Pseudoscience

Phrenology is regarded today as a classic example of pseudoscience.

The term pseudoscience which combines the Greek root pseudo, meaning false, and the Latin scientia, meaning knowledge, appears to have been used first in 1843 by Magendie, who referred to phrenology as "a pseudo-science of the present day" Among its early uses was in 1844 in the Northern Journal of Medicine, I 387: "That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognized as a branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles".

Introduction

The conventions for determining whether a body of knowledge, methodology, or practice is "scientific" vary from field to field, but generally involve similar principles of reproducibility and intersubjective verifiability. Such principles aim to ensure that evidence can be replicated, which allows further investigation to determine whether a hypothesis or theory is valid and reliable. Validated methods are expected to be applied consistently, and bias to be controlled or eliminated. Data, including experimental/environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for peer review.

However, despite general agreement on these principles, there is disagreement about whether it is possible to distinguish "science" from "pseudoscience" in a reliable and objective way, and about whether attempting to do so is useful. The philosopher of science Paul Feyeraband in particular is associated with the view that attempts to distinguish science from non-science are flawed. "The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. ... the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic:" 

Those who believe that characterising some areas as pseudoscientific is useful stress the use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims, over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation, lack of openness to testing by other experts, and a lack of progress in theory development. The term "pseudoscientific" is sometimes applied by disputants working in the same field to disparage a competing theory or the argument used by a rival, sometimes by commentators from outside a field to disparage a whole field, sometimes to express the opinion that a theory published in a popular book has no academic credibility and sometimes in reference to a theory now discarded.

The brights movement, prominently represented by Richard Dawkins, Mario Bunge, Carl Sagan and James Randi, consider that all forms of pseudoscience are harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics consider that pseudoscientific beliefs may be held for several reasons, from simple naïveté about the nature of science, to deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of health and safety may be involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy, or in assessing risks.

Defining science by the scientific method

In the mid-20th Century, Karl Popper suggested the criterion of falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science. Theories may be true or false, but if they do not entail predictions that are in principle capable of falsification by experimental tests, then they are devoid of content and hence mere pseudoscience. Popper subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious and/or metaphysical formulations on the one hand, and pseudoscientific formulations on the other, and gave astrology, Marxism, and Freudian psychoanalysis as examples of pseudosciences as being wholly unfalsifiable theories. More recently, Paul Thagard proposed that pseudoscience can be distinguished by its lack of progress, and by the lack of serious attempts by proponents to solve problems with the theory. Mario Bunge has suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between science and pseudoscience.

Defining pseudoscience

Science differs from revelation, theology, or spirituality in that it claims to offer insight into the physical world by "scientific" means. Systems of thought that derive from "divine" or "inspired" knowledge are not considered pseudoscience if they do not claim to be scientific. However, a field might plausibly be called pseudoscientific if it is presented as consistent with the accepted norms of scientific research, but demonstrably fails to meet these norms.

The following have been proposed to be indicative of poor scientific reasoning.

• Vague, exaggerated or untestable claims
• Failure to use "operational definitions" (i.e. a rigorous description of the means by which measurements are made).
• Failure to use the principle of parsimony, i.e. failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when other viable explanations are possible (Occam's Razor)
• Use of obscurantist language, and misuse of apparently technical jargon, in an effort to give claims the superficial trappings of science.
• Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess well articulated limitations under which predictions do or do not apply.
• Assertion of scientific claims that cannot be falsified in the event they are incorrect, inaccurate, or irrelevant
• Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict
• Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must be true, and vice versa (see: Argument from ignorance)
• Over-reliance on testimonials and anecdotes. Testimonial and anecdotal evidence can be useful for discovery (hypothesis generation) but should not be used in the context of justification (hypothesis testing).
• Selective use of experimental evidence: presenting data that seem to support claims while suppressing or dismissing data that contradict them.
• Reversed burden of proof. In science, the burden of proof rests on the individual making a claim, not on the critic. "Pseudoscientific" arguments may neglect this principle and demand that skeptics demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that a claim is false.
• Evasion of peer review before publicizing results ("science by press conference").

Some proponents of theories that contradict accepted scientific theories avoid the often ego-bruising process of peer review, sometimes on the grounds that peer review is biased against claims that contradict established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated using standard scientific methods.

• Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to reproduce claimed results.
• Assertion of claims of secrecy or proprietary knowledge in response to requests for review of data or methodology.

Lack of progress Thagard proposed that a theory or discipline which has pretensions to be scientific can be regarded as pseudoscientific if (and only if): "it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations"

Personalization of issues

• Tight social groups and granfalloons. Authoritarian personality, suppression of dissent, and "groupthink" can enhance the adoption of beliefs that have no rational basis. The group tends to identify their critics as enemies.
• Assertion of claims of a conspiracy by the scientific community to suppress the results.
• Attacking the motives or character of anyone who questions the claims (Ad hominem fallacy).

