User talk:Thomas Wright Sulcer/sandbox

Tom, this should be User: Thomas Wright Sulcer/Sandbox, which lets the discussion be in User Talk: Thomas Wright Sulcer/Sandbox

Howard, yeah I think you're right, but I put it here following the WP guidelines about sandboxes. So there's no place for a talk page. How about we put the talk up here at the top of the page? But I'm working on other stuff now. Howard, do with this material whatever you want -- if you want to put it into an article, or chop it up, or whatever, be my guest. You know how the terrorism articles work better than I do.--Thomas Wright Sulcer 02:40, 12 March 2010 (UTC)

Howard let's float this article -- please post it and choose a title although I think the current title isn't so bad. --Thomas Wright Sulcer 10:40, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

Tentative article title: Terrorism prevention strategies

Terrorism prevention strategies are means to discourage, prevent, and interrupt violence. There is strong consensus that prevention is more important than fighting terrorism for the overall purpose of safety.

A key is correctly identifying terrorists as terrorists. When correct, preventing terrorism is straightforward. But when authorities can't make this identification, and guess incorrectly, non-terrorists are treated as terrorists, and a slew of new problems arise regarding civil liberties as well as angering the public, lawsuits, possibly causing future terrorism, causing more "friction" within the system as the term was used by expert Brian Michael Jenkins, and weakening chances for future cooperation. For instance, inability to monitor only terrorists' phone calls means that agents must listen in on the private calls of law-abiding citizens, which violates privacy; this can lead to lawsuits as well as reluctance by phone companies to cooperate with authorities, and can result in battles in legislatures whether to grant immunity from lawsuits to phone companies. It can lead to a general perception by the public that government is eavesdropping on all phone calls whether this happens or not. Government must spend huge resources when it can not identify who the terrorists are, what they're planning, and what their likely targets will be, and can lead to sharp criticism from reporters. Megan McArdle of The Atlantic wrote after a terrorist sneaked a bomb on a plane in 2009: "Every time they miss something, we have to give up more liberty." If authorities can't figure out which potential airplane passengers are terrorists, then they have to frisk all passengers.

But the opposite effect can happen as well. Sometimes authorities are so protective of civil liberties that it interferes with their ability to prevent terrorism. Thomas Kean of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States said "I'm concerned about civil liberties as an excuse for not taking action to prevent terrorism." Kean described how FBI officers were afraid to get a search warrant to inspect the laptop computer of captured would-be 9/11 hijacker Zacharias Moussaoui because authorities felt they lacked probable cause.

While some senses of the word terrorism encompass war, the term terrorism in this discussion will be limited to a more widely accepted sense of terrorism as acts by non-state actors. While some definitions include civil war since the slaughter meets criteria such as being intentional, politically motivated, and perpetrated by non-state groups, this article will focus on a more widely accepted conception of terrorism.

Nature of the problem

The most serious problem involves weapons of mass destruction. While the danger of a nuclear bomb getting into the hands of terrorists remains a serious threat, there are indications that nations have done a fairly good job of locking up stockpiles of dangerous weapons and components. It's conceivable that in the future, however, a government could give terrorists a nuclear bomb for a disruptive purpose, or that terrorists could buy or steal nuclear weapons. A growing danger was biological terrorism.

The risk that a truck laden with anthrax moves through a heavily populated city may cause thousands of deaths, although a truck-based attempt by Aum Shinryo failed, for a variety of technical errors, to produce a single casualty in Tokyo. Similarly, the dangers from an outbreak of smallpox could kill millions of people if the infection spreads rapidly. One report from the White House suggested the risk of biological terrorism was unpredictable, dangerous, and evolving rapidly, as new capabilities kept growing in "unpredictable ways" while technical barriers fall and monetary costs decline.

Further, there is an imbalance regarding the perception of a favorable outcome. Commission head Thomas Kean said: "it has been said that the intelligence agencies have to be right 100 percent of the time and the terrorists only have to get lucky once." Particularly regarding serious terrorism, there's a perceived imbalance in favor of the terrorists, since, according to a common view, terrorists can afford to make mistakes, get caught, but if a few of them succeed in pulling off a big attack, then terrorists are viewed as winning the war. As weapons and technology converge to increase the destructive potential of huge weapons, it only takes one slip up for huge loss of life to happen.

But the prospect of overreacting looms at many points. Since authorities generally have huge resources and much greater military might in terms of well-equipped police forces and paramilitary squads, there is a chance that authorities will over-react, possibly pushed by fear and adrenaline, and may kill innocents in an effort to try to kill terrorists. The 9/11 commission speculated that "an indiscriminate massive response could be portrayed by them as an assault on Islam and might provoke a huge backlash that would also advantage al Qaeda." There is some speculation that terrorists deliberately try to provoke authorities into over-reacting. There is also a huge risk of over-reacting financially, of failing to prioritize prevention methods, and spending recklessly out of fear. The 9/11 Commission reckoned that out-of-control spending on security measures would wreak huge costs on state and local governments.

Terrorism keeps evolving. As authorities block or deter certain types of attacks, terrorists evolve new ones. Counter-terrorism needs to continually evolve as well. Critics have charged that authorities are too focused on the last attack and that they don't think creatively enough; for example, Megan McArdle of The Atlantic described the TSA rules as "moronic". She wrote: "The TSA's obsession with fighting the last war is so strong that I expect any day to see them building wooden forts at our nation's airports in order to keep the redcoats at bay."

