Iraq Survey Group

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The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was a U.S., Australian and British intelligence organization that entered Iraq early in the Iraq War, searching for weapons of mass destruction, as well as other prohibited weapons such as long-range guided missiles. Its field commander was then-major general Keith Dayton of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Advising it and preparing it were senior advisers to the Director of Central Intelligence, first David Kay and then, after his resignation, Charles Duelfer. It should not be confused with the Iraq Study Group, a subsequent U.S.-only high-level commission evaluating the Iraq War as well as its justification.

In its unclassified form, the "Duelfer Report" was delivered in key findings, three main volumes, and addenda.

Conclusions

Strategic intent

Delivery systems

Nuclear program

Biological program

Chemical program

Methods

Interrogation

ISG interrogated high-level Iraqi figures, such as former members of the government. Some of those had been captured by the Joint Special Operations Command Special Mission Unit task force (SMU TF) or conventional units. From the onset, ISG, which its own interrogation staff, had concerns about the SMU TF's treatment of detainees.[2]. On August 8, MG Dayton also issued an order that CIA personnel not be allowed to interrogate ISG prisoners without his staff being present, although accounts differ whether this concerned potential abuse, or an issue of responsibility for intelligence. CIA officials said it reinforced a cable sent by the C.I.A's Baghdad station to headquarters on July 16, 2003. That cable expressed concern that SMU TF personnel, on joint teams, had used techniques that had become too aggressive.[3]

References

  1. Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (November 20, 2008), Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, SASC November 2008 , pp. 162-164
  2. Douglas Jehl (September 11, 2004), "Conflict in Iraq: Prison Policy; C.I.A. Cites Order on Supervised Interrogations", New York Times