Blitzkrieg: Difference between revisions

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'''Blitzkrieg''', German for "lightning war", principally refers to the [[combined arms]] tactics used by the German military in the Polish campaign of 1939, the campaign into France and the Low Countries in 1940, and the early phases of the attack on the Soviet Union. In common usage, it has become a generic term for any fast-moving military operation using apparently high technology.  The term was not widely used in German literature, and actually became popularized by an article in the American ''Time'' magazine.<ref>{{citation
'''Blitzkrieg''', German for "lightning war", principally refers to the [[combined arms]] tactics used by the German military in the Polish campaign of 1939, the campaign into France and the Low Countries in 1940, and the early phases of the attack on the Soviet Union. In common usage, it has become a generic term for any fast-moving military operation using apparently high technology.  The term was not widely used in German literature, and actually became popularized by an article in the American ''Time'' magazine.<ref>{{citation
  | url = http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,761969,00.html
  | url = http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,761969,00.html
  | title = Blitzkrieger
  | title = Blitzkrieger
  | date = September 25, 1939 | journal = Time}}</ref>
  | date = September 25, 1939 | journal = Time}}</ref>  In modern military professional literature, it is a subset of the various doctrines of [[deep battle]].
==German WWII usage==
In the specific usage, it referred to the action of relatively small groups of [[tank (military)|tanks]], vehicle-carried [[infantry]], some mobile [[artillery]], and aircraft in [[close air support]]. Its execution also depended on extensive [[radio]] communications from headquarters to advancing units, although communications were fairly primitive by modern standards.  Some of the limitations included the lack of tight coordination and compatible communications between ground and air forces.  While other German thinkers contributed to its development, [[Heinz Guderian]] clearly was its prime executor in the 1939 invasion of Poland.<ref>{{citation
| author = [[Heinz Guderian]]
| title = Panzer Leader
| year = 1952
| publisher = Da Capo Press | edition = 2001 repring
| isbn =  978-0306811012}}</ref>


In the specific usage, it referred to the action of relatively small groups of [[tank (military)|tanks]], vehicle-carried [[infantry]], some mobile [[artillery]], and aircraft in [[close air support]]. Its execution also depended on extensive [[radio]] communications from headquarters to advancing units, although communications were fairly primitive by modern standards. Some of the limitations included the lack of tight coordination and compatible communications between ground and air forces.
Much of the German military of the time moved on foot, or by horse-drawn transit. The role of the air-armor teams was to break holes in the enemy lines, and move quickly into the rear areas, disrupting command, communications, and logistics. Conventional military would hold the flanks of the breakthroughs.  


Much of the German military of the time moved on foot, or by horse-drawn transit. The role of the air-armor teams was to break holes in the enemy lines, and move quickly into the rear areas, disrupting command, communications, and logistics. Conventional military would hold the flanks of the breakthroughs.
Unfortunately, the [[Einsatzgruppe]]n, not part of the military, also followed the breakthroughs in Poland and Russia, and were responsible for most atrocities against civilians and prisoners.  Some German generals, such as [[Johannes Blaskowitz]], actively protested their actions, while others rationalized it as rear area security.


While it is not clear to the extent to which foreign authors contributed to the German interpretation, writers, between the World Wars, who discussed related mobile, tank-heavy operations include [[Basil Liddell-Hart]] and [[J.F.C. Fuller]] (U.K.), [[Charles de Gaulle]](France), and [[Mikhail Tukhachevsky]] (Soviet Union). While Tukhachevsky's work, along with his collaborator, V.K. Triandafillov, was not known specifically in the West until before WWII, it is plausible that during the [[Black Reichswehr]] period in which the Soviets secretly trained the Germans, the earlier Soviet doctrinal work might have become available to Guderian and others. 
==Predececessors==
In many respects, the individual techniques were not new, but had not been put together in a coherent whole. In the [[First World War]], for example, there were two striking examples of the use of high technology to break through defense lines, but the high command involved had not planned to rush mobile forces through the gap and cause chaos in the rear. These two examples were the first large-scale use of [[chemical weapon]]s, by the Germans at the [[Second Battle of Ypres]] (22nd April to 25 May 1915), and the first use of massed tanks, by the British at the [[Battle of Cambrai]] ((20 November to 3 December 1917). One can look back to the [[Battle of the Crater]], on July 30, 1864 during the [[American Civil War]], to see an even earlier failure of imagination, and unreadiness to exploit a breakthrough.
In many respects, the individual techniques were not new, but had not been put together in a coherent whole. In the [[First World War]], for example, there were two striking examples of the use of high technology to break through defense lines, but the high command involved had not planned to rush mobile forces through the gap and cause chaos in the rear. These two examples were the first large-scale use of [[chemical weapon]]s, by the Germans at the [[Second Battle of Ypres]] (22nd April to 25 May 1915), and the first use of massed tanks, by the British at the [[Battle of Cambrai]] ((20 November to 3 December 1917). One can look back to the [[Battle of the Crater]], on July 30, 1864 during the [[American Civil War]], to see an even earlier failure of imagination, and unreadiness to exploit a breakthrough.


