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Revision as of 06:13, 3 September 2009

The Article of the Week is an article chosen by vote among Citizens as exemplifying various qualities we like to see in a Citizendium article; see our article standards. It is chosen each week by vote in a manner similar to that of its sister project, the New Draft of the Week

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Approved Article Scarborough Castle Drew R. Smith; Alexander Wiebel 2
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Approved Article Scarborough Castle: Ruined stone castle on the east coast of Yorkshire, England, begun in mid-twelfth century. [e]

Scarborough Castle's keep viewed towards the town's North Bay. The inner bailey includes a well, and is surrounded by a curtain wall (left) and another stone wall which defended the outer bailey (right).

The ruins of Scarborough Castle stand on a cliff top overlooking the town of Scarborough, North Yorkshire, in England. The castle was founded in the 1130s, but the existing stone ruins date from the 1150s. Over the centuries, several other structures were added, with mediaeval monarchs investing heavily in what was then an important fortress that guarded the Yorkshire coastline, Scarborough's port trade, and the north of England from Scottish or continental invasion. It was also fortified and defended for various civil wars, sieges and conflicts, as kings fought with rival barons, faced rebellion and clashed with republican forces, though peace with Scotland and the conclusion of civil and continental wars in the seventeenth century led to its decline in importance. Once occupied by garrisons and governors who often menaced the town, the castle has been a ruin since the sieges of the English Civil War, but still attracts many visitors to climb the battlements, take in the views and enjoy the accompanying interactive exhibition and special events run by English Heritage.

Features

(CC) Image: Dongyi Liu
The barbican (main gateway, left) today, close to a stone bridge. Unusually for a castle of this kind, the inner bailey is reached from the entrance first, via the bridge, with the outer bailey beyond. The view is towards Scarborough's North Bay.

Because the castle sits atop a sheer cliff 300 feet (92 metres) high, only the south-western slopes leading up to the entrance needed to be defended; the outer thirteenth-to-fourteenth-century curtain wall, 230 yards (210 metres) long, with its (originally twelve) hollow towers for archers[1] therefore do not completely surround the inner buildings of the castle. The entrance consists of a barbican, or fortifications to protect the gateway, completed in the fourteenth century and flanked by two half-circular towers atop high ground.[2] Modifications to the barbican have removed evidence of the old portcullis and its grooves[3] - some of many examples of changes to the castle over the centuries, which is itself a replacement for a twelfth-century fortification[4] built at the site of the remains of an eleventh-century Anglo-Saxon chapel.[5]

Beyond the main gateway, a stone bridge leads to the baileys (enclosed areas). This bridge replaced the two original drawbridges, and was rebuilt in 1337-1338.[6] It leads first to the inner bailey, which would have been used for workshops, offices, a kitchen, and a storage area. Unusually, the outer bailey is reached beyond these, separated from the inner bailey by a ditch and stone wall. This contrasts with the reverse arrangement of baileys found in other castles of this time.[7]

The 86-feet-tall (26 metres) twelfth-century keep and the castle's 150-feet-deep (46 metres) well[8] occupy the inner bailey. The keep, with its entrance on the first floor (i.e. the second level from the ground), survives to this day only as a shell, with the west wall, interior floors and roof missing thanks to a seventeenth-century bombardment. With its sloping plinth to aid defence, flat roof and four turrets[9] this square three-storey building would have been over 100 feet tall (31 metres). The walls range from 11 to 15 feet (3.5 to 4.6 metres) in thickness, the west wall being strongest, and there are several windows, some blocked up. The corners feature decorative rounded mouldings. There are the remains of a hearth in the west wall on the first floor, which comprised a single Great Hall where the occupants ate and often slept. The second and third floors were each divided into two rooms for the most important visitors or the governor, and the basement would have been a storage area.[10]

The baileys are separated by a wall, ditch and bank, with two defended gateways. This larger bailey would have seen entertaining events staged, vegetables grown and animals kept; there was also a graveyard and St. Mary's Chapel, which has completely disappeared, though the remains of the old Anglo-Saxon chapel on the site of an old Roman signal station can still be seen (see early history of the site, below). A twelfth-century mediaeval building, 100 feet (47 metres) in length and excavated in 1888, also stood in the outer bailey to accommodate royal visitors, with a long hall and private chamber for the monarch (the only one with a fireplace, as well as rooms for preparing and storing food. This building was demolished sometime before a survey of 1538, which makes no mention of it, and only the foundations remain.[11]

The 'King's Chambers' in the outer bailey, also known as Mosdale Hall after a fourteenth-century governor of the castle who was responsible for upgrading it, are a striking example of how the castle has been much-altered over the years. Originally built in the thirteenth century and upgraded by Mosdale after 1397, the two-storey building at the curtain wall was converted to red-brick barracks in the eighteenth century, probably also using stone from the castle walls. The red brickwork is clearly visible next to the much earlier outer stone wall, as viewed from Scarborough's South Bay. The thirteenth-century Queen's Tower in the wall nearby was initially luxurious accommodation with private latrines, a porch added in 1320[12] and large windows with bay views, but two of these windows were later blocked up, and one was changed to a cupboard with a rubbish chute. The Master Gunner's House, built in 1748, served as accommodation until the early twentieth century (see events and attractions, below).[13]

Events and attractions

(CC) Image: James Stringer
The eighteenth-century Master Gunner's House now hosts a museum and café.

See also development of the castle as a tourist attraction

The castle site, managed by English Heritage since 1984, is host to various events, usually in summertime, such as pirate and Robin Hood-themed activities.[14] Needless to say, the castle grounds are also reputed to be haunted - by three ghosts, among them a Roman soldier at the signal station site.[15] The eighteenth-century Master Gunner's House now serves as a museum including an interactive exhibition whose centrepiece is a Bronze Age sword. This was discovered in 1980 at the castle and forms the centrepiece of English Heritage's £250,000 investment in making the site a strong tourist attraction.[16] The building also houses a café.[17]

History

See also a timeline of Scarborough Castle

The castle's ten centuries of history have seen it move from a major fortification in the Middle Ages to a well-loved ruin today. It played an important role in several important English events, and survived a series of major sieges as its ownership passed between rival forces. The site itself was far from barren before the establishment of the castle, with activity dating back more than a thousand years before the first stones of the mediaeval castle were laid.

