Ngo Dinh Diem

See also: Vietnam War, Buddhist crisis and military coup of 1963

Ngo Dinh Diem was a politician in French Indochina, who became Premier of the State of Vietnam before partition, and then became President, although in a 1955 election widely accepted as dishonest; Diem's overall margin was 98.2 percent, and he seemed to have received 605,000 votes from the 405,000 registered voters of Saigon. He served until his overthow and assassination in November 1963.

He was a personally ascetic Catholic in a majority Buddhist country, with a Confucian attitude toward authority. The third of sixth sons, his closest advisers were among his surviving brothers, especially the increasingly irrational Ngo Dinh Nhu, his key political advisor. Other brothers, had were effectively private armies, except for his brother Ngo Dinh Thuc, Archbishop of Hue. Since Diem himself was a bachelor, his sister-in-law, born Tran Le Xuan but usually called Madame Nhu, acted as official hostess and was extremely visible. Perhaps the most charitable view that could be taken of Diem was that he believed that his personal rectitude freed him from responsibility to the people he governed.

Other brothers included:

• Ngo Dinh Luyen, Ambassador of the Republic of Vietnam to the United Kingdom until November 2,1963; survived coup because he was out of the country
• Ngo Trong Hieu, Vietnamese Minister of Civic Action and Diem's Director of Political Intelligence until November 1, 1963
• Ngo Dinh Can, the chief of central Vietnam under Diem, executed after the overthrow of Diem; led actions against Buddhists in Hue
• Ngô Ðình Khôi, a French provisional governor killed by the Viet Minh

While the U.S. had supported him from the time he took office, he, or especially hs brother Nhu, was seen as more and more of a problem. In 1963, the Mendenhall-Krulak mission, and then the Taylor-McNamara mission, evaluated his position, which led to gradual withdrawal of support for his rule.

Under French rule

In 1933 he became the Minister for the Interior in a French colonial government under Bao Diem, but resigned. Diem, a nationalist, had exiled himself from the South until the partition was close.

He arrived in Saigon from France on 25 June 1954. and, with U.S. and French support, was named Premier of the State of Vietnam by Emperor Bao Dai, who had just won French assent to "treaties of independence and association" on 4 June.

Diem was an Annamite, from Central Vietnam (although not the Central Highlands) in the South upon taking power. In seeking political support from Southerners, he was not nearly as visible as Bao Dai, nor was he seen as sympathetic to Buddhism or the smaller minorities. Diem had to to create a viable alternative to the Vietminh in those areas where the French had provided security, both the cities and towns, but also in pockets of the rural areas inhabited by people of the regional or "folk" religions, such as the Cao Dai. The existing upper class might be wealthy, but the French had found it was neither popular nor internally cohesive.

Early rule

Francis Cardinal Spellman, in the region to visit U.S. troops, came to Vietnam in early January, celebrated masses, and gave a donation to Catholic Relief Services. While various reports suggested Spellman was Diem's patron in the U.S., it seems likely that his visit was one for his coreligionists. Obviously, Spellman would not be unhappy with a Catholic leader, but the U.S. was quite aware that Diem's Catholicism isolated him from the majority of South Vietnamese. When an Australian cardinal visited Vietnam shortly afterwards, J. Lawton Collins suggested to Diem's brother, the Bishop of Hue, that there be a moratorium on high-level Catholic visits. Collins suggested that these visits aggravated the isolation of Diem from the majority.

1955

The U.S. and France, going into 1955, were dubious of Diem's ability to unify South Vietnam, but there was no obvious alternative: anti-French, nationalist, anti-Bao Dai. The French supported the Vietnamese National Army chief of staff. Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh. Hinh, working with the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen, failed to organize a coup.

On 28 April, Diem, against U.S. advice, against French advice, and against the advice of his cabinet, moved again against the sects. When Binh Xuyen resisted in Saigon, and fired mortars against the Presidential Palace, Diem committe a loyal ARVN battalion and broke the Binh Xuyen he committed the Vietnamese army to battle. Keyes called this Diem's "finest hour". Lansdale and Keyes knew one another by then, and regretted the death of a Cao Dai general, apparently a moderate on the CIA payroll, during the Binh Xuyen incident. Keyes also said that Diem got Lansdale in "hot water" with the French. Diem's brother, Nhu, used the incident to form a coalition against Bao Dai. John Foster Dulles had been planning a withdrawal of support on the day before the incident, but concluded Diem was acceptable based on his performance.

