Vietnamese Communist grand strategy: Difference between revisions
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz (New page: '''Vietnamese Communist grand strategy''' certainly is related to that of Mao Zedong, but diverged considerably from his classical three-phase model. In addition, they came up with a p...) |
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==Background: the Maoist model== | ==Background: the Maoist model== | ||
[[Mao Zedong]] developed a model of "protracted war" that has been the model for the phases many revolutionary movements:<ref name=MaoProtracted>{{citation | |||
| url = http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/PW38.html | |||
| author = Mao Tse-tung | |||
| title = On Protracted War | |||
| work = Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung | |||
| publisher = Foreign Languages Press | |||
| year = 1967 | |||
}}</ref> | |||
#Covert guerilla | |||
#Guerilla | |||
#Conventional warfare | |||
In a purely military context, [[Vo Nguyen Giap]] called these "defensive, equilibrium, and offensive". North Vietnamese grand strategy, however, evolved another path, especially in changing the third stage from conventional military victory to a victory in a political, diplomatic, or psychological context. While the final victory ending the 1954 war was at the diplomatic table in Geneva, a good deal of conventional warfare led to the table, especially the French defeat at [[Dien Bien Phu]]. | |||
Between 1959 and 1965, if not 1972, the Vietnamese politburo changed methods. They went back to something close to Mao's third stage in 1972-1975. Against Cambodia, however, they themselves came closer to their model of western behavior. Against China, yet another model might apply, far closer to a Western model of limited war. | |||
==Contrast: the model of western behavior== | ==Contrast: the model of western behavior== | ||
*Special war | *Special war | ||
*Local war | *Local war | ||
*? | *? | ||
<ref name=Duiker1993>{{citation | |||
| title = The Vietnam War: American and Vietnamese Perspective | |||
| editor = Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh | |||
| publisher = M.E. Sharpe | year = 1993 | |||
| author = William Duiker | |||
| id = Duiker1993 | |||
| contribution = Waging Revolutionary War: The Evolution of Hanoi's Strategy in the South, 1959-1965}}, p. 64</ref> | |||
==First evolution: General Offensive-General Uprising== | ==First evolution: General Offensive-General Uprising== | ||
==Second evolution: adapting to the conventional== | ==Second evolution: adapting to the conventional== |
Revision as of 10:03, 2 January 2009
Vietnamese Communist grand strategy certainly is related to that of Mao Zedong, but diverged considerably from his classical three-phase model. In addition, they came up with a phased model of their enemy's behavior, and then tested their theories against it. Since they now control Vietnam, that does suggest that they eventually came up with a viable model.
Countering that argument, however, is the reality that they apparently expected a fairly quick resolution when they invaded Cambodia in 1978, and found themselves enmeshed in 13 years of war. When the press started referring to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the "Soviets' Vietnam", cynics have called the invasion of Cambodia "Vietnam's Vietnam".
Background: the Maoist model
Mao Zedong developed a model of "protracted war" that has been the model for the phases many revolutionary movements:[1]
- Covert guerilla
- Guerilla
- Conventional warfare
In a purely military context, Vo Nguyen Giap called these "defensive, equilibrium, and offensive". North Vietnamese grand strategy, however, evolved another path, especially in changing the third stage from conventional military victory to a victory in a political, diplomatic, or psychological context. While the final victory ending the 1954 war was at the diplomatic table in Geneva, a good deal of conventional warfare led to the table, especially the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
Between 1959 and 1965, if not 1972, the Vietnamese politburo changed methods. They went back to something close to Mao's third stage in 1972-1975. Against Cambodia, however, they themselves came closer to their model of western behavior. Against China, yet another model might apply, far closer to a Western model of limited war.
Contrast: the model of western behavior
- Special war
- Local war
- ?
First evolution: General Offensive-General Uprising
Second evolution: adapting to the conventional
- ↑ Mao Tse-tung (1967), On Protracted War, Foreign Languages Press
- ↑ William Duiker (1993), Waging Revolutionary War: The Evolution of Hanoi's Strategy in the South, 1959-1965, in Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, The Vietnam War: American and Vietnamese Perspective, M.E. Sharpe, Duiker1993, p. 64