Early history of the site

Archaeological evidence of Iron Age and later settlements from around 900-500 BCE[18] possibly suggest something as extensive as a full hill fort on the headland, though this is yet to be found.[19] Among various finds possibly dating back as far as 3,000 years, a Bronze Age sword is on display in the castle exhibition; this is thought to have been a ritual offering.[20]

(CC) Image: David Friel
Roman soldiers were stationed on the site of the castle centuries before the first stone foundations were laid. Today, occasional Roman infantry re-enactments take place in the castle grounds, such as this one in 2007.

Prior to the establishment of the castle in the twelfth century, a fourth-century Roman signal station stood on the site at the cliff edge. The station was built to warn of approaching hostile vessels, and took advantage of a natural source of fresh water that later became known as the 'Well of Our Lady'.[21] However, there is very little to show that the Roman presence at the headland was anything other than a small company; some pottery has been discovered, but nothing to suggest extensive fortification prior to the mediaeval castle.[22]

The Anglo-Saxons built a chapel on the station site around the year 1000, the remains of which are still visible.[23] This is said to have been destroyed by William the Conqueror's ally Harald Hardrada in 1066[24] - a much later Icelandic poem[25] claims that an early Viking settlement around the harbour was burnt down in 1066 by Hardrada's forces, who reputedly built a large bonfire on the headland to supply burning brands to hurl at the villagers below.[26] This fate of the settlement, if it existed at all, is supported by the fact that Scarborough is not mentioned in the Domesday Book (a survey or census of eleventh-century England). However, there is no archaeological evidence of such an inferno, nor any of the Viking presence; the first clear evidence of the earliest town coincides with the establishment of the surviving stone castle a century later, around 1157-1164. This followed the development of a small settlement around a wooden fortress which the stone castle replaced.[27]

The original wooden castle, 1138-1157

The current ruins of Scarborough Castle were not the first attempt to establish a fortification on the headland. First to indisputably do so was William le Gros, Count of Aumale ('the Fat', died 1179), grand-nephew of William the Conqueror (reigned 1066-1087). A powerful Anglo-Norman baron, William le Gros built a castle following his receipt of the Earldom of York from King Stephen (reigned 1135-1154) in 1138. This was for his victory at the 'Battle of the Standard' that year, when he led a force of Yorkshiremen that repulsed a Scottish invasion.[28] He may also have re-founded the town of 'Scardeburg' itself, though there is little evidence of this. As with other castles, however, there would have been at least a small settlement nearby.[29]

Some information on the establishment of the first castle has survived in the chronicle of William of Newburgh, a monk who in the 1190s wrote about the foundation of the castle. According to him, William le Gros built his fortress of wood, with a palisade wall (i.e. of wooden stakes) on the landward side, and a gate tower at the entrance. This motte and bailey castle subsequently disappeared, with only a small, raised mound (the motte) visible today, in the inner bailey.[30]

The fate of these original fortifications is unclear. Henry II (reigned 1154-1189) ordered all royal castles returned to the Crown,[31] and also had a policy of destroying most of the castles built without royal permission - the so-called 'Adulterine Castles' - that had appeared during Stephen's chaotic reign. Initially, William resisted the call to hand over Scarborough, which he had built on a royal manor, until Henry's forces arrived at York. The wooden castle soon vanished - William of Newburgh, writing near the time, claimed that the structure had decayed through age and the elements, battered beyond repair on the windswept headland.[32] Later interpretations view this as implausible and argue that Henry wanted to stamp his mark on Scarborough, demolishing William's fort and creating a much stronger stone complex.[33]

Building of the stone castle, c.1157-1216

From about 1157,[34] Henry II completely rebuilt the castle, using stone to establish the three-storey keep which survives to this day, and a ditch and palisade wall to protect the inner bailey. Much construction occurred between 1159 and 1169, when the keep was built and a stone wall replaced the palisade division.[35] By the end of Henry's reign in 1189, the grand total of £682, 15 shillings and threepence had been spent on the castle - a fortune at that time - mostly between 1157 and 1164.[36]

While Richard I (reigned 1189-1999) had spent nothing on the castle, King John (reigned 1199-1216) ensured that it was a comfortable residence for himself and his retinue. John's rule was strongly opposed by the northern barons, so the castle at Scarborough also needed to be fortified as a strategic stronghold. John visited the castle four times during his reign, and spent a considerable sum on its defences,[37] including the curtain wall during 1202-1212 on the west and south sides, and a new hall called the 'King's Chambers', later Mosdale Hall.[38] In total, John spent £2,291, three shillings and fourpence on the castle. This included £780 that was mostly earmarked for repairing the keep roof in 1211-1212; John spent more on the castle than any other monarch.[39]

Development and decline, 1216-1311

The barbican today; this gateway was completed in the fourteenth century.

Improvements continued under Henry III (reigned 1216-1272). By this time, Scarborough was a thriving port, and though he never visited the castle,[40] Henry spent a considerable sum on its upkeep. Around 1240-1250, he installed a new barbican, or fortifications for the gateway.[41] It consists of two towers flanking the gateway, with two more towers protecting the approach. These were completed in 1343, and have been much-modified since.[42] At this time, the castle was also a powerful base which an unscrupulous governor could abuse: Geoffrey de Neville, for example, who was governor for 20 years in the thirteenth century, used the garrison to seize port goods. Since governors were not required to reside in the castle, they often pocketed funds rather than use them for repairs.[43] By the mid-to-late thirteenth century, the defences were starting to decay, with floorboards rotten, roof tiles missing and armouries bare of weaponry.[44] Corruption continued among the castle's custodians, who could act with impunity as the castle was outside the jurisdiction of the local borough. In the 1270s, governor William de Percy blocked the main road into Scarborough and imposed illegal tolls.[45]

Despite its decline, in 1265 the castle was still committed to Prince Edward, later Edward I (reigned 1272-1307), and used to hold court in 1275 and 1280. In 1295, Welsh hostages from his campaigns to subjugate Wales were held at the castle.[46] His son Edward II (reigned 1307-1327) also imprisoned some of his Scottish enemies there in 1311.[47]