While it is not clear to the extent to which foreign authors contributed to the German interpretation, writers, between the World Wars, who discussed related mobile, tank-heavy operations include [[Basil Liddell-Hart]] and [[J.F.C. Fuller]] (U.K.), [[Charles de Gaulle]](France), and [[Mikhail Tukhachevsky]] (Soviet Union).
Also in the First World War, Germany had developed techniques for limited breakthrough and infiltration by elite infantry, called "shock" or "storm" units. These stormtroopers were very different in discipline than the interwar [[SA]] (SA). [[Erwin Rommel]] discussed his techniques in a 1937 book.<ref>{{citation
| author = [[Erwin Rommel]], with Manfred Rommel in current version
| date = 1937
| title = Infantry in the Attack (Infanterie im Angriff)
|  publisher = Zenith Press | edition = Zenith Press reprint & update, 2009
| isbn = 978-0760337158}}</ref>
==Role and complementary approaches==
In blitzkrieg, the emphasis is on breaching a relatively static defensive line, holding the flanks of the penetration with foot-mobile infantry, and then having the fast breakthrough force engage targets of opportunity in the enemy's rear. As opposed to the Soviet concept of an [[Operational Maneuver Group]], which will rampage in the rear until destroyed or victorious, the fast force expected to rejoin followup echelons.
 
The Operational Maneuver Group was only one option in much broader Soviet [[deep battle]] doctrine of [[operational art]], such as the ''[[gluboky boi]]'' developed by [[Mikhail Tukhachevsky]] and complemented with logistics and troop mobilization ideas from [[V.K. Triandafillov]].<ref>{{citation
| title = Effects of Operational and Strategic Pauses on Mission Success
| author = Eric D. Beaty
| publisher = School of Advanced Military Studies, [[U.S. Army Command and General Staff College]]
| date = May 2009
| url = http://www.cgsc.edu/sams/media/Monographs/BeatyE-21MAY09.pdf }}</ref>  The particularly Soviet flavor of deep battle doctrine, however, was defensive; it focused on the counterattack against forces that had penetrated by blitzkrieg, but that were overextending their logistical and infantry support. Where blitzkrieg was more or less continuous, ''gluboky boi'' used a "pulsed" sequence of echeloned forces of different composition.
 
Modern U.S. doctrine continues deep battle principles, although current thinking is more along the lines of maneuver than breaking through defensive lines. Nevertheless, in the [[Gulf War]], the heavy armored corps used a fire-heavy technique to penetrate the main Iraqi line, although with all forces being mobile and with far more firepower, even in comparative terms against the Iraqis, than had been imagined by Guderian.
==References==
==References==
{{reflist}}
{{reflist|2}}

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Blitzkrieg, German for "lightning war", principally refers to the combined arms tactics used by the German military in the Polish campaign of 1939, the campaign into France and the Low Countries in 1940, and the early phases of the attack on the Soviet Union. In common usage, it has become a generic term for any fast-moving military operation using apparently high technology. The term was not widely used in German literature, and actually became popularized by an article in the American Time magazine.[1] In modern military professional literature, it is a subset of the various doctrines of deep battle.

