Controlling close support to ground forces/Definition: Difference between revisions
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imported>Howard C. Berkowitz No edit summary |
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A unified approach to [[deconfliction|deconflicting]] controlling all forms of kinetic (i.e., physically destructive) and nonkinetic (e.g., [[electronic warfare]]) support to troops in contact with the enemy, when the proximity is close enough that there is a significant danger of [[fratricide (military)|fratricide]] or degrading troop capabilities (e.g., by interfering with their sensors) | A unified approach to [[deconfliction|deconflicting]] and controlling all forms of kinetic (i.e., physically destructive, such as [[artillery]] and [[close air support]]) and nonkinetic (e.g., [[electronic warfare]]) support to troops in contact with the enemy, when the proximity is close enough that there is a significant danger of [[fratricide (military)|fratricide]] or degrading troop capabilities (e.g., by interfering with their sensors) | ||
Revision as of 10:12, 5 September 2009
A unified approach to deconflicting and controlling all forms of kinetic (i.e., physically destructive, such as artillery and close air support) and nonkinetic (e.g., electronic warfare) support to troops in contact with the enemy, when the proximity is close enough that there is a significant danger of fratricide or degrading troop capabilities (e.g., by interfering with their sensors)