Piers Gaveston besieged, 1312

Scarborough Castle's next appearance in major English history came in 1312, during the reign of Edward II. By this time, the castle was a major fortification,[48] and had a new bakehouse, brewhouse and kitchens in the inner bailey, installed by Henry de Percy, who occupied the castle from 1308.[49] The castle was therefore thought a natural place for the King's favourite knight, the Gascon Piers Gaveston, to seek sanctuary when pursued by the barons who had imposed the Ordinances of 1311 to curb the King's power, and who now saw Gaveston as a threat to their interests.[50] In April 1312, Edward made Gaveston the governor of Scarborough Castle, but his tenure would be brief; in May, the Earls of Pembroke and Warenne, together with Henry de Percy, besieged and took the castle.[51] Despite its strong defences, it fell quickly due to lack of provisions. Gaveston was promised safe escort from the castle, but on the journey south was captured by the Earl of Warwick and subsequently killed. Scarborough fared little better; Edward would later punish the town for not supporting Gaveston by revoking its royal privileges and placing it under the direct rule of appointed governors.[52]

Further assaults and decay, 1318-1635

The castle was besieged several times in the following centuries, playing its part in rebellions and civil war. During the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), Scarborough was an important port for the wool trade, so was attacked several times. With ongoing rumours of a French invasion, a 1393 inquiry into the state of the castle also led to repairs in 1396 and 1400.[53] Henry VI (reigned 1422-1461; 1470-1471) would also order major repairs over 1424-1429, and Richard III (reigned 1483-1485) was the last monarch to enter its grounds. He resided at the castle in 1484 while forming a fleet to fight the Tudors, a struggle he lost along with his life the following year.[54]

Following assaults by France and Scotland in the early sixteenth century, in 1536 Robert Aske unsuccessfully tried to take the castle during the Pilgrimage of Grace, a revolt against the Dissolution of the Monasteries and Henry VIII's (reigned 1509-1547) break with the Roman Catholic Church.[55] Repairs were made the following year, and in 1538 some of the lead of the towers was used by the keeper, Sir Ralph Eure (Evers), to make a brewing vessel; Eure also reported that some of the walls had fallen down.[56] In 1557, forces loyal to Thomas Wyatt the younger, who opposed Mary I (reigned 1553-1558) and Catholicism, took the castle by entering disguised as peasants. Their leader, Thomas Stafford, held the castle for only three days, and was subsequently executed for high treason on Tower Hill.[57]

The Civil War sieges, 1642-1648

For more information, see: Great Siege of Scarborough Castle.
The entire west wall of the castle's keep, as viewed from the barbican gateway, was destroyed in 1645 by artillery bombardment during the English Civil War.

The English Civil War (1642-1651) saw the town, castle and its strategic supply port on the side of Charles I (reigned 1625-1649), with 700 Royalist soldiers led by Sir Hugh Cholmley - who originally occupied the castle as a Parliamentarian in September 1642, but swapped sides in March 1643.[58] The Parliamentarians saw Scarborough as the most valuable Royalist prize because it was the only port not under their dominion.[59] The castle changed hands seven times between 1642 and 1648,[60] and was refortified on Cholmley's orders, including establishment of the South Steel Battery for artillery.[61]

On 18th February 1645, Sir John Meldrum took the town, cutting off any escape routes by land or sea and delivering the last Royalist port for Parliament.[62] The same day, Cholmley retreated into the castle and refused to give in, so the Parliamentarians prepared for what would be a five-month siege - one of the most bloody of the Civil War, with almost continuous fighting. The Parliamentary forces set up what was then the largest cannon in the country, the Cannon Royal, in the twelfth-century St. Mary's Church below the castle, and proceeded to fire 56-65lb (27kg) cannonballs that pounded the castle's defences.[63] In turn, the church was extensively damaged over the three days of fighting.[64] The bombardment partially destroyed the castle keep, but without the outer walls breached, the Parliamentary forces were unable to take the castle immediately afterwards. There followed a period of particularly bloody hand-to-hand fighting around the barbican gateway; ultimately, Sir John Meldrum was mortally wounded.[65]

By July, however, the tide was turning in the Parliamentarians' favour: bombardment, scurvy, lack of water, perhaps a shortage of gunpowder and the threat of starvation meant that the castle's surrender came on 25th July 1645, with only 25 men fit to fight. Only about half of the original 500 defenders emerged alive.[66] Initially repaired and rearmed for Parliament with a company of 160, the castle returned to Royalist hands when the soldiers went unpaid; Matthew Boynton, its new governor, declared for the King on 27th July 1648.[67] This led to a second siege which brought the castle back under Parliamentary control on 19th December, with the garrison defeated as much by the oncoming winter as by the Parliamentary forces.[68] Parliament gave orders to demolish the castle in 1649 and 1651; the orders were subsequently cancelled and a garrison installed in the castle.[69] The castle was later used as a prison for those deemed enemies of the Commonwealth of England, the country's brief period of republicanism; the shell of the keep survives, minus the west wall, which was destroyed in the bombardment. The castle was returned to the Crown following the restoration of the monarchy.

The later Stuarts and imprisonment of George Fox

PD Image
George Fox, who founded the Quakers, was imprisoned in Scarborough Castle in the seventeenth century.

The castle continued as a prison from the 1650s, with the garrison increased in 1658, and in 1662 it returned to Crown hands.[70] Perhaps its most famous inmate was the founder of the Quakers, George Fox (1624-1691), who was imprisoned there from April 1665 to September 1666 for religious activities viewed as troublesome for Charles II (reigned 1660-1685).[71] The castle soon began to decline again: James II (reigned 1685-1688) did not garrison it, his forces gambling that its defences would be sufficient to resist any Dutch invasion,[72] and after the town was seized for William of Orange during the Glorious Revolution that ousted James, no improvements were made.[73]

The castle refortified, 1745-1815

The eighteenth-century red-brick barracks (centre) are visible from the other side of Scarborough's South Bay.

