Sokichi Takagi

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Sokichi Takagi was a Rear Admiral of the Imperial Japanese Navy, principally a staff officer and research analyst, whose studies, as early as February 1944, projected a poor outcome for Japan in World War Two in the Pacific.

Japanese analysis of war trends

He led a Naval General staff study group that raised misgivings about the outcome of the war in February 1944. [1]

In September 1944, Navy Minister Mitsumasu Yonai, to whom he was a close adviser, assigned him to a broad-ranging staff post in the Navy Ministry, not dealing with the lessons of battle but how to extricate Japan from the war. [2]In

Impact of nuclear attacks

As Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff late in the war, his diary is quoted as a source of senior-level thought on the progress of the war. One excerpt has been used as evidence that the nuclear attacks on Japan were not the first issue on the mind of the peace faction. The entry for [3] August 8, two days after the Hiroshima attack, he made notes on a talk with Navy Minister Mitsumasu Yonai. Yonai's first priority in the discussion was Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki's failure to understand the domestic situation, particularly the danger of an uprising, probably Communist. Yonai and some others in the peace faction had been urging an end to the war because they greatly feared Communism. Takagi agreed with Yonai: “In my opinion, someone like the Interior Minister should have a straight talk with the Prime Minister about domestic conditions...I used to think that by September or October the domestic situation would rapidly deteriorate while you said it would start deteriorating in mid-August. Actually, the situation is getting steadily worse in many respects during these couple of days, especially after Hiroshima.” Note that Hiroshima is a qualifier to the main point, not a fundamental decision point.

Yonai agreed, and returned to a domestic economic issue. “Bad news continues and the ration of rice in Tokyo will be reduced by ten percent after [the] 11th of this month.”[4]

Their discussion then turned to the next day's meeting of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War, who might be influencing the Emperor, and concern about the lack of positive response from the Soviet Union.

Career

According to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, events in his career were:[5]

  • 1893 -- Born, Kumamoto, Kyushu.
  • 1915 -- Graduate, Naval Academy.
  • 1928 -- Went to France to study.
  • 1930 -- Assistant Adjutant and Chief Secretary to the Navy Minister.
  • 1933 -- Instructor in Naval War College
  • -- Commander.
  • 1936 -- Member, Naval General Affairs Bureau, and research staff of same.
  • 1937 -- Chief of research section, Naval General Affairs Bureau.
  • -- Captain.
  • 1939 -- Instructor of Naval Administration at the Naval War College.
  • 1940 -- Once more Chief of research section of the Naval General Affairs Bureau; attached to the Ministerial Secretariat.
  • Jun 1942 -- Chief of Staff, Maizuru Naval Station.
  • 1943 -- Attached to Naval General Headquarters.
  • -- Rear admiral.
  • Mar 1944 -- Chief, Education Bureau, Navy Ministry.
  • Sep 1944 -- Again attached to Navy General Headquarters.
  • 15 Sep 1945 -- Retired.

References

  1. Merion and Susie Harris (1991), Soldiers of the Sun: the Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army, Random House, p. 451
  2. Robert Joseph Charles Butow (1954), Japan's decision to surrender, Stanford University Press, p. 38
  3. Ward Wilson (Spring 2007), "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima", International Security 31 (4): 162–179
  4. Full text in "Diary of Takagi Sokichi for Wednesday, August 8, 1945", quoted in Burr, The Atomic Bomb at the End of World War II, doc. 55.
  5. Chairman's Office (1 July 1946), Japan's Struggle to End the War, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, p. 33