German WWII usage

In the specific usage, it referred to the action of relatively small groups of tanks, vehicle-carried infantry, some mobile artillery, and aircraft in close air support. Its execution also depended on extensive radio communications from headquarters to advancing units, although communications were fairly primitive by modern standards. Some of the limitations included the lack of tight coordination and compatible communications between ground and air forces. While other German thinkers contributed to its development, Heinz Guderian clearly was its prime executor in the 1939 invasion of Poland.[2]

Much of the German military of the time moved on foot, or by horse-drawn transit. The role of the air-armor teams was to break holes in the enemy lines, and move quickly into the rear areas, disrupting command, communications, and logistics. Conventional military would hold the flanks of the breakthroughs.

Unfortunately, the Einsatzgruppen, not part of the military, also followed the breakthroughs in Poland and Russia, and were responsible for most atrocities against civilians and prisoners. Some German generals, such as Johannes Blaskowitz, actively protested their actions, while others rationalized it as rear area security.

While it is not clear to the extent to which foreign authors contributed to the German interpretation, writers, between the World Wars, who discussed related mobile, tank-heavy operations include Basil Liddell-Hart and J.F.C. Fuller (U.K.), Charles de Gaulle(France), and Mikhail Tukhachevsky (Soviet Union). While Tukhachevsky's work, along with his collaborator, V.K. Triandafillov, was not known specifically in the West until before WWII, it is plausible that during the Black Reichswehr period in which the Soviets secretly trained the Germans, the earlier Soviet doctrinal work might have become available to Guderian and others.

Predececessors

In many respects, the individual techniques were not new, but had not been put together in a coherent whole. In the First World War, for example, there were two striking examples of the use of high technology to break through defense lines, but the high command involved had not planned to rush mobile forces through the gap and cause chaos in the rear. These two examples were the first large-scale use of chemical weapons, by the Germans at the Second Battle of Ypres (22nd April to 25 May 1915), and the first use of massed tanks, by the British at the Battle of Cambrai ((20 November to 3 December 1917). One can look back to the Battle of the Crater, on July 30, 1864 during the American Civil War, to see an even earlier failure of imagination, and unreadiness to exploit a breakthrough.

Also in the First World War, Germany had developed techniques for limited breakthrough and infiltration by elite infantry, called "shock" or "storm" units. These stormtroopers were very different in discipline than the interwar SA (SA). Erwin Rommel discussed his techniques in a 1937 book.[3]

Role and complementary approaches

In blitzkrieg, the emphasis is on breaching a relatively static defensive line, holding the flanks of the penetration with foot-mobile infantry, and then having the fast breakthrough force engage targets of opportunity in the enemy's rear. As opposed to the Soviet concept of an Operational Maneuver Group, which will rampage in the rear until destroyed or victorious, the fast force expected to rejoin followup echelons.

The Operational Maneuver Group was only one option in much broader Soviet deep battle doctrine of operational art, such as the gluboky boi developed by Mikhail Tukhachevsky and complemented with logistics and troop mobilization ideas from V.K. Triandafillov.[4] The particularly Soviet flavor of deep battle doctrine, however, was defensive; it focused on the counterattack against forces that had penetrated by blitzkrieg, but that were overextending their logistical and infantry support. Where blitzkrieg was more or less continuous, gluboky boi used a "pulsed" sequence of echeloned forces of different composition.

Modern U.S. doctrine continues deep battle principles, although current thinking is more along the lines of maneuver than breaking through defensive lines. Nevertheless, in the Gulf War, the heavy armored corps used a fire-heavy technique to penetrate the main Iraqi line, although with all forces being mobile and with far more firepower, even in comparative terms against the Iraqis, than had been imagined by Guderian.

References

  1. "Blitzkrieger", Time, September 25, 1939
  2. Heinz Guderian (1952), Panzer Leader (2001 repring ed.), Da Capo Press, ISBN 978-0306811012
  3. Erwin Rommel, with Manfred Rommel in current version (1937), Infantry in the Attack (Infanterie im Angriff) (Zenith Press reprint & update, 2009 ed.), Zenith Press, ISBN 978-0760337158
  4. Eric D. Beaty (May 2009), Effects of Operational and Strategic Pauses on Mission Success, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College