How well is terrorism being prevented? Generally experts examining efforts to prevent terrorism give mixed reviews; there are some pluses, some minuses, some strong points, some weak points. There are some indications of initial success in preventing terrorism, as Newsweek analyst Fareed Zakaria suggested that terrorist attacks have declined 40% since 2001. But the risk of terrorists getting nuclear weapons remains "unacceptably high", according to one report. Perhaps the biggest part of the problem is seeing the terrorists, identifying them, fleshing them out; when authorities can identify violent extremists, apprehension and justice are mere details.

Disrupting Terrorism at Different Stages

One way to approach terrorism prevention is to construct a model of how a person becomes a terrorist and decides to engage in terrorism, and look for places at each step of the process where authorities can intervene. The steps are roughly in this order: radicalization, networking, hiding, money, weapons, planning, target selection, deciding to attack, attacking, and escape, and at each step there are opportunities for authorities to discourage or dissuade or capture terrorists. The earlier in the cycle that terrorism is blocked, the better; it's much better to prune an attack long before it approaches the execution stage. Overall, of course, the aim is to kill or capture the terrorists before they strike. But former DHS Director Chertoff said in 2007 "the lesson from Iraq is to gather intelligence to disrupt the long chain of events needed to deliver a bomb–from recruiting terrorists to infiltrating them into the country, gathering bomb materials, and selecting targets and tactics." In Israel, it's called the "three circles of security": first, getting intelligence before terrorists begin their operations; second, checkpoints to delay attackers; third, hardening targets such as restaurants and malls.

Radicalization

See also: Self-radicalization

How does a person change from a so-called normal law-abiding member of society to a terrorist? How does radicalization happen? Can we identify particular persons susceptible to radicalization? Is it exposure to inflammatory material on the Internet? Are there connections to an aggrieved group of persons abroad? Answers to these questions, even partial answers, can be particularly helpful in helping enable prevention strategies. Limiting the supply of new terrorist recruits is a big part of winning the battle against terrorism. If authorities can profile a likely terrorist, then it may be possible to put precious resources into more intensive scrutiny of their actions and connections. What thought processes inside a person's head lead them to becoming terrorists? Is there a moment when a person decides to become a terrorist? How do terrorists see themselves?

The task of understanding how radicalization happens is fraught with difficulty. Some studies suggest that a tiny number of persons, often Muslims, are prone to becoming extremists; but officials concede that they don't understand how this process works. What pathways lead to Jihadi terrorism? One theorist in Islam Review speculated that risk factors predisposing some persons towards extremism exist based on psychological factors. There is speculation that Al Qaeda is a mindset which sees Islam on the defensive with its existence threatened by secular societies and globalization. One suggestion is to focus prevention efforts on reaching out at the local level with outreach programs using community policing.

Recruitment, as well, is a point in which authorities can intervene. Sometimes recruitment happens by media appeals. Al-Qaeda makes propaganda videos which encourage viewers to become radicalized, but it's not clear how effective these appeals are. It may be possible to make counter-propaganda which might disrupt the radicalization process; counter-terrorism experts suggest that this is an area where governments could do a much better job, and which would yield excellent results.

Some theories suggest radicalization can't happen just by exposure to Internet web sites in themselves, but that contact between a would-be radical and a mentor, a facilitator, or a inciter is required. In 2009, a U.S. army major named Nidal Hasan went on a shooting rampage, killing 13 people at Fort Hood, and it was learned later that Hasan had been in "close contact" with a U.S.-born radical Muslim cleric living in Yemen; officials are trying to determine if the cleric had a role in the attack. Expert Bruce Hoffman explored whether the Fort Hood attack was an example of 21st century terrorism if Hasan was inspired by propaganda to take up the cause of terrorism without any training or money from abroad. One study suggested the best time to intervene is before an individual boards a plane to fly to a radical training camp, since experiences in those camps can "harden their commitment towards al-Qaida and associated movements" according to one source; but a huge obstacle is that in most cases, a person has broken no law, and there are no grounds for arrest.

But profiling likely terrorists is problematic since there obviously isn't a "typical profile of a homegrown terrorist." There don't appear to be clear patterns pointing to likely recruits; intense religious affiliations do not seem to predict likely terrorist involvement. There's consensus that profiling is difficult. And if authorities focus on a particular group, it's possible for recruiters to adjust their strategy to target other groups; what's important is being flexible to new developments. Identifying terrorist leaders is especially difficult. Terrorists don't look like terrorists, of course. The 9/11 commission asked:

“

Militants pose themselves as ordinary citizens and immigrants here in the United States. They appear so clean cut, they could fit in on any golf course. And they do this to remain undetected until they carry out their terrorist goals. If we're lucky, they're dressed in their customary dress, they're wearing their traditional non-Western clothing ... As long as we allow groups to be protected from racial profiling, how can we win this new war?

”

Authorities have suggested that a counter-narrative can help deter global radicalism, but one report in 2006 suggested this effort has been ineffective. A counter-narrative might try to undermine the reputation and credibility of terrorists within the larger community of Muslims, for example; Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker wrote in The New York Times that "if the seeds of doubt can be planted in the mind of Al Qaeda’s strategic leadership that an attack would be viewed as a shameful murder of innocents–or, even more effectively, that it would be an embarrassing failure–then the order may not be given." Most deaths in terrorists attacks involve non-combatants or innocents, according to one analyst. In a bi-partisan report about the 9/11 attacks, Thomas H. Kean reprimanded the cruelty of the act in moral terms:

“

Those who perished in those attacks or those who were wounded had done nothing to warrant it. They were going about their business. They were doing their jobs. They were flying to see family or to conduct business or to spend time with loved ones or going or returning from vacations. They didn't personally know their assassins. Those who attacked them had no particular human target in mind. They just wanted to kill as many people as possible. They didn't care who the victims were. All they had to do to warrant their killing and maiming, they wanted to target buildings or certain airplanes.