The Jacobite Rebellion of 1745, part of a series of uprising aimed at restoring the Catholic House of Stuart to the throne, saw the castle refortified with gun batteries and barracks for 120 officers and men by 1746. The keep was pressed into service as a powder magazine, storing gunpowder, and the South Steel Battery was rebuilt. In 1748, the Master Gunner's house was also constructed, which served as accommodation until the early twentieth century and today hosts the exhibition on the castle.[74] The castle saw no action during this time, however. Later still, the threat of French invasion during the Napoleonic Wars led to the permanent establishment of a garrison, which remained until the mid-nineteenth century; French prisoners were also held at the castle during 1796.[75]

The World Wars

During World War I, Scarborough was used for British propaganda purposes following the bombardment of the town by two warships of the German Empire, Derfflinger and Von der Tann, on 16th December 1914. This killed 19 people and also damaged the castle's keep, barracks and curtain walls. The barracks were demolished due to the extensive damage wrought by the bombardment.[76] In World War II, the castle served as a secret listening post.[77]

Development of the castle as a tourist attraction

The second half of the nineteenth century saw the castle emerge as a tourist attraction. Foundations of a mediaeval hall were excavated in 1888,[78] and an 1890 photo shows visitors using the grounds to practice archery.[79] By 1920, the site was sufficiently important to be taken into public ownership by the Ministry of Works. The demolition of the eighteenth-century barracks exposed the mediaeval foundations of Mosdale Hall, which can be seen to this day. In 1984, the castle was placed in the hands of English Heritage, which runs a museum at the site featuring a Bronze Age sword discovered nearby in 1980 (see events and attractions, above).

Footnotes

  1. Walmsley (1998: 4); Binns (1996: 17).
  2. Walmsley (1998: 2).
  3. Page (1923).
  4. Scarborough Archaeological and Historical Society (2003: 12, 14).
  5. Walmsley (1998: 1; 3); Binns (2002: 17).
  6. Page (1923).
  7. Walmsley (1998: 4-5).
  8. English Heritage: 'Step Inside Scarborough Castle'. .pdf document.
  9. Page (1923) reports that the roof must always have been flat, because there are no weather-mouldings.
  10. Page (1923); Walmsley (1998: 4-5).
  11. Walmsley (1998: 3-5); Page (1923).
  12. Page (1923).
  13. Walmsley (1998: 4).
  14. See the English Heritage website 'Events at Scarborough Castle'; examples include a mediaeval joust in 2008, and a 'Wartime Weekend' in 2009, featuring battle re-enactments and RAF fly-bys. See Scarborough Evening News: 'It's joust good fun at Scarborough Castle event as hundreds turned out', 4th August 2008, and 'Return to war years at castle', 21st May 2009.
  15. Marsden, Horlser & Kelleher (2006: 135).
  16. Yorkshire Evening Post: 'A gift to the gods... and a godsend for museum'. 11th May 2005.
  17. Scarborough Evening News: 'THIS WEEK: Master Gunner's House, at Scarborough Castle'. 8th May 2009.
  18. Walmsley (1998: 3).
  19. Scarborough Archaeological and Historical Society (2003: 7, 13). The Society speculates that this structure, if it indeed existed, might have been the "hill-fort bay" mentioned by Ptolemy (c.90-168 AD), the Greco-Roman geographer (p.13).
  20. Yorkshire Evening Post: 'A gift to the gods... and a godsend for museum'. 11th May 2005.
  21. Binns (2002: 17).
  22. Scarborough Archaeological and Historical Society (2003: 12, 14).
  23. Walmsley (1998: 1; 3).
  24. Binns (2002: 17).
  25. Monsen & Smith (1989). Translation of the work of the thirteenth-century Icelander Snorri Sturluson.
  26. Goodall (2000: 22-23).
  27. Scarborough Archaeological and Historical Society (2003: 8).
  28. Binns (2002: 15).
  29. Binns (2002: 14, 18).
  30. Scarborough Archaeological and Historical Society (2003: 12, 14).
  31. Binns (2003: 14; 2002: 18-19).
  32. 'GENUKI: Geographical and Historical information from the year 1890'.
  33. Goodall (2000: 23).
  34. Sources disagree on exactly what year the stone castle was begun. Page (1923) suggests that it might have been in the reign of Stephen, but others, e.g. Walmsley (1998: 1), cite the dates of the first entries on English Treasury documents, the Pipe Rolls, to put forward a date of 1158 for the first foundations being laid. Binns (2002: 19), in a detailed account of Scarborough's history, accepts 1157.
  35. Goodall (2000: 23); Walmsley (1998: 1).
  36. Binns (2002: 19).
  37. Goodall (2000: 24).
  38. Clark (p.181).
  39. Binns (2002: 24).
  40. Binns (2002: 32).
  41. Binns (2002: 28).
  42. Walmsley (1998: 2-3).
  43. Binns (2002: 27).
  44. Goodall (2000: 25).
  45. Binns (2002: 33).
  46. Page (1923).
  47. Walmsley (1998: 2).
  48. Rowntree (1931: 142).
  49. Goodall (2000: 27).
  50. Binns (2003: 35-40).
  51. Page (1923).
  52. Binns (2003: 25; 2002: 38).
  53. Page (1923).
  54. Goodall (2000: 27).
  55. Beattie (1842: 76).
  56. Page (1923).
  57. Walmsley (1998: 2-3); Beattie (1842: 76).
  58. Page (1923).
  59. Binns (1996: 147).
  60. Binns (1996: 73-220); Page (1923).
  61. Binns (1996: 141).
  62. Page (1923).
  63. Goodall (2000: 29-31).
  64. Pope (p.13). Church booklet; St. Mary's with Holy Apostles' Church website: A Brief History of St. Mary's by Stan Pope'; Binns (1996: 165-166); Scarborough Archaeological and Historical Society (2003: 31).
  65. Binns (1996: 153-156).
  66. Binns (1996: 157-165).
  67. Binns (1996: 199).
  68. Binns (1996: 207-212).
  69. Rakoczy (2007: 180).
  70. Page (1923).
  71. Walmsley (1998: 1; 3).
  72. Page (1923).
  73. Goodall (2000: 33).
  74. Walmsley (1998: 1-4).
  75. Walmsley (1998: 3).
  76. Walmsley (1998: 2).
  77. English Heritage: 'The History of Scarborough Castle'.
  78. Page (1923).
  79. Goodall (2000: 34).
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The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order is an influential and controversial book on grand strategy, international relations and world futures, by the late political scientist Samuel Huntington. He does not rigorously define an abstraction of a civilization, but uses examples, although in a Foreign Affairs (magazine)|Foreign Affairs article he called a civilization "the highest cultural grouping and the broadest level of cultural identity short of that which distinguishes humans from other species."

