Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency: Difference between revisions

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'''''Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (FM3-24)''''' (Marine Corps designation '''MCWP 33.3.5''' is the principal [[counterinsurgency]] doctrinal manual of the [[U.S. Army]] and [[U.S. Marine Corps]]. <ref name = FM3-24>{{citation  | publisher = US Department of the Army   
'''''Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (FM3-24)''''' (Marine Corps designation '''MCWP 33.3.5''' is the principal [[counterinsurgency]] doctrinal manual of the [[U.S. Army]] and [[United States Marine Corps|U.S. Marine Corps]]. <ref name = FM3-24>{{citation  | publisher = US Department of the Army   
|author = [[John Nagl]], [[David Petraeus]], [[James Amos]], [[Sarah Sewall]]  
|author = [[John Nagl]], [[David Petraeus]], [[James Amos]], [[Sarah Sewall]]  
   | title = Field Manual 3-24:  Counterinsurgency
   | title = Field Manual 3-24:  Counterinsurgency
   | date = December 2006
   | date = December 2006
   | url = http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf
   | url = http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf
}} </ref> proposes a structure that includes both ''[[insurgency]]'' and ''[[counterinsurgency]]'' (COIN). While military manuals rarely show individual authors, generals [[David Petraeus]] (U.S. Army) and [[James Amos]] (U.S. Marine Corps) are widely described as establishing many of this volume's concepts; other team members included [[John Nagl]] and [[Sarah Sewall]]. Sewall is a specialist in [[peace operations]] and brought a contrarian view.
}} </ref> proposes a structure that includes both ''insurgency'' and ''[[counterinsurgency]]'' (COIN). While military manuals rarely show individual authors, generals [[David Petraeus]] (U.S. Army) and [[James Amos]] (U.S. Marine Corps) are widely described as establishing many of this volume's concepts; other team members included [[John Nagl]] and [[Sarah Sewall]]. Sewall is a specialist in [[peace operations]] and brought a contrarian view.


It has become as dominant as was [[Field Manual 3-0: Operations]], which codified the "maneuvrist", network-centric doctrines for conventional warfare. In principle, both capabilities are necessary, but some critics, such as [[Gian Gentile]], have suggested that the Army, specifically, is letting conventional capabilities lapse in favor of counterinsurgency.<ref name=AFJ>{{citation
It has become as dominant as was [[Field Manual 3-0: Operations]], which codified the "maneuvrist", network-centric doctrines for conventional warfare. In principle, both capabilities are necessary, but some critics, such as [[Gian Gentile]], have suggested that the Army, specifically, is letting conventional capabilities lapse in favor of counterinsurgency.<ref name=AFJ>{{citation
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*Chapter 2: UNITY OF EFFORT: INTEGRATING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
*Chapter 2: UNITY OF EFFORT: INTEGRATING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
*Chapter 3: INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
*Chapter 3: INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
*Chapter 4: DESIGNING COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS
*Chapter 4: DESIGNING COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS AND OperationS
*Chapter 5: EXECUTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
*Chapter 5: EXECUTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OperationS
*Chapter 6: DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES
*Chapter 6: DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES
*Chapter 7: LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
*Chapter 7: LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
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*Appendix E: AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
*Appendix E: AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
==Evolution==
==Evolution==
Even supporters of the doctrine suggest the manual is a guideline rather than a rigid set of instructions; while there may indeed be counterinsurgency operations in the [[Afghanistan War (2001-)]] and the [[Iraq War, insurgency|Iraq War]], experience has taught that the two insurgencies are different and need different handling.  There are continuing professional discussions about its interpretation and areas for improvement.<ref name=SWJ>{{citation
Even supporters of the doctrine suggest the manual is a guideline rather than a rigid set of instructions; while there may indeed be counterinsurgency operations in the [[Afghanistan War (2001-2021)]] and the [[Iraq War, insurgency|Iraq War]], experience has taught that the two insurgencies are different and need different handling.  There are continuing professional discussions about its interpretation and areas for improvement.<ref name=SWJ>{{citation
  | title = FM 3-24 / MCWP 33.3.5 Update Discussion
  | title = FM 3-24 / MCWP 33.3.5 Update Discussion
  | journal = [[Small Wars Journal]]
  | journal = [[Small Wars Journal]]

Latest revision as of 02:20, 1 April 2024

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Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (FM3-24) (Marine Corps designation MCWP 33.3.5 is the principal counterinsurgency doctrinal manual of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. [1] proposes a structure that includes both insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN). While military manuals rarely show individual authors, generals David Petraeus (U.S. Army) and James Amos (U.S. Marine Corps) are widely described as establishing many of this volume's concepts; other team members included John Nagl and Sarah Sewall. Sewall is a specialist in peace operations and brought a contrarian view.

It has become as dominant as was Field Manual 3-0: Operations, which codified the "maneuvrist", network-centric doctrines for conventional warfare. In principle, both capabilities are necessary, but some critics, such as Gian Gentile, have suggested that the Army, specifically, is letting conventional capabilities lapse in favor of counterinsurgency.[2]

Organization

  • Chapter 1: INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
  • Chapter 2: UNITY OF EFFORT: INTEGRATING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES
  • Chapter 3: INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
  • Chapter 4: DESIGNING COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS AND OperationS
  • Chapter 5: EXECUTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OperationS
  • Chapter 6: DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES
  • Chapter 7: LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
  • Chapter 8: SUSTAINMENT.
  • Appendix A: A GUIDE FOR ACTION
  • Appendix B: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND OTHER ANALYTICAL TOOLS
  • Appendix C: LINGUIST SUPPORT
  • Appendix D: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
  • Appendix E: AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Evolution

Even supporters of the doctrine suggest the manual is a guideline rather than a rigid set of instructions; while there may indeed be counterinsurgency operations in the Afghanistan War (2001-2021) and the Iraq War, experience has taught that the two insurgencies are different and need different handling. There are continuing professional discussions about its interpretation and areas for improvement.[3]

References

  1. ↑ John Nagl, David Petraeus, James Amos, Sarah Sewall (December 2006), Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, US Department of the Army
  2. ↑ Gian P. Gentile (January 2008), "Our COIN doctrine removes the enemy from the essence of war", Armed Forces Journal
  3. ↑ "FM 3-24 / MCWP 33.3.5 Update Discussion", Small Wars Journal, (discussion start) 8 July 2008
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