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'''Terrence K. "Terry" Kelly''' is a Senior Researcher with the | {{TOC|right}} | ||
'''Terrence K. "Terry" Kelly''' is a Senior Researcher with the RAND Corporation, where his primary research areas are national and homeland security policy.<ref name=RANDbio>{{citation | |||
| url = http://www.rand.org/about/people/k/kelly_terrence_k.html | | url = http://www.rand.org/about/people/k/kelly_terrence_k.html | ||
| title = Staff Profiles: Terrence K. Kelly | | title = Staff Profiles: Terrence K. Kelly | ||
| publisher = | | publisher = RAND Corporation}}</ref> He was a member of the Strategic Assessment Group for General [[Stanley McChrystal]], reviewing the situation in the [[Afghanistan War (2001-2021)]] and proposing new alternatives. | ||
==Iraq== | |||
In 2008, he testified to the [[U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]] about approaches to stabilization in Iraq. <blockquote>we are trying to do too much in Iraq. Unless one thinks that the U.S. can maintain very high troop levels in Iraq for the foreseeable future, we need to clearly understand what we must do as opposed to what we would like to do, and commit resources accordingly. This requires a clear articulation of U.S. vital interests. While it is difficult to build a strategy that relies on hindsight to | |||
assess progress and success, it is not difficult to articulate U.S. interests in Iraq – something that | |||
has not been done in a manner that is useful to strategist and planners. U.S., not Iraqi, interests | |||
should drive our strategy, and they will have profound implications on our approach and required | |||
resources...it is clear that Iraq will not reach | |||
reconciliation in the near future if “reconciliation” is understood in the literal sense...[a realistic goal is] cessation of large-scale violence | |||
based on an agreed upon way forward – a ''modus vivendi'' – that all major Iraqi players accept.<ref name=Modus>{{citation | |||
| url = http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2008/KellyTestimony080403a.pdf | |||
| title = An Iraqi Modus Vivendi: How Would It Come About and What Would It Look Like? | |||
| author = Terrence K. Kelly | |||
| id = RAND Corporation CT-303 | |||
| publisher = [[U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]] | |||
| date = 3 April 2008}}</ref></blockquote> | |||
From February 2006 to April 2007, he served as the Director of the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment Office for the [[U.S. Mission to Iraq]]. In 2004, he was the Director for Militia Transition and Reintegration Programs for the [[Coalition Provisional Authority]] in Iraq. | From February 2006 to April 2007, he served as the Director of the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment Office for the [[U.S. Mission to Iraq]]. In 2004, he was the Director for Militia Transition and Reintegration Programs for the [[Coalition Provisional Authority]] in Iraq. Based on that experience, he and others wrote recommendations for the Office of the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Office of the Secretary of Defense]] on errors and recommendations in creating [[Iraqi Security Forces]]. <ref name=>{{citation | ||
| title = Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience | |||
| author = Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, Keith Crane | |||
| publisher = RAND Corporation | |||
| year = 2005 | |||
| url = http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG365.pdf}}</ref> | |||
==Army assignments== | |||
He served as the Senior National Security Officer in the White House [[Office of Science and Technology Policy]], a 1997 White House Fellow and served as the Chief of Staff of the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. | |||
He | He participated in [[Operation URGENT FURY]] in Grenada for which he was awarded a [[Bronze Star]]. | ||
He has held faculty positions in West Point's System Engineering Department and the Mathematical Sciences Department (visiting) at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and an Adjunct Professor of Security Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College of Public Policy and Management. | He has held faculty positions in West Point's System Engineering Department and the Mathematical Sciences Department (visiting) at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and an Adjunct Professor of Security Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College of Public Policy and Management. | ||
==Education== | ==Education== | ||
*M.S. in Computer and Systems Engineering and Ph.D. in Mathematics, [[Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] | *M.S. in Computer and Systems Engineering and Ph.D. in Mathematics, [[Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] | ||
*Masters in Strategic Studies, | *Masters in Strategic Studies, U.S. Army War College | ||
*B.S., [[United States Military Academy]] (1982) | *B.S., [[United States Military Academy]] (1982) | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
Latest revision as of 07:05, 21 March 2024
Terrence K. "Terry" Kelly is a Senior Researcher with the RAND Corporation, where his primary research areas are national and homeland security policy.[1] He was a member of the Strategic Assessment Group for General Stanley McChrystal, reviewing the situation in the Afghanistan War (2001-2021) and proposing new alternatives.
Iraq
In 2008, he testified to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about approaches to stabilization in Iraq.
we are trying to do too much in Iraq. Unless one thinks that the U.S. can maintain very high troop levels in Iraq for the foreseeable future, we need to clearly understand what we must do as opposed to what we would like to do, and commit resources accordingly. This requires a clear articulation of U.S. vital interests. While it is difficult to build a strategy that relies on hindsight to
assess progress and success, it is not difficult to articulate U.S. interests in Iraq – something that has not been done in a manner that is useful to strategist and planners. U.S., not Iraqi, interests should drive our strategy, and they will have profound implications on our approach and required resources...it is clear that Iraq will not reach reconciliation in the near future if “reconciliation” is understood in the literal sense...[a realistic goal is] cessation of large-scale violence
based on an agreed upon way forward – a modus vivendi – that all major Iraqi players accept.[2]
From February 2006 to April 2007, he served as the Director of the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment Office for the U.S. Mission to Iraq. In 2004, he was the Director for Militia Transition and Reintegration Programs for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Based on that experience, he and others wrote recommendations for the Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense on errors and recommendations in creating Iraqi Security Forces. [3]
Army assignments
He served as the Senior National Security Officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, a 1997 White House Fellow and served as the Chief of Staff of the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office.
He participated in Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada for which he was awarded a Bronze Star.
He has held faculty positions in West Point's System Engineering Department and the Mathematical Sciences Department (visiting) at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and an Adjunct Professor of Security Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College of Public Policy and Management.
Education
- M.S. in Computer and Systems Engineering and Ph.D. in Mathematics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
- Masters in Strategic Studies, U.S. Army War College
- B.S., United States Military Academy (1982)
References
- ↑ Staff Profiles: Terrence K. Kelly, RAND Corporation
- ↑ Terrence K. Kelly (3 April 2008), An Iraqi Modus Vivendi: How Would It Come About and What Would It Look Like?, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, RAND Corporation CT-303
- ↑ Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, Keith Crane (2005), Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience, RAND Corporation