Free speech: Difference between revisions
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==Clear and present danger== | ==Clear and present danger== | ||
UDHR Article 20 states a right of peaceful assembly and association. Violence, or threats of violence, are rarely if ever protected speech. ''[[Schenck v. United States]]'' further said, <blockquote>Words which, ordinarily and in many places, would be within the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment may become subject to prohibition when of such a nature and used in such circumstances a to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent. The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.</blockquote> The 1942 ''[[Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire]]'' decision<ref>Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)</ref> affirmed the decision of the [[New Hampshire (U.S. state)|New Hampshire]] on a state law blocking what it called "fighting words" in a face-to-face situation: <blockquote>"any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place," or "call him by any offensive or derisive name," was construed by the Supreme Court of the State, in this case and before this case arose, as limited to the use in a public place of words directly tending to cause a breach of the peace by provoking the person addressed to acts of violence.</blockquote>The Court later refined its definition, in ''[[Bradenburg v. Ohio]] (1969)'':<blockquote>These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.<ref name=Brandenburg>Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969)</ref></blockquote> | UDHR Article 20 states a right of peaceful assembly and association. Violence, or threats of violence, are rarely if ever protected speech. ''[[Schenck v. United States]]'' further said, <blockquote>Words which, ordinarily and in many places, would be within the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment may become subject to prohibition when of such a nature and used in such circumstances a to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent. The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.</blockquote> The 1942 ''[[Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire]]'' decision<ref>Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)</ref> affirmed the decision of the [[New Hampshire (U.S. state)|New Hampshire]] on a state law blocking what it called "fighting words" in a face-to-face situation: <blockquote>"any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place," or "call him by any offensive or derisive name," was construed by the Supreme Court of the State, in this case and before this case arose, as limited to the use in a public place of words directly tending to cause a breach of the peace by provoking the person addressed to acts of violence.</blockquote>The Court later refined its definition, in ''[[Bradenburg v. Ohio]] (1969)'':<blockquote>These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.<ref name=Brandenburg>Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969)</ref></blockquote> | ||
==Political speech== | ==Political speech== | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
Revision as of 08:39, 28 March 2024
Even in liberal democracies, there are differing views of free speech. Nations with the greatest tradition still restrict things that are an immediate danger, as Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote in the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the 1919 case, Schenck v. United States,
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.[1]
Freedom of thought
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) does freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the right to change religions and to practice one's religion. This is not universally accepted, Based on the right of freedom of opinion, Article 19 state a right to transfer "information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."
Clear and present danger
UDHR Article 20 states a right of peaceful assembly and association. Violence, or threats of violence, are rarely if ever protected speech. Schenck v. United States further said,
Words which, ordinarily and in many places, would be within the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment may become subject to prohibition when of such a nature and used in such circumstances a to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent. The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
The 1942 Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire decision[2] affirmed the decision of the New Hampshire on a state law blocking what it called "fighting words" in a face-to-face situation:
"any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place," or "call him by any offensive or derisive name," was construed by the Supreme Court of the State, in this case and before this case arose, as limited to the use in a public place of words directly tending to cause a breach of the peace by provoking the person addressed to acts of violence.
The Court later refined its definition, in Bradenburg v. Ohio (1969):
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.[3]