department was so opposed that [[Secretary of State]] [[Dean Rusk]] told Kennedy that he would resign if Lansdale were appointed. <ref name=Shultz>{{citation|
title = the Secret War against Hanoi: the untold story of spies, saboteurs, and covert warriors in North Vietnam
| first = Richard H., Jr. | last = Shultz
| publisher = Harper Collins Perennial | year = 2000}},  pp. 280-281</ref>
 
Kennedy then suggested Lansdale command [[Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam]], which would have required jumping hin from his [[brigadier general]] to [[lieutenant general]] rank. The [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] objected intensely, considering him an intelligence operator, not a regular military officer<ref>Schultz, pp. 281-282</ref>
 
In February 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, presumably with the support of Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]], named him as head of a new Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, with responsibility for [[Department of Defense]] covert action and work with the CIA. Going into 1962, Lansdale headed that office, but the Joint Chiefs responded by creating the Special Assistant (to the [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]]) for Counterinsurgency and Special Affairs (SACSA). SACSA was the Washington control for [[MACV-SOG]], the military covert action organization in Vietnam. <ref>Schultz, pp. 284-286</ref>
 
Lansdale, in the fall of 1962, had visited [[Maxwell Taylor]], then Ambassador to South Vietnam, and offended Taylor by directly visiting President [[Ngo Diem Dinh]]. Taylor, who returned to the Pentagon and became Chairman of the JCS, removed Lansdale from Vietnam operations and reassigned him to Cuban operations.
==Latin America==
While Lansdale was selected by [[Robert Kennedy]] as a key player in [[Operation MONGOOSE]], the CIA plan to kill [[Fidel Castro]]. SACSA [[Brute Krulak]] said that the [[Director of Central Intelligence]], [[John McCone]], lost confidence in Lansdale, and Lansdale was ordered into retirement in May 1963, taking effect in October.
==References==
{{reflist|2}}

Revision as of 23:40, 16 November 2008

This article is developing and not approved.
Main Article
Discussion
Related Articles  [?]
Bibliography  [?]
External Links  [?]
Citable Version  [?]
 
This editable Main Article is under development and subject to a disclaimer.

Template:TOC-right Edward Lansdale was a United States Air Force major general who was principally assigned to intelligence agencies; the Office of Strategic Services during the Second World War, military intelligence immediately after the war, and then to the Central Intelligence Agency.

He is best known as the key advisor to Ramon Magsaysay, initially secretary of defense and then president of the Phillipines, where the Hukbalahap insurgency was successfully ended. His there made him the model for the thinly veiled "Colonel Hillandale" character in the book, The Ugly American. [1]The title of that book has become much misused, as the title character was a sympathetic character.

In addition, however, he was very significantly involved in U.S. policy in the Vietnam War between 1954 and 1960.

Phillipines

Vietnam

In 1954, Lansdale was in the original CIA team to Vietnam, the Saigon Military Mission. While he did not unreservedly approve of President Ngo Dinh Diem, he did advise Diem

While influential at first, and seen originally as the key counterinsurgency expert in the country, he gradually lost his role and was essentially out of the decision loop soon into the Kennedy Administration Kennedy himself liked Landsdale and suggested him as Ambassador to South Vietnam. To that, the State Department was so opposed that Secretary of State Dean Rusk told Kennedy that he would resign if Lansdale were appointed. [2]

Kennedy then suggested Lansdale command Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam, which would have required jumping hin from his brigadier general to lieutenant general rank. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected intensely, considering him an intelligence operator, not a regular military officer[3]

In February 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, presumably with the support of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, named him as head of a new Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, with responsibility for Department of Defense covert action and work with the CIA. Going into 1962, Lansdale headed that office, but the Joint Chiefs responded by creating the Special Assistant (to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for Counterinsurgency and Special Affairs (SACSA). SACSA was the Washington control for MACV-SOG, the military covert action organization in Vietnam. [4]

Lansdale, in the fall of 1962, had visited Maxwell Taylor, then Ambassador to South Vietnam, and offended Taylor by directly visiting President Ngo Diem Dinh. Taylor, who returned to the Pentagon and became Chairman of the JCS, removed Lansdale from Vietnam operations and reassigned him to Cuban operations.

Latin America

While Lansdale was selected by Robert Kennedy as a key player in Operation MONGOOSE, the CIA plan to kill Fidel Castro. SACSA Brute Krulak said that the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone, lost confidence in Lansdale, and Lansdale was ordered into retirement in May 1963, taking effect in October.

References

  1. Lederer, William J. & Eugene Burdick (1999), The Ugly American, W.W. Norton
  2. Shultz, Richard H., Jr. (2000), the Secret War against Hanoi: the untold story of spies, saboteurs, and covert warriors in North Vietnam, Harper Collins Perennial, pp. 280-281
  3. Schultz, pp. 281-282
  4. Schultz, pp. 284-286