Permissive Action Link

From Citizendium
Revision as of 17:28, 28 April 2010 by imported>Howard C. Berkowitz (snapshot save while writing)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search

A Permissive Action Link (PAL) is a U.S.-developed physical component of a nuclear weapons, specifically to prevent unauthorized activation by persons who have legitimate access to them, and by persons at intermediate levels in the chain of command over the weapon. They complement measures to prevent activation of the weapon by accidents of nature, and validation mechanisms within the command and control system.

It is unclear who both originated the idea and effectively shepherded through the government.[1]

PAL Implementation

There have been six general types of PAL. The multiple codes allow setting options such as the nuclear yield in weapons with the "Dial-a-yield" feature, but also things such as burst altitude.[2]

Class Features Comments Representative uses
(none) Mechanical combination lock A single person may not have the complete combination nuclear artillery shells
A Four-digit, 10-position electromechanical coded switch Most retired; enabled a single option W28, W28, W50, and W52
B Ground or airplane cabin-operable 4-digit coded switch later version with limited try followed by lockout until reset
C Single-code 6-digit switch limited try followed by lockout
D Multiple-code 6-digit switch limited try followed by lockout
F Multiple-code 6-digit switch limited try followed by lockout

Since the PAL is a part of the weapon, each specific design will vary. It is generally agreed that their primary function is acting as switches in the high-voltage path interconnecting power supplies, high-voltage capacitors, timing components, and detonators.[3]

References

  1. , The JCAE and the Development of the Permissive Action Link, The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project, Brookings Institution, August 1998
  2. Chuck Hansen (September 4, 1995), Parv V: Arming & Fuzing: Techniques & Equipment, The Swords of Armageddon: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945
  3. Steven M. Bellovin (21 October 2005), Permissive Action Links,Nuclear Weapons, and the History of Public Key Cryptography, Department of Computer Science, Columbia University