”

Greater cultural awareness can help too. Linguists with excellent analytical skills and cultural awareness can help authorities spot problems and possibly identify terrorists. There is a greater call for more speakers of Arabic to work as investigators, case officers, interrogators, interpreters and translators.

Further, it's important to paint terrorists as terrorists. Terminology can have a big impact. One report criticized a policy of labeling prevention efforts as a war on terrorism since it implies that terrorists are holy warriors; rather, terrorists should be painted as criminals. Many efforts, however, describe terrorism as a "war"; even the head of the 9/11 investigatory commission, Thomas H. Kean described the 9/11 attacks as the beginning of a war.

Re-education programs, as well, are a way to help re-assimilate would-be terrorists into society, and provide a counter-narrative to persons considering violent extremism. The government of Saudi Arabia claimed that it took 4,000 militants and put them through a rehabilitation program which included "psychological counseling, vocational training, art therapy, sports, and religious reeducation, and helped "rehabilitated" terrorists find jobs and even wives. The post-release program held family members responsible if there were repeated acts of violence, as well as surveillance.

Networking

After a person has become radicalized, the next step is hooking up with other terrorists, unless, of course, terrorists caused the radicalization. It is important for authorities to understand how networking among terrorists happens, and take steps to interfere with these efforts. How can terrorists determine that they trust each other?

If a terrorist can't connect with others, they're described as a [[self-radicalized|self-radicalized] lone wolf terrorist. Examples of supposed lone wolf terrorists have been Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, although whether he was consistently regarded as a "terrorist" has been subject to debate. Lone wolf terrorists are harder to find, since they don't interact with others, but at the same time, authorities generally believe they're the least dangerous and most inept, since they can't swap information about such skills as bomb-making, although this wasn't the case with Kaczynski who killed three people with homemade bombs.

One way to interfere with terrorists' ability to network is electronic surveillance. If terrorists communicate by phone, email, or letter, it's possible to intercept these communications; provisions in the United States of the Patriot Act authorize extensive domestic surveillance. Since terrorists use the Internet extensively to share information, plan, and discuss methods, intercepts are possible and potentially highly fruitful. Terrorists, as well, use the Internet to learn how to build bombs since "information and expertise now flow in all directions." Sites which detail the making of explosives can be tracked by authorities. As in many other areas, when authorities use surveillance to spy on vast swaths of the public, this activity can generate concerns about civil liberties.

Nevertheless, picking up signals between terrorists is vital; U.S. president Bush said in 2008 "we need to know who the terrorists are talking to, what they're saying and what they're planning." Authorities depend on private firms such as phone and Internet companies to intercept messages, but this usually involves listening in on non-terrorist communications, that is, violating the privacy of citizens. Some citizens have sued the phone companies for these violations, but the government is seeking to grant immunity from these lawsuits.

Authorities have built fake websites. Since cyberspace is a place where terrorists recruit, share information, train, and identify each other, authorities have mounted stealth campaigns to plant "bogus e-mail messages and Web site postings, with the intent to sow confusion, dissent and distrust among militant organizations," according to one report.

Intelligence agencies are vital to help disrupt terrorist networks and capture leaders. There have been significant improvements. In the United States, Congress passed legislation to improve coordination among intelligence agencies. Sharing intelligence is widely seen as a positive development, although problems remain.

Infighting between terrorist groups can provide new opportunities for authorities. If there's a way to encourage power struggles or infighting, it helps prevent terrorism. One analyst suggested infighting between groups was one cause for a decline in terrorist activity during the first decade of the 21st century. One suggestion is, with great publicity, to free terrorists with the thanks of the United States, cynically called "trap, neuter and release." In the case of radical Islamist groups, having their actions described as heresy, by competent jurists, also is a countermeasure.

Organizing

See also: Clandestine cell system

After being radicalized and networking, terrorists organize themselves into a structure. A top-down hierarchical structure brings centralization of control but leaves the group more vulnerable to exposure, so that if one person is caught, everybody is caught. A looser cell-based structure is harder to catch but lacks coordination. A decentralized arrangement makes it more difficult for intelligence agencies to bust apart whole rings, since terrorists in one cell may not know which persons are members of another cell.

“

Bin Laden and Zawahiri don't control each individual operation. When you have four or five different guys planning operations, perhaps of a smaller magnitude than 9/11, it's harder to follow.

”

Authorities try to infiltrate terrorist groups to prevent terrorism at this stage. This is highly risky for the agent doing the infiltrating, since if his or her purpose is discovered, it often leads to their death. But infiltration can be effective when done right, since it allows authorities to understand who terrorists are and what they're planning long before an attack. When cells are smaller and affiliated loosely with other cells, infiltration is more difficult. Israel has infiltrated some terrorist groups which led to arrests long before any bombings happened. Efforts to kill terrorist leaders have been effective on some occasions, although as of 2009, bin Laden and Zawahiri are still at large. There have been calls to explore links between terrorists and leaders of organized crime. The 9/11 Commission suggested it was important to understand how Al Qaeda works and understanding their "terrorist-attack mode."

A related strategy is denying sanctuary to terrorists. A report in 2006 suggested it was good to deprive Al-Qaeda of sanctuary in Afghanistan.

Hiding

See also: Counterintelligence

After networking and organizing, terrorists must keep their locations and purpose hidden. Authorities can take different actions to expose terrorist hideouts.