Some of these criticisms has also been levelled to areas regarded as part of conventional science. According to Churchland, "Most terms in theoretical physics, for example, do not enjoy at least some distinct connections with observables, but not of the simple sort that would permit operational definitions in terms of these observables. [..] If a restriction in favor of operational definitions were to be followed, therefore, most of theoretical physics would have to be dismissed as meaningless pseudoscience!"

The demarcation problem, and criticisms of the concept of pseudoscience

Despite broad agreement on the basics of the scientific method, the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated. This is the problem of demarcation. The defining feature of science is not experimental success, for, in Rothbart's words, "most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified". Many disciplines currently thought of as science exhibited at some time in their history, features which are often cited as flaws of scientific method, and many currently accepted scientific theories — including the theory of evolution, plate tectonics, the Big Bang (a term originally chosen by Fred Hoyle to poke fun at the idea), and quantum mechanics — were criticized as being pseudo-scientific when first proposed. In retrospect, it is clear that this was a response to the challenge they posed to accepted doctrines, and a reflection of the difficulty in gathering evidence for new theories. Further, because of the heterogeneous nature of the scientific enterprise itself, it is difficult to create a set of criteria which can be applied to all disciplines at all times.

Nevertheless, over the years there have been repeated efforts by philosophers of science to propose demarcation criteria. Logical positivism, proposed that only statements about empirical observations are meaningful, thus asserting that all metaphysical statements) are meaningless. Later, Karl Popper attacked logical positivism and introduced his criterion of falsifiability.

Popper's vision of the scientific method was soon itself tested in detail by the historian of science Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn concluded, from analysis of the history of scientific ideas, that science does not progress by a linear accumulation of new knowledge, but undergoes periodic revolutions, which he calls "paradigm shifts", in which the nature of scientific inquiry within a particular field is abruptly transformed. He argued that falsification had played little part in such scientific "revolutions", and concluded that this was because rival paradigms are incommensurable - it is not possible to understand one paradigm through the conceptual framework and terminology of another rival.

In response to Kuhn's criticisms, Imre Lakatos proposed that it might instead be possible to distinguish between "progressive" and "degenerative" research programs . Kuhn questioned this, asking "Does a field make progress beecause it is a science, or is it a science because it makes progress?" He also questioned whether scientific revolutions were obviously progressive, noting that Einstein's general theory of relativity is in some respects closer to Aristotle's than either is to Newton's.

Many philosophers have questioned ( whether any clear or meaningful boundaries can be drawn between pseudoscience (notably by Feyeraband, see above)and "real" science. When there is a significant cultural or historical distance (as, for example, modern chemistry reflecting on alchemy), protosciences can be misinterpreted as unscientific. Often the term "pseudoscience" is used simply as a pejorative to express a low opinion of a given field, regardless of any objective measures; thus according to McNally, "The term “pseudoscience” has become little more than an inflammatory buzzword for quickly dismissing one’s opponents in media sound-bites." . Larry Laudan has suggested that pseudoscience has no scientific meaning: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".

The ubiquity of pseudoscientific thinking

The National Science Foundation stated that, in the USA, "pseudoscientific" beliefs became more widespread during the 1990's, peaked near 2001 and mildly declined since; nevertheless, pseudoscientific beliefs remain common in the USA. As a result, according to the NSF report, there is a lack of knowledge of pseudoscientific issues in society and pseudoscientific practices are commonly followed. Bunge (1999) stated that a 1988 survey showed that 50% of American adults rejected evolution, and 88% believed that astrology was a science.

Pseudoscientific thinking has been explained in terms of psychology and social psychology. The human proclivity for seeking confirmation rather than refutation (confirmation bias) , the tendency to hold comforting beliefs, and the tendency to overgeneralize have been proposed as reasons for the common adherence to pseudoscientific thinking.

Pseudoscience in psychology

Some neurologists and clinical psychologists are concerned about the increasing amount of what they consider pseudoscience in psychotherapy and popular psychology, and that "pseudoscientific" therapies such as Neuro-linguistic programming, Rebirthing, Reparenting, and Primal Scream Therapy are being increasingly adopted. They state that scientifically unsupported therapies might harm vulnerable members of the public, undermine legitimate therapies, and spread misconceptions about the nature of the mind and brain. Some psychiatrists and psychologists also perceive pseudoscientific ideas in more popularly accepted branches of psychotherapy, such as co-counselling, Gestalt Therapy, Re-evaluation Counseling and even in the work of Twelve-step program bodies such as Alcoholics Anonymous.

External links

• The Anatomy of Pseudoscience - Steven Novella, MD
• Science and Pseudoscience - transcript and broadcast of talk by Imre Lakatos
• Science Needs to Combat Pseudoscience - A statement by 32 Russian scientists and philosophers