Gian Gentile
Gian P. Gentile is a colonel in the United States Army, who is on the faculty of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served two combat tours in Iraq, the second as commander of 8/10 Reconnaissance Squadron operating against insurgents in Baghdad in 2006, and is a highly visible critic of counterinsurgency doctrine.
Andrew Bacevich has called him a leader of the "Conservative" versus "Crusader" faction in current military thinking, which challenges the "revisionist" interpretation that the Vietnam War could have been won, if only the U.S. had used a proper counterinsurgency approach. Bacevich describes Gentile's core concern as "an infatuation with stability operations will lead the Army to reinvent itself as 'a constabulary,' adept perhaps at nation-building but shorn of adequate capacity for conventional war-fighting."[1]
He points to GEN Creighton Abrams, the last U.S. combat commander in the the Vietnam War, deciding, immediately after that war, to prepare the Army for combat with the Soviet Union, rather than a less understood counterinsurgency. "If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would the ground phase of the 1991 Gulf War have been completed in four days? Would the 2003 drive to Baghdad have been accomplished in three weeks?"[2]
If the Army principally prepares itself for counterinsurgency, as did the Israeli Defense Forces manning checkpoints in the Occupied Territories in the early 2000s, it
...could easily reprise Israel’s experience in southern Lebanon two years ago. Because the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had devoted themselves nearly exclusively to low-intensity conflict in the West Bank and Gaza, their conventional warfighting skills atrophied to the point where they could not fight effectively against a semi-conventional foe in Lebanon, according to U.S. Army historian Matt Matthews, relying heavily on the Israeli Winograd Commission that studied the reasons for the IDF’s disastrous showing[2]
In an article entitled "e challenges what he considers the prevailing thinking that the Army of the future should prepare principally for asymmetrical counterinsurgency, rather than decisive large-scale combat. [3]
Iraq War
He wrote, in a New York Times op-ed, that the major differences between 2006 and 2007 were:[4]
- "a decision by senior American leaders in 2007 to pay large amounts of money to Sunni insurgents to stop attacking Americans and join the fight against Al Qaeda.
- the decision by the Shiite militia leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, to refrain from attacking coalition forces
- the separation of rival factions in Baghdad stemming from sectarian cleansing in 2006-2007
== Tank Company Commander, Korea, 1993-1995 History Teacher, USMA, 1995-98; 2003-04 Division Planner, 2000-01 Cavalry Squadron Operations Officer, 2001-02 Brigade Combat Team Executive Officer, 20
Education
- B.A., History, University of California, Berkeley, 1986
- M.M.A.S., School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College 2000
- PhD., History, Stanford University, 2000
References
- ↑ Andrew Bacevich (October 2008), "The Petraeus Doctrine", Atlantic Monthly
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Gian P. Gentile (Summer 2008), "A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its Defects", World Affairs
- ↑ Gian P. Gentile (January 2008), "Our COIN doctrine removes the enemy from the essence of war", Armed Forces Journal
- ↑ Gian P. Gentile (4 February 2008), "Our troops did not fail in 2006", New York Times