In the book, the chief premise is

that culture and cultural identifies, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration and culture in the post-Cold War world. suggesting that major conflict is likely; "avoidance of a global war of civilization depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics." He bases this on five corollaries to the central theme:

  1. Global politics is multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization (cultural)|modernization is distinct from Westernization
  2. "The balance of power among civilizations is shifting; the West is declining in relative influence"
  3. "A civilization-based world order is emerging; societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful
  4. "The West's universalist pretentions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China"
  5. "The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal"

He rejects globalization as being neither necessary nor desirable.</onlyinclude> He specifically rejects the The End of History and the Last Man|"end of history" model of his student, Francis Fukuyama:

we may be witnessing..the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.[1]

Note that Fukuyama has sometimes been strongly identified with neoconservatism, which has this ideal of liberal democracy, although his position keeps evolving.

Paradigms

He cites several paradigms that came from the Cold War, none of which he finds accurate although the latter two are closest.

  1. One world: euphoria and harmony: This is most often expressed in Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis
  2. Two worlds: Us and Them: There are, however, several binary systems. From the Islamic perspective, there is the Dar al-Islam and the Dar al-Hab. Thomas P. M. Barnett speaks of the "connected core" and everyone else. Orient versus Occident is a classic, if not terribly useful division
  3. 184 States, More or Less: He sees this as the realism (foreign policy)|"realist" model, based on state interest. Perhaps not for 184 states, but there is some of this in Henry Kissinger's balance of power models[2]
  4. Sheer chaos: The advent of weakened and failed states supports this model, for which he cites Zbigniew Brzezinski[3] and Daniel Patrick Moynihan[4]

Instead, he proposes that a workable model groups into seven or eight civilizations takes the best of the models and builds from them. Its assumptions are:[5]

  • "The forces of integration in the world are real and are precisely what are generating counterforces of cultural assertion and civilizational consciousness
  • "The world is in some sense two, but the central distinction is between the West as the hitherto dominant civilization and all the others, which, however, have little if anything in common among them. The world, in short, is divided between a Western one and a non-Western many.
  • "Nation states are and will remain the most important actors in world affairs, but their interests, associations, and conflicts are increasingly shaped by cultural and civilizational factors.
  • "The world is indeed anarchical, rife with tribal and nationality conflicts, but the conflicts that pose the greatest danger for stability are those between states or groups from different civilizations."

The test of a model is that it:[6]

  1. Generalizes, rationally, about reality
  2. Helps understand causality
  3. Anticipates, and sometimes predicts
  4. Separates the important from the unimportant
  5. Shows the roads to be taken to goals

Not all models are useful for all purposes, as he points out the differences between a road map for driving and a chart for air navigation.

Cultures and civilizations

Huntington's basic premise is that a number of great cultures are in unavoidable conflict:

  1. Western: Beginning in AD 700, Huntington says it still has three subcomponents: European, North American, and Latin American. It also includes European-settled countries such as Australia and New Zealand
  2. Latin American: While the civilization has European and North American roots, it has a distinct identity. Huntington's rationale for separating it is its political interactions more than its cultural ones
  3. Islamic: Clearly beginning in the seventh century, while it has an inherent concept of unity (i.e., Dar al Hab and Dar al Islam), there is still strong factionalization into Arab culture|Arab, Turkic culture|Turkic, Persian culture|Persian, Malay culture|Malay and other subcivilizations
  4. Sinic (or Confucian): dating back at least to 1500 BC and perhaps a millennium earlier, Huntington referred to this as Confucian in earlier works but considers Sinic more accurate, to include Vietnamese and Korean civilizations — although Vietnamese and Koreans might have hearty objections
  5. Hindu
  6. Orthodox
  7. Japanese: an offshoot of Sinic, which was recognizable somewhere between 100 and 400 AD.

While it no longer exists, the Soviet Union clearly qualified as a civilization, in conflict with many others, especially Western, as well as exercising proxy conflict through other civilizations.

Huntington observes that a pan-African civilization does not now exist, but may form.

Some of his lists include a Buddhist civilization, but he argues that it is largely extinct in India and has been absorbed in China and Japan. The places where the strongest arguments can be made are Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka and Thailand (Therevada Buddhist subcivilization); Bhutan, Mongolia and Tibet (Lamaist Mahayana Buddhist).[7]He does not include Vietnamese culture as Buddhist.

He observes that there can be common enemies from a third civilization, exemplified, in older civilization, with the Western Allies and Soviet Union versus the mixed-model Axis. The Iran-Iraq War is a conflict within Islamic civilization. #Fault line wars|Fault line wars within a mixed geographic area such as the former Yugoslavia are yet another model for conflict, with the variant of how radicals tend to displace moderates.

The structure of civilizations

Most major civilizations have one or more places that is its cultural center, or core state(s). The number and location may change over time; it has been stable for Japan. The West usually has several cores, which he sees as the United States, a European Franco-German one, and Britain. The civilization may also have a number of member states.

Islam, Latin America and Africa lack core states; this is especially problematic for Islam both in terms of Muslim and non-Muslim societies, as well as conflicts such as Sunni-Shi'a. Africa has the problem of English-speaking and French-speaking backgrounds.

Lone countries are isolated by language, religion, or other factors. He cites Ethiopia as isolated by Amharic language and Coptic orthodoxy. Haiti does not fit with Latin America; although it does have French ties, its Voodoo religion is African. The most important lone country is Japan.

Cleft countries have sufficiently large and distinct groupings as to have separated (e.g., Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia), semi-separated (e.g., Sudan, Tanzania), or have a threat of separatism (e.g., Canada).

