Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency: Difference between revisions
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'''''Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (FM3-24)''''' (Marine Corps designation '''MCWP 33.3.5''' is the principal | '''''Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (FM3-24)''''' (Marine Corps designation '''MCWP 33.3.5''' is the principal counterinsurgency doctrinal manual of the [[U.S. Army]] and [[United States Marine Corps|U.S. Marine Corps]]. <ref name = FM3-24>{{citation | publisher = US Department of the Army | ||
|author = [[John Nagl]], [[David Petraeus]], [[James Amos]], [[Sarah Sewall]] | |author = [[John Nagl]], [[David Petraeus]], [[James Amos]], [[Sarah Sewall]] | ||
| title = Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency | | title = Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency | ||
| date = December 2006 | | date = December 2006 | ||
| url = http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf | | url = http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf | ||
}} </ref> proposes a structure that includes both ''insurgency'' and '' | }} </ref> proposes a structure that includes both ''insurgency'' and ''counterinsurgency'' (COIN). While military manuals rarely show individual authors, generals [[David Petraeus]] (U.S. Army) and [[James Amos]] (U.S. Marine Corps) are widely described as establishing many of this volume's concepts; other team members included [[John Nagl]] and [[Sarah Sewall]]. Sewall is a specialist in [[peace operations]] and brought a contrarian view. | ||
It has become as dominant as was [[Field Manual 3-0: Operations]], which codified the "maneuvrist", network-centric doctrines for conventional warfare. In principle, both capabilities are necessary, but some critics, such as [[Gian Gentile]], have suggested that the Army, specifically, is letting conventional capabilities lapse in favor of counterinsurgency.<ref name=AFJ>{{citation | It has become as dominant as was [[Field Manual 3-0: Operations]], which codified the "maneuvrist", network-centric doctrines for conventional warfare. In principle, both capabilities are necessary, but some critics, such as [[Gian Gentile]], have suggested that the Army, specifically, is letting conventional capabilities lapse in favor of counterinsurgency.<ref name=AFJ>{{citation |
Latest revision as of 14:04, 12 May 2024
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Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (FM3-24) (Marine Corps designation MCWP 33.3.5 is the principal counterinsurgency doctrinal manual of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. [1] proposes a structure that includes both insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN). While military manuals rarely show individual authors, generals David Petraeus (U.S. Army) and James Amos (U.S. Marine Corps) are widely described as establishing many of this volume's concepts; other team members included John Nagl and Sarah Sewall. Sewall is a specialist in peace operations and brought a contrarian view. It has become as dominant as was Field Manual 3-0: Operations, which codified the "maneuvrist", network-centric doctrines for conventional warfare. In principle, both capabilities are necessary, but some critics, such as Gian Gentile, have suggested that the Army, specifically, is letting conventional capabilities lapse in favor of counterinsurgency.[2] Organization
EvolutionEven supporters of the doctrine suggest the manual is a guideline rather than a rigid set of instructions; while there may indeed be counterinsurgency operations in the Afghanistan War (2001-2021) and the Iraq War, experience has taught that the two insurgencies are different and need different handling. There are continuing professional discussions about its interpretation and areas for improvement.[3] References
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