Sometimes police agencies resort to wide sweeps of people in the hope of picking up terrorists in the net. For example, police in France have periodically done these in the hope of ensnaring terrorists; but their efforts have been criticized. The idea is to arrest and interrogate large numbers of people in the hope of catching a terrorist, but the drawback is that the innocent detainees are arrested without cause, and can put French authorities "on the wrong side of the law." Even a suspect's friends and family members can be interrogated with few requirements. But French authorities justify sweeps as sometimes necessary to "catch terrorists before they act." But legal matters can ensue; the French judicial system has been criticized for giving suspects only "only minimal access to legal counsel."

Seemingly random police convergences are a variant of the sweeps tactic. This has been done in New York City in the U.S.. Police converge, seemingly randomly, on a particular area. The idea is to "keep extremists guessing as to when and where a large police presence may materialize at any hour" and, as a result, throw terrorists off balance.

When the larger community becomes opposed to terrorism, it becomes harder for terrorists to hide within them. Therefore, efforts to discredit terrorism among Arab publics can make hiding more difficult. The 9/11 Commission suggested that Al Qaeda was a system for "transforming the discontents of Islam into a violent expression of jihad." To counter this, authorities try to discredit terrorism as a way to bolster religion. Newsweek analyst Fareed Zakaria wrote that the Muslim world has shown an "extraordinary drop in support for Islamist terror organizations" and, as a result, it's more difficult for terrorists to hide, find safe haven, and get financial support.

Israeli counterterrorism experts have developed strategies to discover where terrorists might hide explosives. Finding a weapons cache can save lives. Police have shared information about how terrorists try to disguise explosives.

In the U.K., investigators believe there may be up to 1600 potential terrorists hiding inside the nation, possibly planning an attack. But authorities can't monitor the activities of all of these people all of the time; they have to guess which ones are the most dangerous, and monitor those. So another technique to break up terrorism is selective monitoring.

Money

See also: Financial intelligence

See also: Informal value transfer system

See also: Transnational spillover from weak and failed states

Disrupting financing of terrorist activity is a key; there have been indications of success in this regard. Terrorist financing methods have continued to evolve, and some funds are moved about using trust-based systems such as Hawallah, large transfers of cash, or even PayPal. Deterring the "support network" including financial supporters is vital. A more coordinated approach to uncovering terrorist financing was suggested by the 9/11 Commission.

Weapons

See also: Weapons of mass destruction

See also: Radiological weapon

See also: Chemical weapon

See also: Biological weapon

See also: Nuclear weapon

Terrorism prevention efforts try to make it difficult for terrorist to get weapons, explosives, poisons, and other dangerous materials. It is particularly difficult for terrorists to obtain nuclear weapons, although some analysts speculate that the increasing ease of technological innovation works against this. For the most part, up to 2009, governments have been skillful at keeping nuclear technology away from terrorists, although it's possible that terrorists could bribe a public official, steal a bomb, or make one from scratch. Locking up biological weapons is perhaps more difficult, since there are numerous unprotected laboratories with a wide variety of toxins and pathogens.

Authorities try to lock up and keep an account of dangerous materials. For example, there are thousands of places where radioactive waste is stored, but it is difficult to keep track of them; one government agency tries to collect materials which could be used to manufacture a so-called dirty bomb but has a backlog of uncollected materials. There is a focus on locking up this material.

There have been efforts to disrupt networks of nuclear bomb makers. Authorities have disrputed the A.Q. Khan "black market nuclear network" and persuaded the government of Libya to end programs of building WMDs, although nations such as Iran and North Korea continue efforts to build atomic weaponry as well as missiles. Israeli counterterrorism efforts have emphasized a disruption of "bomb supply lines."

Governments have threatened those who supply weapons to terrorists. U.S. president George W. Bush pledged to hold "fully accountable" any nation that shares nuclear weapons with another state or terrorists. To do this, however, it is vital to fully trace the path of nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorists, and this may be difficult to do, although the U.S. and other nations are developing new technologies which try to identify the source of unconventional weapons. And it's informing other nations that it has increasing capability to identify these sources.

Planning

Counterintelligence helps disrupt planning. Professor Erik Dahl at the Naval Postgraduate School suggested that the "most effective intelligence is gathered close to home, as a result of local, on-the-ground domestic intelligence efforts." There are ways to try to gather "deeper intelligence", suggests one report. Sometimes there is sufficient evidence to arrest and try suspected terrorist leaders. But as an overall strategy, the 9/11 commission thought it was "absurd" to attempt to do this.

Selecting a target

Selecting a target. Which target is chosen? Where and why?

• Walls and barriers. Physical barriers such as strong secured walls at embassy compounds can deter truck bombers, but they also deny public access as well; a 2006 report criticized embassies for being overbuilt with a "fortress mentality" which "stifles public access and outreach."

Deciding to attack

Deciding to attack. Eighth, how does a group decide to attack? Is there thinking about the likelihood of getting caught? Does this deter them? How do they plan for escape afterwards?

• Deterrence. If terrorists can be persuaded there's a reasonable chance they'll get caught, they may be deterred. This is part of the logic of plane-side searches. But searches must be frequent enough to have a deterrent value.

• Pre-emption. This is the doctrine that when authorities have enough indication of a likely attack, that it's permissible for them to strike first, and prevent the attack, rather than wait for it to unfold. This is a controversial doctrine. Inevitably, errors will happen, and sometimes innocent civilians will be killed by mistake. But attacks upon likely terrorists using unmanned Predator drones, for example, have been effective in killing some terrorist leaders.