Torn countries, have a predominant culture with leaders that want to shift it into a different one, such as Peter the Great in Russia or Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. "Their leaders refer to them as a 'bridge' between two cultures, and observers describe them as Janus-faced."[8]

Universal civilization

Huntington mentions, somewhat dubiously, the modern idea that universal civilization is emerging, citing the novelist V. S. Naipaul.[9] Others make similar arguments, such as his student, Francis Fukuyama, and theorists of modernization, such as Thomas P. M. Barnett.

He describes the assumptions of universal civilization as:

  1. A "thin" minimal morality of things that are right or wrong — which, he says, if true, are not new
  2. The eighteenth century meaning refers to those things that distinguish "civilized" society, such as cities and literacies
  3. It may describe what he calls the Davos|Davos culture, or those values held by key influencers of Western society, shared, outside the west, by 0.1 to 1 percent of the world's population
  4. The spread of Western consumption patters, which he describes as irrelevant: "Somewhere in the Middle East, a half-dozen young men could well be dressed in jeans, listening to rap, and, between their bows to Mecca, putting together a bomb to blow up an American airliner." This universal assumption is also challenged in Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World.

The last point is said to have more merit if applied to global communications than to consumption. While CNN argues it is a world influencer, it reaches 2-4% of the world population. Regional alternatives such as al-Jazeera may well counterbalance it.

Western civilization as modernization

Economic globalization is not strictly equivalent to universal civilization, since one or more civilizations may still be the economic hegemons. Perhaps the strongest argument for the emergence of universal civilization is the emergence, since the eighteenth century, of a modernizing Western civilization, a "third-generation" civilizations with core characteristics:

  1. Classical legacy
  2. European languages
  3. Catholicism and Protestantism
  4. Separation of spiritual and temporal authority
  5. Rule of law
  6. Social pluralism
  7. Representative bodies
  8. Individualism

Further, if there is an emerging universal civilization, it should be moving toward universal language and universal religion. Considerable arguments are made that English is the world's language, but he cites studies showing that there is little evidence that its use as a first language is increasing. He argues, however, that it can be called the worldwide Language of Wider Communication, the means of communications among cultures and civilizations.[10]

In some cases, the use of English in a multilingual country, such as India, is evidence to the desire to maintain identities of multiple civilizations within the nation. The example here is the insistence by non-Hindi speaking peoples to resist the Hinduization pushed by Nehru.

English continues to grow at the university level, but is being displaced on a daily level in a broader pattern of the growth of indigenous language, such as Arabic over French in North Africa, and Urdu over English in Pakistan.

Is there a trend to universal religion? At one extreme, celibate religions do not grow at all. Of the world's major religions, only Christianity and Islam are proselytizing, a requirement for major growth. There is a much higher birth rate among Muslims, so Islam has the edge in growth factors.

Responses to western modernization

Non-western societies have responded to the Western impact by adopting or rejecting, selectively or jointly, modernization and westernization.

  1. Rejectionism: accept neither Westernization nor modernization, such as Japan before the Meiji restoraion. He cites Daniel Pipes as saying that "only the very most extreme [Moslem] fundamentalists rejected modernization as well as Westernization"[11]—yet that is a core of Salafism, clearly driving the Taliban among others. Rejectionists reject both modernization and Westernization.
  2. Kemalism: Embrace both in the context of local culture. Obviously, Harrington uses the model of Kemal Ataturk forcing a new society onto Turkey, but there are other analogies, such as Peter the Great of Russia. Kemalists regard both Westernization and modernization as desirable.
  3. Reformism: isolating the society but adapting the desirable parts, such as the Ch'ing Dynasty motto of "Chinese learning for the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical use." Reformism regards modernization as desirable but Westernization as not.

Fukuyama disputes that Westernization and modernization are distinct.[12]

The nature of dominance

Huntington cites a list from Jeffery Barnett, writing in the U.S. Army War College journal, as explaining how the West establishes its dominance. Barnett described a policy of "exclusion" as replacing containment: when the West wants to influence, it excludes the offending actor from exclude the challenger from "sources of trade, capital, and aid". This is usually in the form of sanctions but could include armed intervention, or sanctions with armed backup.[13]

According to Harrington, the West can do this through:[14]

  • Control of international economics
    • World's largest buyer
    • Control hard currencies
    • Provide the bulk of manufactured goods
  • Have massive military capability, including power projection and sea control
  • Conduct advanced research and education
  • Exert moral influence in certain civilizations and cultures
  • Control space and international communications

Obviously, countries such as China are developing some of these capabilities; Japan is important and part of multiple civilizations.

The Challenger Civilizations

In the realignment of civilizations, there are several ways in which civilizations are challenging dominance. Economic development is the most evident. Religion, especially the Islamic resurgence, is another.

Economic

Huntington speaks of "The Asian Affirmation", where Japan was first thought an anomaly, perhaps a case of Western economics in a non-Western society, the Four Tigers of Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore demonstrated it was not unique. A third wave of economic growth took place in China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, followed by a fourth wave in India, the Philippines, and Vietnam. China and Vietnam produced unique mixtures of market economies under Communist governments.

Development was accelerated. While it took the US and UK 58 and 47 years, respectively, to double their per capita output, Japan did so in 33, Korea in 11, and China in 10.

Within the overall formation of broader civilization groups, economic integration is fastest when there is some cultural commonality, the European Union being most dramatic, but also Latin American groupings such as MERCOSUR and the Central American Common Market.

There are four levels of such integration:[15]

  1. Free trade area (e.g., NAFTA, ASEAN)
  2. Customs union (e.g., MERCOSUR, Andean Pact)
  3. Common market (e.g., early European Union)
  4. Economic union (e.g., European Union in part)

While, in the past, trade patterns follow national boundaries,[16] Huntington says they will follow cultural lines in the future; "businessmen make deals with people they can understand and trust."[17] Bookstores are filled with "doing business with the Japanese" guides, as well as more general guides to intercultural communications in trade.

