U.S. policy towards Afghanistan: Difference between revisions
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Until recently, '''U.S. policy towards Afghanistan''' has been defined by relations with other states and non-state actors, but [[nation building]] has become part of that mission, in cooperation with the [[NATO]] [[International Security Assistance Force]], with the approval of the [[United Nations]]. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remains a [[failed state]], a source of much of the world's [[opium]], and a potential sanctuary for trans-national [[terrorism|terrorists]]. | Until recently, '''U.S. policy towards Afghanistan''' has been defined by relations with other states and non-state actors, but [[peace operations#nation building]] has become part of that mission, in cooperation with the [[NATO]] [[International Security Assistance Force]], with the approval of the [[United Nations]]. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remains a [[failed state]],<ref>{{citation | ||
| url =http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings | |||
| author = [[Foreign Policy (magazine)]] and [[Fund for Peace]] | |||
| title = The Failed States Index 2009}}</ref> a source of much of the world's [[opium]], and a potential sanctuary for trans-national [[terrorism|terrorists]]. | |||
Considerable changes in policy, if not operations, came with the [[Obama administration]]. | Considerable changes in policy, if not operations, came with the [[Obama administration]]. [[Anthony Cordesman]], after a visit in August 2009, wrote<blockquote>The United States cannot win the war in Afghanistan in the next three months -- any form of even limited victory will take years of further effort. It can, however, easily lose the war.<ref name=WaPo2009-08-31>{{citation | ||
| title = How to Lose in Afghanistan | |||
| author = [[Anthony Cordesman]] | |||
| date = 31 August 2009 | journal = Washington Post | |||
| url = http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/30/AR2009083002252_pf.html}}</ref></blockquote> Cordesman said that the [[George W. Bush Administration]] had given priority in resources to the [[Iraq War]], both for security and humanitarian purposes, and did not respond to problems of corruption in the government of [[Hamid Karzai]]. "It treated Pakistan as an ally when it was clear to U.S. experts on the scene that the Pakistani military and intelligence service did (and do) tolerate al-Qaeda and Afghan sanctuaries and still try to manipulate Afghan [[Pashtun people|Pashtun]] to Pakistan's advantage." | |||
==Military and security== | |||
GEN [[David McKiernan]], who had been commanding US forces and ISAF, was relieved, somewhat abruptly, with GEN [[Stanley McChrystal]]. McKiernan was a distinguished combat arms officer, having successfully led the conventional attack in the [[Iraq War]], while McChrystal's background is in [[special operations]]. | |||
McKiernan's approach had been "enemy-centric", pursuing the [[Taliban]] and [[al-Qaeda]], where McChrystal is believed to be taking a more "population-centric" [[counterinsurgency]] approach. | |||
==Humanitarian assistance== | |||
==Corruption and foreign aid== | |||
==References== | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
Revision as of 18:04, 31 August 2009
Until recently, U.S. policy towards Afghanistan has been defined by relations with other states and non-state actors, but peace operations#nation building has become part of that mission, in cooperation with the NATO International Security Assistance Force, with the approval of the United Nations. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remains a failed state,[1] a source of much of the world's opium, and a potential sanctuary for trans-national terrorists.
Considerable changes in policy, if not operations, came with the Obama administration. Anthony Cordesman, after a visit in August 2009, wrote
The United States cannot win the war in Afghanistan in the next three months -- any form of even limited victory will take years of further effort. It can, however, easily lose the war.[2]
Cordesman said that the George W. Bush Administration had given priority in resources to the Iraq War, both for security and humanitarian purposes, and did not respond to problems of corruption in the government of Hamid Karzai. "It treated Pakistan as an ally when it was clear to U.S. experts on the scene that the Pakistani military and intelligence service did (and do) tolerate al-Qaeda and Afghan sanctuaries and still try to manipulate Afghan Pashtun to Pakistan's advantage."
Military and security
GEN David McKiernan, who had been commanding US forces and ISAF, was relieved, somewhat abruptly, with GEN Stanley McChrystal. McKiernan was a distinguished combat arms officer, having successfully led the conventional attack in the Iraq War, while McChrystal's background is in special operations.
McKiernan's approach had been "enemy-centric", pursuing the Taliban and al-Qaeda, where McChrystal is believed to be taking a more "population-centric" counterinsurgency approach.
Humanitarian assistance
Corruption and foreign aid
References
- ↑ Foreign Policy (magazine) and Fund for Peace, The Failed States Index 2009
- ↑ Anthony Cordesman (31 August 2009), "How to Lose in Afghanistan", Washington Post