Traveling to the place of attack

• Screening. Steven Levitt suggested it makes sense to try to screen "risky people" from entering the country as well as tracking questionable or dubious persons after entering the country; he wrote "if someone enters on a student visa and isn’t enrolled in school, for instance, he is worth keeping under close surveillance." There is a risk that too much screening can be seen as paranoia, and matters such as visa frustrations, and preventing legitimate port managers such as Dubai Ports from operating U.S. ports, can undermine efforts at public diplomacy. But border controls and immigration policies were seen as uneven. A report in 2008 by DHS Secretary Chertoff suggested the tighter U.S. screening procedures were having the effect of shifting terrorist focus to Europe which was perceived as a "more open target." Making borders more secure has been closely identified with preventing future attacks. Sometimes dogs trained at sniffing explosives are used, although training standards are not uniform which makes cooperation between different squads very difficult. Some police experts have developed guidelines to help screeners spot a potential suicide bomber. At the same time, screening is imperfect; in 2009, a terrorist slipped explosives on to an airliner, but was prevented from detonating the bomb by alert passengers. This caused huge embarrassment for the TSA and a call for an investigation by president Obama and a statement from Attorney General Janet Napolitano saying "the system worked", but with an article in The Atlantic by author Megan McArdle countering "the system failed." McArdle wrote terrorists are "bound to get through airport security if they really want" and also have the option to "blow up the crowds of people patiently waiting in line to go through airport security." McArdle wrote that "our elaborate system of security theater is probably next to useless." Before 9/11, data showed the 19 terrorists filed missing and incomplete information on their visa applications; some terrorists described themselves as "student" but failed to name which school they were supposedly attending.

• Tough decisions. If authorities know that an attack is imminent but can't pinpoint the terrorists or target, then they face an agonizing choice particularly if they have a few clues. Suppose a cell of terrorists has acquired a nuclear bomb and plans to detonate it in a few hours, but authorities have one of the members of the cell in custody; is it proper to use methods such as torture to try to extract information about the impending attack that may save tens of thousands of lives? This is a tough moral dilemma. While authorities such as Dennis C. Blair have made pledges saying "I believe strongly that torture is not moral, legal, or effective," he might find himself rethinking that decision when confronted by a crisis.

see Interrogation and human-source intelligence for a broader, less moralistic discussion

A general pattern that emerges is that authorities, when faced with the prospect of imminent or devastating attacks, are pressed to do anything they can to stop the attack, including violate civil liberties, invade privacy, conduct warrantless wiretaps, and even resort to torture.

Attacking

Attacking. How do terrorists get to their place of attack?

• Airliners are particularly vulnerable to different forms of attack. If terrorists slip on board an airliner, there are many ways to bring the airliner down, such as starting a fire in a lavatory. Explosives slipped through security can be devastating. And a downed airliner can be particularly expensive and costly in terms of lives lost, damage, and fear created. So it is understandable that much effort has gone into screening passengers. But there are huge difficulties involved. In the United States alone, there are about 450 major airports and 28,000 daily flights; screening every passenger for every flight is a monumental task. There are no reliable machines to screen for combustible liquids; so, as a result, liquids over a certain amount are banned. But screening procedures are imperfect, delay boarding, and inconvenience passengers. Explosive sniffing dogs at airports, however, is often seen as a last line of defense; one writer in Time Magazine criticized governments for investing too much time and money in this last line of defense, rather than using resources more effectively, and arresting terrorists before the execution stage.

“

Governments still tend to focus much of their time and money on our last lines of defense–explosives sniffers at airports and haz-mat suits for firefighters. That's the equivalent of building a really deep castle moat and waiting for the invaders to arrive.

”

One firm markets an Internet-based communications network as an alternative to air travel, and suggests the way to prevent terrorism is simply for people to fly less.

• Improvised explosive devices (IEDs). One report from the White House suggested the U.S. was particularly vulnerable to IEDs. And preparedness varies by municipality; Los Angeles has 28 full-time explosives technicians and an $8 million downtown headquarters, while Washington has only 10 technicians in portable trailers. But these after-the-fact efforts to cope with bombs, whether real or imagined, has been criticized as less effective than efforts to detect and disrupt bomb plots in advance.

• Physical barriers. It's possible to place large concrete blocks in front of building entrances. Most American embassies are surrounded by thick sturdy walls. Even the cockpit doors of the flight crew have been hardened.

• Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices Car bombs. Terrorists are less inclined to use sophisticated, expensive, untried weapons, and more likely to rely on simpler and pragmatic types of weapons. Since 1970 to 2007, 756 car bombs have been deployed by such groups as the IRA, Basque separatists, and al-Qaeda, according to research by the University of Maryland.

• Low-tech terror. Freakonomics author Steven Levitt in The New York Times suggested that "incredibly simple strategies" such as sniper shootings offered a "virtually infinite array" of means of attack. He believed that there is no effective means to prevent a campaign of "low-grade, low-tech terror" and that authorities are powerless to prevent such terrorism. His strategy? "Don't be afraid; get on with life."

• Airport security. In 2006 Glasgow airport installed high-tech license-plate recognition systems to control a barrier at an airport entrance; the system would only admit recognized buses and taxis; but according to one report, this high-tech system was defeated with a simple method– merely tailgating behind a registered bus or taxi was enough to get inside the barrier.
• Damage controlIndividual protection. One way authorities can try to control damage is by instructing citizens how to cope with large-scale terrorist attacks such as chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological events. For example, a study by the Rand Corporation offers advice to citizens about individual efforts to cope with one of these emergencies.
  • chemical attack: In a chemical attack, citizens are urged to "find clean air quickly."
  • radiological attack: If a dirty bomb has been detonated, avoid inhaling radioactive dust; if outdoors, move indoors, cover your nose and mouth and stay indoors; close windows and shut down ventilation systems and await instructions.
  • nuclear attack"Avoid radioactive fallout: evacuate the fallout zone quickly or, if not possible, seek best available shelter."ref>RAND MR-1731, p. xviii</ref>
  • biological attack "Get medical aid and minimize further exposure to agents."
    • if it's smallpox, and if there's any suspicion of contagion, get vaccinated quickly. The White House urged the public to be prepared for large-scale disasters. The U.S. White House has promulgated efforts to "promote global health security", so that if a smallpox epidemic breaks out, then global health agencies may be better prepared to cope with it. The U.S. White House urged citizens to prepare for possible disasters, and be ready with extra food and essentials.

