U.S. policy towards Afghanistan

See also: Afghanistan War (2001-)

See also: Afghanistan War (1978-92)

Until recently, U.S. policy towards Afghanistan has been defined by relations with other states and non-state actors, but nation building has become part of that mission, in cooperation with the NATO International Security Assistance Force, with the approval of the United Nations. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remains a failed state, a source of much of the world's opium, and a potential sanctuary for trans-national terrorists.

Considerable changes in policy, if not operations, came with the Obama administration. Anthony Cordesman, after a visit in August 2009, wrote

The United States cannot win the war in Afghanistan in the next three months -- any form of even limited victory will take years of further effort. It can, however, easily lose the war.

Cordesman said that the George W. Bush Administration had given priority in resources to the Iraq War, both for security and humanitarian purposes, and did not respond to problems of corruption in the government of Hamid Karzai. "It treated Pakistan as an ally when it was clear to U.S. experts on the scene that the Pakistani military and intelligence service did (and do) tolerate al-Qaeda and Afghan sanctuaries and still try to manipulate Afghan Pashtun to Pakistan's advantage."

Background

In the Afghanistan War (1978-92), the U.S. conducted a proxy war with the Soviet Union.

Military and security

GEN David McKiernan, who had been commanding US forces and ISAF, was relieved, somewhat abruptly, with GEN Stanley McChrystal. McKiernan was a distinguished combat arms officer, having successfully led the conventional attack in the Iraq War, while McChrystal's background is in special operations.

McKiernan's approach had been "enemy-centric", pursuing the Taliban and al-Qaeda, where McChrystal is believed to be taking a more "population-centric" counterinsurgency approach.