S-75 Dvina

The first widely deployed Soviet surface-to-air missile was the S-75 Dvina, designated the SA-2 by NATO with the reporting name GUIDELINE.

Unit organization

Air defense units armed with the Dvina were formed as regiments

Missiles

The S-75 surface-to-air missile would consist of a 1D (V-750) cruise stage, with an Isayev S2.711 engine, and a solid propellant booster by Kartukov's KB-2 Factory 81 GKAT. Isayev had begun development of the engine in accordance with the decree of 1 October 1954. It was the first Isayev engine using a gas generator-powered turbopump for propellant feed. The gas generator was powered by OT-155 monopropellant to ensure a quick start and build-up to full thrust. D D Sevruk at OKB-3 was tasked with building a competing motor design, and both motors reached the stage of flight trials. Isayev's was judged the more successful, and in 1955 Factory 82 began series production of the S2.711 engine.

In November 1957 the V-750 missile and S-75 Dvina surface-to-air missile system were accepted into service. During production a modernised S2-711V1 engine with 3100 to 3452 kgf was introduced to power the improved V-750V rocket.

Electronics

Firing battery level

The first surface-to-air missile (SAM) system deployed by the Soviet Union, the S-75 Dvina (NATO identifier SA-2, designation name GUIDELINE) had, in its original versions, two primary radars at the firing battery level, SPOON REST long-range search (range 170mi/275km) and FAN SONG (range 40 mi/65 KM) acquisition/fire control. Later versions increased both the radar's range and resistance to jamming.

FAN SONG has two antennas operating on different frequencies, one to track the target's compass bearing and the other to track its altitude.

Regimental command and control level radars

SA-2 regimental headquarters have an additional FLAT FACE long-range radar as well a SIDE NET height-finder; the regimental headquarters coordinates the multiple batteries.

Combat record

The S-75 first came to the world's attention when it downed an American U-2 spy aircraft at 20.4 km over the Soviet Union on May Day 1960. The Americans had thought the aircraft out of the reach of any Soviet missiles until then. It again downed a U-2 during the Cuban Missile Crisis on October 27, 1962.

In American bombing of North Vietnam in 1965-1966 and 1972-1973, it downed from 68 to 105 American fighters and 15 B-52 bombers. Intense American countermeasures, including avoiding protected areas, jamming aircraft, chaff, and anti-radar missiles kept the loss rate low for the American fighters (less than 0.03% per fighter sortie over North Vietnam), but this statistic disguises the manner in which the S-75 dictated the air battle. The American fighters could fly under the S-75's envelope, but there they could be picked off by anti-aircraft guns, ground fire, and shoulder-launched missiles. Over 1000 American aircraft met this fate. When the B-52's flew directly over areas defended by S-75's during the Linebacker campaign of 1972-1973, they suffered losses of 3% per sortie. It was said that this was only achieved due to the Strategic Air Command's insistence on flying the same course night after night. Even in the face of jamming, the North Vietnamese could fire the S-75's, fused for altitude, into B-52 bomber formations with some success. It was also claimed that 2,000 S-75's were expended to achieve these 15 kills. But from the Soviet point of view, the S-75 was a success. From the point of view of US pilots, the 'flying telephone pole' was greatly feared.

The S-75 continued to play a role in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, the various wars in the Persian Gulf, and the Balkan conflicts. It was no longer the primary threat, but it could not be ignored and continued to set the context for the air battle into the 1990's