• Killing terrorists. Once an attack is set in motion, the fact of the attack is, in itself, a semi-win for the terrorists. The battling causes fear and mayhem. Authorities generally have much greater firepower and will prevail, but terrorists have the advantages of selecting the time and place of attack. So authorities are often trying to play catch up. For example, after the 9/11 planes were hijacked, but before they were crashed into buildings, there was an opportunity for authorities to summon fighter planes to shoot down the hijacked planes; but to have done this would have required quick timing. In the case of a potential suicide bomber, authorities have been trained to shoot for the head and not the chest, since a shot in the chest may cause a detonation. But it calls on police officers to make split-second decisions in a very dangerous situation, and mistakes are not only possible, but deadly.

• Focus only on high-damage targets. Some suggest it's simply not possible to prevent most kinds of attacks, and the best that can be done is to focus funds and guns on preventing only those terrorist events which could involve a huge loss of life; a Time Magazine reporter suggested efforts should focus on preventing a truck bomb laden with "old-school fertilizer" which could kill thousands in Times Square rather than trying to prevent "an airplane from being taken down by liquid explosives," which is much harder to detect, and likely to be much less damaging.

Escaping

Escaping. When terrorists escape after an attack, they need to avoid detection and retreat to a hideout or fortified location. If this happens, terrorists can execute more attacks in the future. So it is important for authorities to prevent such escapes, possibly by identifying escape routes or taking other measures to prevent subsequent attacks.

• Apprehending terrorists prevents future attacks. So it's important to catch terrorists before they strike again. One concern is that with hard-to-detect attacks, such as biological attacks, it's possible for terrorists to repeatedly strike cities without getting caught.

• Returning to normalcy fast. Authorities in Israel have learned that it's important to clean up a bomb site fast, since it helps people get back to "business as usual" and lessen overall trauma. While in America a bombsite may be roped off for days, in Israel it's cleared quickly, sometimes within hours. Steps involved alerting the public, assisting victims, getting people to the hospital, and cleaning the blood-splattered pavement. "The longer the scene is left there, the more traumatizing it becomes," said one official.

General strategies to prevent terrorism

While an interference model can focus efforts to prevent terrorism at particular stages, general strategies help authorities lessen terrorism. These efforts may not be tied to a particular interference point but can thwart terrorism nevertheless.

Overall strategy

Some analysts see a basic choice of model dealing with terrorism: a criminal law approach, and a war approach. There are plusses and minuses with each model. In some respects, the United Nations has been seen as preferring to describe terrorism as a criminal law problem since has defined terrorism as a "crime", rather than an international security approach, according to one theorist.

Military force

One terrorism expert suggested, in most cases, that military force was not the best means to thwart terrorism. It can be like trying to kill a malaria-bearing mosquito with a hammer; there is too much risk of collateral damage. A 2006 report criticized an overemphasis by the U.S. on military solutions which created "substantial drains on forces."

Cyber Warfare

See also: Information operations

• Disrupting cyberoperations. When authorities recover the hard disk drives of terrorist cells, they can use that information to countermessage for the purpose of "instailling doubt".

Psychological warfare

See also: Information operations

• Counter-propaganda. American efforts have released videotapes of terrorists "teaching children to kidnap and kill" to expose terrorist tactics as merciless and cruel. Authorities have also released letters, whether captured or fake, between terrorist leaders, which describe the terrorists' spirit as "weak" and "plagued by poor morale." Other efforts seek to undermine the perceived theological legitimacy of terrorism by having clerics renounce "violent jihad on legal and religious grounds."

Spending

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. defense establishment spending much more money. But it is easy to overspend; author Steven Levitt suggested that spending huge amounts of money trying to prevent an on-board explosive filled in a tube of toothpaste was unwise since the risk of a detonation was small; he suggested funds should be diverted to preventing terrorism which was more likely and more devastating, such as preventing planes from being shot down by shoulder-launched missiles. There have been repeated examples of how once government grows, it's difficult to shrink it back after it's no longer needed. Efforts to give foreign aid to foreign governments to help them prevent insurgencies can be effective.

Winning the battle of ideas

See also: Information operations

• Bolstering credibility of moderate Muslims. Analyst Brian Michael Jenkins suggests it's important to support moderate persons in Arab countries to stand up to extremists. There are reports that American diplomats are urging prominent Islamic clerics to amplify their speeches and writings with respect to renouncing violence. Understanding is key; one report suggests that Israeli counterterrorism experts were sharing insights into Islamic fundamentalism with U.S. police departments.

Protecting the public

Government has been making increasing efforts to hire safety experts, particularly in areas such as biological warfare and expertise in the life sciences. There is increased sense of vulnerability in the area of biological terrorism, and stepped up efforts to alert the biological sciences community about a need for vigilance and awareness. A commission sponsored by the U.S. Congress suggested that academics and biologists with access to dangerous technologies should be alerted about the risks of "potentially dangerous knowledge falling into the wrong hands." A danger with biological terrorism is repeated attacks, especially if perpetrators are not caught; one report suggested that with "a biological attack, terrorists can strike a city, reload the aerosol can, and come back a week later with the same agent and attack again." As a result, authorities have made greater efforts to inform the life sciences community about the importance of biosecurity. In addition, tougher laws have been proposed for regulations securing high-risk toxins and pathogens.