Religion

While Asian resurgence was economic, he writes Islamic Resurgence in initial capitals, arguing that it is as significant as social changes suchas the Protestant Reformation or American or Russian Revolutions. It is by no means monolithic, as shown by the contrast between fundamentalist Shiism in the 1979 Iranian Revolution versus the Salafist trends under the Taliban.

Hassan al-Turabi also speaks of fundamental reconstruction of society.[18]

Some Muslim societies, such as Saudi Arabia, did not have a significant middle class. As the middle classes have developed, however, they often became the core of the political activists.[19]

Military

At least the realism (foreign policy)|realist model encourages proliferation. He cites the Sinic-Islamic spread of weapons as especially significant. Conflicts such as India-Pakistan and Iran-Israel have produced WMD arms races.

It has been immensely easier to manage military proliferation, as with the general adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, than Western human rights concepts. While the still-fluid agreements on nuclear arms between the US and North Korea might be considered "negotiated surrender", "the capitulation of the United States on human rights issues with China and other Asian power is unconditional surrender."[20]

Human rights

While more than 30 countries, in the 1970s and 1980s, became more democratic and less authoritarian, the most common reason was economic development rather than democracy promotion.

Democracy was also most likely to take place where there were Western, Christian, or both influences, such as Spain and Portugal, the Philippines and Eastern Europe. Orthodox countries, while certainly having a Christian influence, are less likely to democratize, perhaps since many are from the Soviet ex-civilization.

Anticolonialist sentiment often leads to failure of human rights resolution in the UN, some being regarded as "human rights imperialism".

Core state and fault line conflicts

Conflict among civilizations take place at multiple levels. Fault line conflicts are micro-level clashes between groups from different civilizations within the same state, such as the former Yugoslavia. Core state conflicts are between the major states of different civilizations, such as the Cold War.

Transition wars

As opposed to the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War (1978–1992) started as an invasion, but became ethnic and fault line war. Afghanistan was a very special case, the first successful resistance to a foreign power that was based neither on nationalism or socialism, but Islam.[21] At the same time, the Soviets were faced with opposition from groups or civilizations:

  1. American technology
  2. Saudi money
  3. Muslim demographics and zeal

While many argue the "blowback" of that conflict in Afghanistan, it certainly contributed to the establishment of jihadist groups targeting both the "far enemy" of the West, as well as what were seen as corrupt Islamic states, the "near enemy." Ironically, Saddam may well have been more liberal than the House of Saud, and there was much thinking that he might be a bloody tyrant, but he's our bloody tyrant.

The Gulf War, starting with the invasion of Kuwait, did pit Muslim against Muslim, but not in the framework of jihad. Supporting Huntington's arguments, many analyses of ongoing insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to a lesser extent the 1978-1992 war, failed to recognize that the political geography is not based on the Durand Line official boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but on the distribution of the Pashtun people.

Fault line wars

Fault line wars tend to intensify, and moderates, who perhaps would be satisfied with autonomy, are supplanted by radicals for whom nothing short of total independence is enough. In Palestine, Hamas challenged the Palestinian Authority, but in Israel, Kach challenged Likud. In Tajikistan, groups that were initially nationalist-democratic were replaced by jihadists.

It is often the more extreme factions that receive support from the worldwide diaspora. Armenian communities in the United States are politically influential, leading to prohibition of aid to Azerbaijan; Cuban-Americans have blocked any lessening of tension with Castro.

How does such a war stop? The first is exhaustion, when the radicals can no longer generate enough fury. This is apt to lead to a truce, not peace. To get additional stability, third parties are almost always needed.

Safeguarding against war

Huntington thinks that the great civilizations will hang together or hang separately, and embracing multicivilizational society is the best safeguard against the "new barbarism". He sees that barbarism as including transnational mafias, drug cartels, terrorist gangs, and, in some cases, unwise transnational corporations. He warns, however, that the culture of the U.S. and other Western countries involves share princiles of liberty, democracy, individualism, constitutionalism and private property. Some advocates of multiculturalism are separatists who would destroy the shared culture. He asks if Americans are Western or "something else?"

Three rules govern a productive future. Cultural diversity has to be recognized and fundamental divides respected. The West must recognize the Cold War and its bipolarity is gone. New multipolar groupings are needed, such as accepting the Central European states into the Wet, to recognize the uniqueness of Latin American culture and align it with the West so far as is reasonable, to slow the drift of Japan to China, to accept Russia as a core state with legitimate security needs on its southern border, and to recognize that Western intervention is "probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world.:"

The principal international organizations need to change from the Cold War organization. For example, the United Nations Security Council should probably have a seat for each major civilization, possibly rotating from the representatives of civilizations, such as the African Union and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The British and French seats should, in his view, become a European seat.

