Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency: Difference between revisions

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(New page: '''''Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency''''' is the principal counterinsurgency doctrinal manual of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. The lead writers included GEN [[David...)
 
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'''''Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency''''' is the principal [[counterinsurgency]] doctrinal manual of the [[U.S. Army]] and [[U.S. Marine Corps]]. The lead writers included GEN [[David Petraeus]], GEN [[James Amos]], [[John Nagl]], and [[Sarah Sewall]].
'''''Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency''''' is the principal [[counterinsurgency]] doctrinal manual of the [[U.S. Army]] and [[U.S. Marine Corps]]. The lead writers included GEN [[David Petraeus]], GEN [[James Amos]], [[John Nagl]], and [[Sarah Sewall]].
It has become as dominant as was [[Field Manual 3-0: Operations]], which codified the "maneuvrist", network-centric doctrines for conventional warfare. In principle, both capabilities are necessary, but some critics, such as [[Gian Gentile]], have suggested that the Army, specifically, is letting conventional capabilities lapse in favor of counterinsurgency.
Even supporters of the doctrine suggest the manual is a guideline rather than a rigid set of instructions; while there may indeed be counterinsurgency operations in the [[Afghanistan War (2001-)]] and the [[Iraq War, insurgency|Iraq War]], experience has taught that the two insurgencies are different and need different handling.  There are continuing professional discussions about its interpretation and areas for improvement.<ref name=SWJ>{{citation
| title = FM 3-24 / MCWP 33.3.5 Update Discussion
| journal = [[Small Wars Journal]]
| url =http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/fm-324-mcwp-3335-update-discus/
| date = (discussion start) 8 July 2008}}</ref>
==Organization==
*Chapter 1: INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
*Chapter 2: UNITY OF EFFORT: INTEGRATING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES
*Chapter 3: INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
*Chapter 4: DESIGNING COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS
*Chapter 5: EXECUTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
*Chapter 6: DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES
*Chapter 7: LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
*Chapter 8: SUSTAINMENT.
*Appendix A: A GUIDE FOR ACTION
*Appendix B: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND OTHER ANALYTICAL TOOLS...........B-1
*Appendix C: LINGUIST SUPPORT
*Appendix D: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS.
*Appendix E: AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY...............
==References==
{{reflist|2}}

Revision as of 12:33, 30 September 2009

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Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency is the principal counterinsurgency doctrinal manual of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. The lead writers included GEN David Petraeus, GEN James Amos, John Nagl, and Sarah Sewall.

It has become as dominant as was Field Manual 3-0: Operations, which codified the "maneuvrist", network-centric doctrines for conventional warfare. In principle, both capabilities are necessary, but some critics, such as Gian Gentile, have suggested that the Army, specifically, is letting conventional capabilities lapse in favor of counterinsurgency.

Even supporters of the doctrine suggest the manual is a guideline rather than a rigid set of instructions; while there may indeed be counterinsurgency operations in the Afghanistan War (2001-) and the Iraq War, experience has taught that the two insurgencies are different and need different handling. There are continuing professional discussions about its interpretation and areas for improvement.[1]

Organization

  • Chapter 1: INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
  • Chapter 2: UNITY OF EFFORT: INTEGRATING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES
  • Chapter 3: INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
  • Chapter 4: DESIGNING COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS
  • Chapter 5: EXECUTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
  • Chapter 6: DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES
  • Chapter 7: LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
  • Chapter 8: SUSTAINMENT.
  • Appendix A: A GUIDE FOR ACTION
  • Appendix B: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND OTHER ANALYTICAL TOOLS...........B-1
  • Appendix C: LINGUIST SUPPORT
  • Appendix D: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS.
  • Appendix E: AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY...............

References