Government, as well, has focused efforts on improving methods of public identification. There were arguments that better detection of counterfeit travel documents would have been helpful to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Identity theft, as well, promotes terrorism, so tighter standards on identities has been recommended as a helpful prevention method; many of the 9/11 hijackers entered the U.S. under pseudonyms.

Risk-based prioritization

A 2006 study called for greater emphasis on allocating resources based on a model of risk and damage, so that funds were used efficiently to protect the most vulnerable targets in sensible ways. Expert Richard C. Clarke urged an effort to secure major cities and critical facilities, including computer networks. Even the 9/11 Commission called for abandoning "unrealistic expectations of total security" and a more realistic acceptance of risk. This means that sometimes terrorist attacks will succeed, but if infrastructure is built strong and resilient, with backup systems, when some attacks succeed it won't shut society down. One analyst argued that the highest priorities for protection should be civilian populations against weapons of mass destruction, but that critical infrastructure, government functions, and national symbols all need protection.

Promoting democracy

• Democracy has been promoted as a solution to terrorism by U.S. president George W. Bush. Bush suggested democracy entails "suffocation" for terrorists, and that leaders of Al-Qaeda such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi were working hard to prevent democracy from taking root in Iraq.

  In 2004, we intercepted a letter from Zarqawi to Osama bin Laden. In it, Zarqawi expressed his concern about, "the gap that will emerge between us and the people of the land." He declared, "Democracy is coming." He went on to say, "This will mean suffocation" for the terrorists. Zarqawi laid out his strategy to stop democracy from taking root in Iraq.

  Democracy as a solution to terrorism, as well, was mentioned by Thomas Kean in the 9/11 commission hearings who said "I believe that we'll never be safe from Islamic extremism until the Arab Muslim countries begin to experience democracy." However, there is considerable concern among academics and foreign policy experts about the transition period. A tightly-controlled nation led by a monarch or dictator, which permits free elections and the free movement of people and ideas, can find itself embroiled in serious conflict which permit chances for a wide range of terrorism. Some analysts suggest that democracy can not be achieved overnight or imposed by a foreign power, since successful democratic functioning requires the evolution of economic institutions and law and a habit of peaceful acceptance of change. They point to case studies of nations which have undergone severe upheaval during such a transformation, and the results are often negative or counter-productive.

• Unilateralism counter-productive. A 2006 report suggested that the go-it-alone foreign policy of the U.S. during the Bush administration undermined public diplomacy.

Improving intelligence gathering

Information sharing is a key to improved intelligence. After 9/11, the U.S. federal government established one agency with overall authority to prevent terrorism: the Department of Homeland Security. It had over 200,000 employees in 2007. Nevertheless, despite this framework, getting different government agencies to cooperate is often difficult since the nature of intelligence work is to safeguard secret. Information-in-progress is the life-blood of these agencies, and they're often loathe to share secrets lest they compromise an ongoing investigation. Differing agencies, as well, compete for scarce federal dollars as well as power and prestige; minimizing so-called turf wars is important. The New York City police department sends liaison officers to foreign capitals such as London, Tel Aviv, Amman and elsewhere to build relationships with foreign police forces and gather data about threats. Some efforts to ensure inter-agency cooperation were written into legislation, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, although one critic suggested the role of the CIA remained confused. A 2006 report suggested there wasn't sufficient coordination between agencies such as the FBI and DHS and DoD, although it found greater centralized leadership after the creation of the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI's task is to integrate a wide range of intelligence coming from people, machines, satellites, intercepted communications, and other sources. Unified terrorism databases help agencies share information when data is in common formats.

Ideally a database would combine disparate information; even data about stock purchases may offer some clues about a possible attack. For example, in the week before 9/11, there were stock transactions involving millions of dollars in which some investors guessed that United Airlines and American Airlines would drop sharply in value; both of these airlines lost aircraft in the attacks of that day, and their stock did drop in value. The 9/11 commission noted these details but it was unclear who made these purchases or why. But investigators armed with this information might have new leads to study possible impending attacks. But a continuing problem is how to intelligently mine through huge volumes of information to find that one important clue.

Sometimes authorities appeal to the public for tips. One report from the U.S. White House called for "empowering an informed, involved, and observant citizenry" and encouraging people to provide tips when they observe "suspicious activities." There can be a downside here, as well, particularly since most tips are well-meaning but confused pieces of non-information.

Police departments, as well, share information. Departments in different countries do this too; for example, experts from Israel have been visiting police departments in the U.S. and sharing methods; this not only expands the available pool of law enforcement know-how, but cements relations with allied nations as well. Police in the U.S., U.K., Northern Ireland, and Arabian nations have shared information. Sometimes U.S. police chiefs travel to Israel to study methods intensively, but these training trips can cost $5000–$7000 per person per trip.

Surveillance is a general strategy. Britain, particularly London, has a "wondrous surveillance system" with "cameras all over London," according to U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman. Cameras have many functions; they seem particularly useful after an attack, since they can help investigators trace who did what, and allow investigators to see the faces of particular people and license plates of vehicles. As a result, cameras make it easier for authorities to apprehend terrorists after an attack, but they have yet to prove themselves valuable in preventing the attack in the first place. In the U.S., DHS gave $40 million to states to invest in video security systems; but despite the investment, the police in metropolitan Washington have not arrested anybody because of the information from the cameras. Freakonomics author Steven Levitt questioned the value of putting cameras everywhere and suggested it is "very anti-American" and wouldn't work politically, but saw value in helping authorities identify perpetrators.

