South Vietnamese Buddhist crisis and coup of 1963

See also: Vietnam, war, and the United States

In 1963, many things happened in the Vietnam War, but the Vietnam War, Buddhist crisis and military coup of 1963 were sufficiently complex to warrant a discussion separate from the main Vietnam War article, and even from an article on Ngo Dinh Diem himself. Diem, president of South Vietnam, and his immediate advisors, had been part of the basic war problem for some time. While Diem himself was an ascetic that probably did not personally profit, members of his family, and numerous southern officials, were motivated by opportunities for corruption rather than government by the consent of the governed. Diem demonstrated no real understanding of democracy, and kept power with the Catholic minority. Increasingly bitter interactions with a Buddhist opposition led to a crisis in 1963, with iconic images of monks burning themselves alive in protest. Eventually, Diem was overthrown by a military coup in which he and his most hated brother (and advisor) were shot within minutes of their capture by the soldiers carrying out a coup. While there was a parliament, general democratic government never emerged; the main power in South Vietnam remained with the military leadership until the country was conquered in 1975.

Diem (and his successors) were primarily interested in using the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) as a device to secure power, rather than as a tool to unify the nation and defeat its enemies. Despite American efforts from 1960 through 1972, the situation never decisively improved. Saigon would ultimately lose the war because its large and very well equipped army lacked motivation to support a government.

For a government to prevail in the face of a determined insurgency, special factors usually need to be present. The mot relevant successful example is that of the Phillippines, where Ramon Magsaysay, as Defense Minister and then President, prevailed over the Communist-dominated Hukbalahap. His success involved being extremely visible to the people, even in the rural areas, demonstrating real concern, and backing up his deeds with action. He also rooted out corruption in government, which had been a major problem in South Vietnam. In contrast to the aloof and rigid Diem, Magsaysay was a charismatic leader. One of his first acts on assuming the presidency showed the sort of symbolism needed to "capture the hearts and minds": throwing open the guarded gates of the Presidential Palace and inviting the people into "their house". The Presidential Palace of Vietnam was entered only by South Vietnamese military coups, and then by North Vietnamese tanks. Magsaysay, unfortunately, died in an airplane accident.

In Vietnam, the Communist leadership in the North, which dominated the Southern insurgency, had clearly defined political objectives, and a grand strategy, involving military, diplomatic, covert action and psychological operations to achieve those objectives. Whether or not one agreed with those objectives, there was a clear relationship between long-term goals and short-term actions. Its military first focused on guerilla and raid warfare in the south, simultaneously improving the air defenses of the north. It also spoke to the people's needs at a village level, with a shadow government that indeed was not corrupt, but was quite willing to use terror and other forces to realize its agenda. In the Western sense, there was never a viable democratic alternative during the Vietnam War.

Diem, his personality, and his advisors

Even before addressing more obvious religious conflict, it should be observed that Diem apparently had a Confucian view of his authority being rightful; while he had lived in the West, he did not share Western concepts of government. By most accounts, he personally, although not some of his closest advisors, was ascetic. He compounded his alienation from the public by giving to the Catholic minority, in a country that is majority Buddhists but many smaller religions or sects. Perhaps the most charitable view that could be taken of Diem was that he believed that his personal rectitude freed him from responsibility to the people he governed.

Diem's closest advisors were his brothers, especially the increasingly irrational Ngo Dinh Dhu, his key political advisor, who, as did several of the brothers, have what were effectively private armies. Since Diem himself was a bachelor, his sister-in-law, born Tran Le Xuan but usually called Madame Nhu, acted as official hostess and was extremely visible.

Background of Buddhist resentment

On the order of 1 million Vietnamese moved following partition, the majority going south from the northern area of Tonkin was the heart of the French culture in Vietnam, with the University of Hanoi and its French staff, and where Catholicism was dominant in the villages. " It was from this culture, with partition pending, that between 800,000 and 1 million Catholics came south. Voluntary exiles such as Ngo Dinh Diem also returned to the South. While movement was still allowed until mid-1955, the bulk of the movement came south in a surge. 300,000 airlifted by the U.S. had been closely associated with the French, as soldiers and civil servants, or had lived in Catholic dioceses where the bishops had dominated local rule.

An estimated two-thirds of the Catholic population of the North came South, following their priests, in numbers estimated from 600,000 to 800,000. Along with the Catholic refugees, coming from Tonkin (i.e., the north), various exiles returned. Diem was such an exile; he arrived in Saigon from France on 25 June 1954. and, with U.S. and French support, was named Premier of the State of Vietnam by Emperor Bao Dai, who had just won French assent to "treaties of independence and association" on 4 July.

The Diem government was most comfortable with Catholic coreligionists, who made up approximately 20 percent of the population. The majority was Buddhists, with significant native sects such as the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. Groups such as the Binh Xuyen were not strictly religious, but certainly did not identify with the Diem government, led by a man from Annam, the lowlands of Central Vietnam (although not the Central Highlands, the semi-autonomous Montagnard homeland). In fairness to Diem, he was placed in a situation where the population had not prepared for self-government, and he had not had the opportunity to connect with the people, especially in the southern areas including Saigon.