Reviews

  • Publishers Weekly "...he makes several vital points: modernization does not mean Westernization; economic progress has come with a revival of religion; post-Cold War politics emphasize ethnic nationalism over ideology; the lack of leading "core states" hampers the growth of Latin America and the world of Islam. Most controversial will be Huntington's tough-minded view of Islam. Not only does he point out that Muslim countries are involved in far more intergroup violence than others, he argues that the West should worry not about Islamic fundamentalism but about Islam itself, 'a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.' While Huntington notes that the war in Bosnia hardened into an ethno-religious clash, he downplays the possibility that such splintering could have been avoided. Also, his fear of multiculturalism as a source of American weakness seems unconvincing and alarmist."[22]
  • Fred Halliday, New Statesman (UK): "Of all the broad-sweep books on the post-cold war world Huntington's is without doubt the worst and the most pernicious. It is the worst because it is careless with facts, ignorant of history and indifferent to the whole range of social theory that has, with due care, looked at such issues as culture, socialisation and tradition. . . . For a book that claims to be about different civilisations, it is striking that all the references are to books in English. Huntington is pernicious because he fuels myths about cultural conflict, and reinforces those who seek to consolidate relativist, community-based authority."[23]
  • William McNeill, New York Review of Books: I agree with Huntington when he argues that the commitments to particular patterns of civilization and particular religious identities are rapidly gaining importance in international affairs. But I disagree with the conclusions he draws; for it seems to me that increasing connections among civilizations simultaneously sustain a contrary trend toward global cosmopolitanism. This trend, in my view, offers by far the best hope for the future, and is therefore very much worth fostering, as the universalist strand in American foreign policy, perhaps naively, tends to do.[23]
  • Richard Bernstein, New York Times: "...one of those books so sweeping in its effort to incorporate a vast panorama into a single concept that it almost challenges you to poke holes in it...'The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.'...The rest, as they say, is commentary: in Mr. Huntington's case, commentary of an erudite and closely reasoned sort. This does not mean that he is always convincing...he seems to be taking aim at Francis Fukuyama, whose notion about the end of history was a provocative attempt to make general sense of the confusing plethora of events. Mr. Fukuyama posited that the Western liberal-democratic idea had triumphed globally, and there was no place else for humankind to go."[24]
  • Francis Fukuyama, American Interest (magazine)|American Interest: "Sam, in my view, underrated the universalism of the appeal of living in modern, free societies with accountable governments. His argument rests heavily on the view that modernization and Westernization are two completely separate processes, something which I rather doubt. The gloomy picture he paints of a world riven by cultural conflict is one favored by the Islamists and Russian nationalists, but is less helpful in explaining contemporary China or India, or indeed in explaining the motives of people in the Muslim world or Russia who are not Islamists or nationalists. Nation-states and not civilizations remain the primary actors in world politics, and they are motivated by a host of interests and incentives that often override inherited cultural predispositions."[12]
  • Michael Ignatieff, The New York Times Book Review: "Mr. Huntington never clearly specifies when the right to cultural difference -- which is what the United States is surely all about -- shades into moral decline. He is deeply unclear about what conditions of cultural coherence and consensus are actually compatible with the convulsive changes that accompany modern life. His ruling assumptions are profoundly conservative and static...The Huntington argument that the West should stop intervening in civilizational conflicts it doesn't understand makes a powerful claim that internationalists cannot easily ignore. The question is whether there remain certain human interests that all civilizations had better endorse for our common survival. Genocide is genocide, famine is famine, and a world where civilizations no longer intervene to save strangers from these universal threats is one that not even Samuel P. Huntington would feel safe in."[25]
  • Wang Gungwu, National Interest (magazine)|National Interest: "The book rests on two very solid pillars. The first - hardly a revelation but well worth the emphasis it is given - is that the balance of power is shifting from the West to Asia, and that China's economic power and the demographic growth of Muslim peoples together create a formidable challenge to the existing international system. The second is that, today, identity and community are on the rise as mobilizing themes in comparison to political and economic ideologies; that ascriptive, particularly ethnic, affiliations are on the rise compared to functional ones; and that religion and nostalgia for the past seem to prevail over belief in science, progress, or utopian revolution...Where he seems to me to go deeply wrong is in fixing these phenomena on the primacy of one permanent factor, namely civilizations, interpreted essentially in terms of religion. Worse perhaps, Huntington assumes the closed and conflictual character of these entities as he tries to fit every conflict in the world into his scheme. And last but not least, he bases his prescriptions for Western policies on what amounts to a global segregationist scheme that negates the West's basic concepts and aspirations, and that ignores several of the imposing realities of modern society."[26]
  • Glenn Perry, Arab Studies Quarterly: "Drawing fire particularly from many who--incorrectly, as I argue--interpret him as inciting intercivilizational conflict, particularly between the West and Islam, Huntington's thesis has inspired a clash among wielders of pens, if not swords." Some reviewers suggest he is replacing the Cold War fear of the Red Menace with a new fear of an Islamic Green Menace. "There has been a tendency for enlightened scholars to strike back at his thesis as the main incarnation of such bias."[27]
  • Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (quoted by Perry): " ...a rehash of a century-old myth that under girded European hegemonic policies justifying wars of colonial expansion and missionary crusades during the nineteenth century under the rubric of 'civilizational mission,' 'white man's burden,' or Manifest Destiny. It posited the superiority of European man, the acme of human civilization, who willingly assumes the burden of sharing his values and achievements with the rest of the backward world. In the process, this myth justified the ransacking of the cultures of the conquered people and confining Muslim achievements to ethnological museums or the dustbin of history."

References

  1. Francis Fukuyama (Summer 1989), "The End of History", The National Interest 16 (4), p. 18
  2. Henry Kissinger, A World Restored
  3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1993: Out of Control
  4. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandemonium
  5. p. 36
  6. p. 30
  7. pp. 47-48
  8. pp. 138-139
  9. V. S. Naipaul (30 October 1990), Wriston Lecture: Our Universal Civilization, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research
  10. Joshua A. Fishman, "The Spread of English as a New Perspective for the Study of Language Maintenance and Language Shift," in Fishman, Cooper & Conrad: The Spread of English: The Sociology of English as an Additional Language, Newbury House, 1977, p. 108ff, quoted on p. 60
  11. Daniel Pipes, Path of God, pp. 197-197, quoted on p. 74
  12. 12.0 12.1 Francis Fukuyama (29 December 2008), "Samuel Huntington, 1927-2008", American Interest
  13. Jeffery R. Barnett (Spring 1994), "Exclusion as National Security Policy", Parameters: 51-65
  14. pp. 81-82
  15. p. 131
  16. Gowa, Joanne; Edward Mansfield (1993), "Power politics and international trade. (prisoner's dilemma representation)", American Political Science Review. Retrieved on August 13, 2009
  17. p. 135
  18. Hassan al-Turabi (Winter 2002), Summer 1994 interview by Nathan Gardels, ed., "The Islamic Awakening's Second Wave", New Perspectives Quarterly
  19. p. 113
  20. p. 194
  21. David C. Rapoport, "Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Groups, in Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies and Militance, University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 445, quoted on p. 247
  22. Editorial Reviews, The Clash Of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Amazon.com
  23. 23.0 23.1 Book Summary and Media Reviews, The Clash Of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Bookbrowse.com
  24. Richard Bernstein (6 November 1996), "A Scholar's Prophecy: Global Cultural Conflict", New York Times
  25. Michael Ignatieff (1 December 1996), "Fault Lines", New York Times
  26. Wang Gungwu (Winter, 1996), "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order", National Interest
  27. Glenn E. Perry (Winter 2002), "Huntington and his critics: the West and Islam", Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)

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