Since counter-intelligence agencies must keep some data secret from other parts of government, it is sometimes difficult winning cooperation and funding and speaking candidly with oversight committees. In general, secrecy is at odds with transparency. But this makes it harder, at times, to win public support and keep funding from diminishing.

International cooperation

There's an important foreign policy dimension to any effort to prevent terrorism, particularly if foreign governments fund terrorism or provide safe harbor, or secretly encourage it while pretending to be against terrorism. American errors in foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, have caused huge discontent, particularly within the Arab world; even Thomas H. Kean of the 9/11 commission criticized U.S. foreign policy for turning a "turned a blind eye to the expansion of settlements in the West Bank," and actions such as these fuel Arab anger. Sometimes perceived American weakness, as well, can cause terrorists to escalate their war. Kean suggested that bin Laden was encouraged to ramp up his terrorism campaign after seeing the U.S. retreat from Somalia and Lebanon after attacks caused the deaths of American soldiers. While the United Nations can make resolutions, there has been criticism of its effectiveness in being able to prevent terrorism; it has been criticized for failing to come up with an adequate definition of terrorism, and has been described by some critics as being "impotent."

There was speculation that stationing troops in foreign territory, particularly Western troop in the Middle East, was counter-productive, since it angered Arab opinion, and encouraged radicals to become violent. One study by a University of Chicago professor suggested that the single best predictor of terrorism was having troops stationed abroad.

Aiding troubled nations has been mentioned as a deterrence strategy. In 2009 Secretary of State Clinton said "we cannot stop terrorism or defeat the ideologies of violent extremism when hundreds of millions of young people see a future with no jobs, no hope, and no way ever to catch up to the developed world," and this reflects a policy of helping troubled nations economically. This approach is based on a view that poor economic conditions spawn desperate actions such as violent extremism, and that improving the jobs outlook will lessen the risk of terrorism.

Analysis of effectiveness

Here is an analysis in 2006 by an expert agency of U.S. efforts to prevail against terrorism.

Accomplishments

• Deprived al Qaeda of sanctuary in Afghanistan
• No subsequent catastrophic attack on American territory
• Eliminated significant al Qaeda leadership
• Forged strong international intelligence cooperation
• Constrained terrorist financing
• Elevated democracy promotion on U.S. foreign policy agenda
• Organized State Department to strengthen public diplomacy
• Created Millennium Challenge Corporation & increased foreign assistance funding
• Launched “Transformational Diplomacy”
• Created new department to coordinate homeland security
• Strengthened commercial aviation security
• Expanded local and state capacity for homeland security operations
• Increased significantly prevention & response in the private sector
• Improved ability to recognize & address biological threats
• Centralized leadership under Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
• Established National Counterterrorism Center to focus collection, analysis, and operational planning
• Increased information sharing among intelligence agencies, particularly FBI and CIA
• Strengthened international cooperation with intelligence and security agencies
• Led international coalition to evict al Qaeda from Afghanistan
• Launched the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Container Security Initiative
• Pursued stronger, harmonized counterterrorism laws and practices globally
• Strengthened counterterrorism cooperation and technical assistance with many countries
• Identified and incapacitated A.Q. Khan black market nuclear network
• Negotiated end of Libyan WMD programs
• Established principle of sovereign accountability (no “safe harbor”) for terrorists
• Renewed DoD emphasis on counterterrorism and irregular warfare
• Increased Special Operations Forces capabilities, cultural awareness, linguists
• Raised priority for building foreign capacity
• Created State Department Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Continuing Challenges

• Rise of autonomous “self-starter” cells
• Metastasized jihadist threat
• Bin Laden and Zawahiri still at large
• Failure to create enduring security in Afghanistan and Iraq
• Public diplomacy undermined by perceived U.S. unilateralism
• U.S. moral authority & image eroded by Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, etc.
• Public diplomacy weakened by domestic security paranoia (visa frustrations, Dubai Ports, etc.
• Democracy and development assistance agendas viewed skeptically in many countries
• Fortress mentality at embassies stifles public access and outreach
• Failure to create counternarrative to global radicalism
• No risk-based approach to prioritization, resource allocation, and long-range planning
• Department of Homeland Security is a holding company, not an integrated department
• Absence of clear national architecture and road map for preparedness
• Inadequate coordination between DoD and DHS and FBI
• Most security enhancements are slapped on, not built in
• Border and immigration controls uneven and troubled
• Weak, ineffective oversight from Congress
• Serious internal contradictions mar intelligence reform, inhibiting DNI’s authority
• Ambiguous roles and authorities among defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security
• Analytic emphasis on tactical and near-term at the expense of strategic and long-term
• Deficient personnel language, cultural awareness, and analytical skills
• No common information-sharing environment
• Unresolved tension between civil liberties and increased domestic surveillance
• Intelligence cooperation remains largely bilateral
• Failure to slow or end nuclear weapon and missile programs in Iran and North Korea
• Counterterrorism mandates generate fatigue among allies and partners
• “War” rhetoric and emphasis on military dimensions limit cooperation
• Risk of WMD acquisition by terrorists remains unacceptably high
• No grand strategy or interagency concept of operations for the “long war”
• Overemphasis on use of military, creating substantial strains on forces
• Insufficient deployable operational capacity in civilian agencies
• No master plan to coordinate “soft power” programs
• Chronically weak interagency coordination, planning, and operations

Source:Center for Strategic & International Studies, September 2006.