Battle of Leyte Gulf: Difference between revisions

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[[Image:Leyte Actual Japanese OOB.png|right|300px|thumb|Japanese order of battle]]
[[Image:Leyte Actual Japanese OOB.png|right|300px|thumb|Japanese order of battle]]
===Concept of operations===
===Concept of operations===
At first, the Japanese concept of Operation SHO-GO sought the Mahanian "decisive battle" of major fleet units.
===Command structure===
===Command structure===
====Mobile Fleet====
====Mobile Fleet====

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The Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 23-26, 1944, was the largest naval battle in world history, in terms of total combatant personnel and firepower. It was fought in the seas around and to the east of the Philippine Islands between the Japanese Imperial Navy and Allied naval forces. The bulk of naval combat took place after the initial troop landings on the island of Leyte.

Both sides suffered from divided command. The only joint commanders were in Washington and Tokyo.

American situation

U.S. Pacific strategy derived from Joint Chiefs of Staff decisions at the Cairo Conference (1943), to obtain "bases from which the unconditional surrender of Japan can be forced."[1] There was, however, little clarity and much argument among the JCS and the two theater commanders, Douglas MacArthur for the Southwest Pacific Area and Chester Nimitz for the [Central] Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas. JCS guidance to Nimitz and MacArthur, dated 12 March 1944, reflected what was to become an obsolete concept: "The JCS has decided that the most feasible approach to Formosa, Luzon and China is by way of the Marianas, Luzon and China."

Events were to make Formosa, Luzon and China infeasible as the final bases for attacks on the Japanese home islands.

Concept of operations

MacArthur had a deep emotional bond to the Phillipines, and both believed the honor of the United States required their liberation and that such an approach was strategically sound.

Command structure

U.S. units involved in naval combat

United States Third Fleet under Admiral William Halsey reported to Admiral Chester Nimitz, and had the roles of defeating the major Japanese fleet and taking the islands of the Central Pacific. To increase the tempo of operations, the same ships were Third Fleet when under Halsey and his staff, and Fifth Fleet when under Admiral Raymond Spruance. Spruance and Halsey, without friction, alternated in planning and executing operations.

The Joint Chiefs in Washington had never been able to agree on a single commander for the Pacific. Nevertheless, the Third and Seventh Fleets were standing organizations that had reasonable internal communications.

Seventh Fleet mission

Under MacArthur, the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid (commander, Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area) had the mission of landing and supporting the landing force. [2]

Third Fleet mission

There was much more ambiguity in the mission of Vice Admiral William Halsey's Third Fleet.

Japanese situation

As with the U.S. forces, the only common command was at the national capital. Admiral Soemu Toyoda directed a number of units, which had extremely poor coordination — even rivalry — with one another.

Japanese order of battle

Concept of operations

At first, the Japanese concept of Operation SHO-GO sought the Mahanian "decisive battle" of major fleet units.

Command structure

Mobile Fleet

First Striking Force

Second Striking Force mission

Land-based aviation

Submarines

The battle

By the time landings had started, the most crucial Japanese objective was to attack the transports and other Seventh Fleet ships. They planned a two-pronged attack, through Surigao Strait and through San Bernadino Strait; the latter passes Samar. Their main body was Kurita's Force A within the First Striking Force. Two uncoordinated forces were to try to approach through Surigao Strait, Nishimura's Force C and Shima's Second Striking Force. Meanwhile, Ozawa was to continue acting as a decoy to divert Third Fleet away from the Japanese attack forces.

Leyte-map1.jpg

Japanese scouting

American forces shot down a Japanese scout plane on the 20th. Unknown to the U.S., it was looking for kamikaze targets, but probably due to poor communications, the Japanese did not start coordinated kamikaze operations. They managed a single attack on the 21st, damaging the cruiser HMAS Australia.[3]

The Fight in Palawan Passage

On 23 October, Japanese Center Force was sighted by U.S. patrol submarines, USS Darter and USS Dace, in Palawan Passage. After reporting it to higher headquarters, USS Darter and USS Dace torpedoed three heavy cruisers, sinking two and damaging a third such that it had no additional role in the war. The first, IJN Atago, was Admiral Kurita's flagship; Rear Admiral Ugaki took temporary command until Kurita was rescued by a destroyer, [4]

This was the first of several shocks to Kurita, which may have affected his later judgment. It was also a key intelligence datum to the U.S. command.

Battle of the Sibuyan Sea

Vice Admiral Willis Lee was Commander, Battleships, Pacific Fleet, and wore the "second hat" of commanding Task Force 34 (battleships) of Third Fleet. TF 34, however, never operated independently; Lee's reports collated information from battleships and other heavy surface combatants operating with the fast carrier groups. They reported finding a Japanese force on the morning of the 24th.[5]

In this action, Third Fleet indeed sank the superbattleship IJN Musashi.

Battle of Surigao Strait

For more information, see: Battle of Surigao Strait.

Equipped with superb optics, the Japanese began the war ruling night action. The Allied development of radar, however, neutralized this advantage, but the Japanese often still preferred stealth by night.

Action off Samar

For more information, see: Action off Samar.

Sometimes called the Battle of San Bernadino Strait, the Action off Samar describes the improvised and successful American defense against Kurita's Force A, which was attempting to break into Leyte Gulf. While his Force A had lost combat power in the preliminaries and the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, it was still an immensely powerful gunfire force that could devastate the transports and support vessels in Leyte Gulf.

Organized Kamikaze operations

Battle of Cape Engano

Outcome

In the greatest and most complex naval battle ever fought, half the Japanese Navy went to the bottom; US losses were light, and the troops on the beaches were untouched. Of the 282 warships engaged (216 American, 2 Australian, and 64 Japanese), the Japanese lost 4 carriers, 3 battleships, 10 cruisers, and 11 destroyers. American losses totaled one light carrier, two escort carriers, and three destroyers.

Halsey always defended his decision to abandon Leyte; its defense was Kinkaid's job and his mission was strategic. The overwhelming weight of opinion has been that Ozawa outfoxed Halsey, who clung too tenaciously to his carrier doctrine, and who failed to gather and act on the information that was available to him. Halsey's blunder might have cost tens of thousands of lives, or at least delayed the invasion of the Philippines for months, but his luck made him the victor in the biggest naval battle of all time.

Although the Japanese came surprising close to inflicting a major defeat on the Americans, at the last minute the tide turned and the U.S. Navy sank virtually all of Japan's naval power. Part of World War II in the Pacific it involved a complex overlapping series of engagements fought off the Philippine island of Leyte, which the U.S. Army had just invaded. The army forces were highly vulnerable to naval attack, and the Japanese goal was to inflict massive destruction on them. Two American fleets were involved, the Seventh and Third, but they were independent and did not communicate well. The Japanese communication system was even worse, and the Japanese army and navy did not cooperate.

References

  1. Samuel Eliot Morison (1970), History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. Volume XII: Leyte, June 1944-January 1945, Atlantic Monthly/Little, Brown, p. 4
  2. MUSKETEER/KING V CANF SWPA - OPERATION PLAN 13-44, U.S. Navy, 26 December 1944
  3. Edward P. Hoyt (1983), The Kamikazes, Burford Books, ISBN 1580800319, pp. 59-64
  4. Morison, pp. 169-174
  5. Willis Lee (14 December 1944), Report of Operations of Task Force THIRTY-FOUR During the Period 6 October 1944 to 3 December 1944., U.S. Navy