Pakistani Security Forces: Difference between revisions
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz (New page: '''Pakistan's security forces''' are composed of a regular military, a paramilitary Frontier Corps, Inter-Services Intelligence, and police organizations. The structure reflects a ...) |
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz |
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| author = [[Central Intelligence Agency]] | | author = [[Central Intelligence Agency]] | ||
| url = https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html}}</ref> | | url = https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html}}</ref> | ||
===Regular military=== | |||
===Counterinsurgency=== | |||
Counterinsurgency strategists, who think in population-centric rather than enemy-centric terms, are looking at strengthening the Pakistani security forces to operate in a more effective way. This hardly represents a consensus within the Pakistani government, when President [[Asif Ali Zardari]] said, in May 2009, Pakistan needed to develop its capabilities and required more military aid,<ref>{{citation | |||
| title = War to be extended beyond Swat, says Zardari | |||
| date = May 18, 2009 | |||
| journal = The News (Pakistan) | |||
| url - http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=22190}}</ref>. Also in May, Pakistani Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani said "[E]xcept for very specialized weapons and equipment and [advanced] technology, no generalized foreign training is required," <ref name=>{{citation | |||
| date = May 17, 2009 | |||
| journal = Daily Times (Pakistan) | |||
| title = Counter-insurgency training facilities developed: Kayani | |||
| url = http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\17\story_17-5-2009_pg1_2 | |||
}}</ref> and outside input would be counterproductive. | |||
This is a major conflict for U.S. policymakers. [[C. Christine Fair]] of the [[RAND Corporation]] said "Pakistan's army does not want to become a counterinsurgency force." <ref name=CFR2009-06-18>{{citation | |||
| title = Realigning Pakistan's Security Forces | |||
| Author = Jayshree Bajoria | |||
| date = June 18, 2009 | |||
| publisher = [[Council on Foreign Relations]] | |||
| url = http://www.cfr.org/publication/19660/realigning_pakistans_security_forces.html}}</ref> | |||
<ref name=Fair2009-05-05>{{citation | <ref name=Fair2009-05-05>{{citation | ||
| title = From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship | | title = From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship | ||
| Line 18: | Line 35: | ||
| date = May 5, 2009 | | date = May 5, 2009 | ||
}}</ref> | }}</ref> | ||
==Police== | ==Police== | ||
<ref name=ISPU>{{citation | <ref name=ISPU>{{citation | ||
Revision as of 20:42, 12 August 2009
Pakistan's security forces are composed of a regular military, a paramilitary Frontier Corps, Inter-Services Intelligence, and police organizations. The structure reflects a concern with very different threats: major conventional and potentially nuclear warfare with India, guerilla movements in disputed or tribal territories, and counterterrorism in the main provinces of the country.
Regular military
The conventional forces comprise an Army (includes National Guard), Navy (includes Marines and Maritime Security Agency), and Pakistan Air Force (Pakistan Fiza'ya). UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) has maintained a small group of peacekeepers since 1949; India does not recognize Pakistan's ceding historic Kashmir lands to China in 1964; India and Pakistan have maintained their 2004 cease fire in Kashmir and initiated discussions on defusing the armed stand-off in the Siachen glacier region; [1]
Regular military
Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency strategists, who think in population-centric rather than enemy-centric terms, are looking at strengthening the Pakistani security forces to operate in a more effective way. This hardly represents a consensus within the Pakistani government, when President Asif Ali Zardari said, in May 2009, Pakistan needed to develop its capabilities and required more military aid,[2]. Also in May, Pakistani Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani said "[E]xcept for very specialized weapons and equipment and [advanced] technology, no generalized foreign training is required," [3] and outside input would be counterproductive.
This is a major conflict for U.S. policymakers. C. Christine Fair of the RAND Corporation said "Pakistan's army does not want to become a counterinsurgency force." [4] [5]
Police
References
- ↑ Central Intelligence Agency, Pakistan, Military, The World Factbook
- ↑ "War to be extended beyond Swat, says Zardari", The News (Pakistan), May 18, 2009
- ↑ "Counter-insurgency training facilities developed: Kayani", Daily Times (Pakistan), May 17, 2009
- ↑ Realigning Pakistan's Security Forces, Council on Foreign Relations, June 18, 2009
- ↑ C. Christine Fair (May 5, 2009), From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship, House Foreign Affairs Committee, CT-330
- ↑ Hassan Abbas (April, 2009), ISPU: Police and Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding