U.S. policy towards Afghanistan

See also: Afghanistan War (2001-)

See also: Afghanistan War (1978-92)

Until recently, U.S. policy towards Afghanistan has been defined by relations with other states and non-state actors, but nation building has become part of that mission, in cooperation with the NATO International Security Assistance Force, with the approval of the United Nations. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remains a failed state, a source of much of the world's opium, and a potential sanctuary for trans-national terrorists.

Considerable changes in policy, if not operations, came with the Obama administration. Anthony Cordesman, after a visit in August 2009, wrote

The United States cannot win the war in Afghanistan in the next three months -- any form of even limited victory will take years of further effort. It can, however, easily lose the war.

Cordesman said that the George W. Bush Administration had given priority in resources to the Iraq War, both for security and humanitarian purposes, and did not respond to problems of corruption in the government of Hamid Karzai. "It treated Pakistan as an ally when it was clear to U.S. experts on the scene that the Pakistani military and intelligence service did (and do) tolerate al-Qaeda and Afghan sanctuaries and still try to manipulate Afghan Pashtun to Pakistan's advantage."

Before the August 2009 Afghanistan presidential election began, U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry reflected on the policy elements announced by President Obama in March, involving both additional civilian and military personnel, plus financial resources, for work, in partnership with the new elected goverment, to:

• field capable and sufficient Afghan National Army and police units
• support effective government personnel systems
• help combat corruption
• provide financial assistance to key Afghan institutions
• promote agricultural development
• address detention issues
• support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts
• fix contracting practices

The effort must be accountable on both sides.

Background

In the Afghanistan War (1978-92), the U.S. conducted a proxy war with the Soviet Union.

Military and security

GEN David McKiernan, who had been commanding US forces and ISAF, was relieved, somewhat abruptly, with GEN Stanley McChrystal. McKiernan was a distinguished combat arms officer, having successfully led the conventional attack in the Iraq War, while McChrystal's background is in special operations.

McKiernan's approach had been "enemy-centric", pursuing the Taliban and al-Qaeda, where McChrystal is believed to be taking a more "population-centric" counterinsurgency approach.

Corruption and foreign aid

A new anti-corruption partnership was announced, described by Assistant Ambassador and Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs E. Anthony Wayne as the first under the "Afghan First" principle. It joins the Afghan Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission with U.S. and U.N. assistance. . U.N. envoy Kai Eide participated in the plan to train Afghan civil servants in governance.