In June, concerned that Viet Minh might win, Diem abolished elections for village councils. Traditionally, the village level was autonomous. By replacing it at all, he inherited responsibility for corruption at that level. His appointments were usually from outside the villages; outsiders that he considered "dependable" Catholics, Northerners, or others not tied to the rural culture. This drove the villagers to the sort of conspiracy that they used against the French.

The Geneva agreements had specified the start of consultations on the 1956 referendum would begin, between Hanoi and Saigon, in July 1955. Diem refused to enter into talks. On 20 July, Vietnam announced that it would not participate in talks for the reunification of North and South Vietnam through the elections that were scheduled for the following year, according to the Geneva agreements. Diem pointed out that his government had not signed the Geneva agreements, and thus was not subject to them.

On 26 October Ngo Dinh Diem became President and Commander-in-Chief after defeating Bao Dai in an election.

December was a time of land reform in both North and South. In the North, it was a period of ideological purges, with thousands of landowners executed or imprisoned (see Giap below)

In 1955, the first part of Diem's land reforms involved resettling refugees and other land destitute Vietnamese on uncultivated land; the ownership of this land was not always clear.

1956

Under the French, the Montangnards of the Central Highlands had been autonomous. Diêm moved ethnic Vietnamese, as well as refugees from the North, into "land development centers" in the Montagnard areas. He intended to assimilate the unwilling tribes, a point of ethnic resentment that was to become one of the many resentments against Diem. These resentments both cost internal support, and certainly were exploited by the Communists.In the fall of 1956, Diem dealt strongly with another group not considered of his circle: the approximately 1,000,000 Chinese-identified people of Vietnam, who dominated much of the economy. He barred "foreigners", including Chinese, from 11 kinds of businesses, and demanded the half-million Vietnamese-born men, known as "uncles", "Vietnamize", including changing their names to a Vietnamese form. His vice-president, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, was put in charge of the program.

1957

In 1957, the 300-man Lien doi Quan Sat soi 1 (1st Observation Unit) was formed, trained by United States Army Special Forces for special reconnaissance and unconventional warfare. While it was under the Presidential Liaison Office, it was originally based in Nha Trang, and perhaps was comparable to the paramilitary side of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was commanded by a Diem loyalist, then-LTC Le Quang Tung.

1958

A year after its formation, it was slightly increased in size, renamed a Group, and moved to Saigon to be more responsive to Diem. While it did take on some border reconnaissance, it was primarily a presidential guard, and used to carry out paramilitary missions for the Diem and his immediate advisors.

Strategic Hamlet Program

A major thrust of Diem's government was the Strategic Hamlet Program to provide rural security. After receiving British and U.S. advice, he started the program in 1962, directed by Ngo. Both the actual effectiveness of the program, and its effect on national political stability, remain controversial to this day.

Some, such as U.S. Ambassador Frederick Nolting, felt they could have been the key:

The strategic hamlet program, which was Nhu’s principal thing, and in my opinion a good thing, was wiped out. And all these hospitals and schools and things that I’ve been talking about were virtually wiped out. Finally, the U.S. was faced with the alternatives: either go in to save Saigon or wash our hands of it. President Johnson made the decision to send American combat forces, but I do not think that there was a need up to ‘63, before the coup, of American military power in that situation

John Paul Vann, in contrast, believed forced relocation was a cruel folly. He strongly rejected a similar progrram in 1965, on the theory that the allegiance of the peasants could be gained only by keeping the peasants in the land they cherished, and bettering there lives in their villages.

Government development

Legislative Assembly elections were held in 1959, and the highest plurality of any candidate was won by an opposition candidate, Phan Quang Dan. While he was briefly in the Cabinet, Diem had him arrested after a 1960 coup; he did return to post-Diem governments. U.S. Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow had recommended that Dan would be useful as a member of a "loyal opposition", a concept not acceptable to Diem.