Diem himself, however, was ill-equipped to connect with the people. Catholicism was not the only basis for his personality and leadership, but also Confucian principles where he ruled by right, rather than the Western concept of the consent of the governed. Personally ascetic, his closest advisors were of his family, and then his coreligionists.

The crisis begins

While there had been long-term resentment by the Buddhists, the situation flared in April 1963. For unclear reasons, the central government ordered the provincial authorities to enforce a ban on the display of all religious flags. This ban had rarely been enforced, but, since the order went out shortly before the major festival, Vesek (informally called Buddha's Birthday), which fell on May 8, many Buddhists perceived this as a direct attack on their customs.

Not long before the enforcement order had been issued, there were many displays of Papal flags, commemorating the 25th anniversary, in the priesthood, of Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Thuc, Catholic Archbishop of Hue. On Buddha's birthday, there was a demonstration, protesting the seemingly selective ban on flags. The enforcement was at the orders of Diem's brother Ngô Đình Cẩn, who, from a headquarters in Hue, controlled central Vietnam.

Again for unclear reasons, a Civil Guard unit used gunfire against the demonstrators, killing several adults and children. The Diem government described the attack as having been arranged by Viet Cong provocateurs, without strong evidence; the goverment seemed unwilling to investigate or conciliate.

A Buddhist monk, Thich Quang Duc, calmly walked to a major Saigon intersection on June, sat in the lotus position as acolytes poured gasoline over him, and then struck a cigarette lighter and burned himself to death. Reporters had been alerted by the Buddhists, and photograph of the monk, engulfed in flames, drew worldwide attention to the situation. Madame Nhu's response to this crisis was to refer to "barbecues", while her husband said "if the Buddhists want to have another barbecue, I will be glad to supply the gasoline". It would be hard to imagine less conciliatory language.

Negotiations

For the first time, the Buddhists of Vietnam, generally both factionalized and peaceful, made demands on the Government. Diem's vice president, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, himself a Buddhist, represented the government in the negotiations, apparently with growing personal credibility.

Diem agreed to what he termed "compromises" on June 16. The fact that they had been able to get any concessions strengthened their unity.

U.S. support weakens in the presence of coup warnings

The breakdown of U.S. support for Diem became more apparent on July 9, when John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence briefed Kennedy on a coup being contemplated by the respected commander of the ARVN, Tran Van Don. Don did not give a specific date for the coup, but suggested it might be in as little as two weeks, and had widespread support from the generals. They felt they had to act before the Viet Cong made more propaganda from the Buddhist persecution; Don said that Buddhist leaders did not believe Diem would keep his agreements made in June. According to Don, Diem believed that agreeing to even reasonable Buddhist demands would encourage them to ask for more. Don also told the CIA officer, Lucein Conein, that the Buddhists were planning more suicides and demonstrations.

Diem was unable to command support from the military or the people, seemingly convinced of his own righteousness, much as he claimed "divine intervention" had protected him during the 1962 bombing of the Presidential Palace. While his successors were primarily Buddhists, they were still interested in power, and often more corrupt than was Diem. TThe crisis and aftermath, therefore, was more a matter of power than of theology

By August, with Ambassador Frederick Nolting on vacation and about to be replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge, the position of Diem, vis-a-vis the United States, was collapsing.

Nhu escalates; U.S. government conveys last warnings to Diem

On August 21, Nhu used the authority of martial law to carry out massive raids on Buddhist pagodas, and portrayed them as the responsibility of the ARVN and CIA. The raids were not by ARVN forces at all, but by paramilitary police and Vietnamese Special Forces, under the direct command of Le Quang Tung. This prompted key U.S. decisions, expressed in "Cable 243" from Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman, conveying the Administration position to Ambassador Lodge. Hilsman's cable included the points:

• "US Government cannot tolerate situation when such power lies in Nhu's hands. Diem must be given the chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and replace them with the best military and polite personalities available
• If, in spite of all your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.

Hilsman made it clear that the Administration was insistent that the blame be placed on Nhu, that the ARVN be cleansed of taint, and the Nhus must go. The Nhu-must-go message was presented again and again, by different emissaries, with no results.

McNamara suggested sending an investigator, and, on September 6, MG Victor Krulak, JCS Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities. Joseph Mendenhall, a career diplomat, with him. their report on their return generated a legendary response from the President.

They returned five days later, and briefed the NSC. The perspectives were sufficiently different that John F. Kennedy inquired, "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?" Quips aside, the military and civilian views differed. Mendenhall brought back the U.S. Information Agency (called U.S. Information Service in foreign countries) director Johm Mecklin, and Agency for International Development Rufus Phillips, who headed the rural foreign aid program. Mecklin said the situation would be salvageable only with U.S. combat troops, while Phillips said fifty strategic hamlets in the Mekong Delta had been overrun, and more were at risk. Krulak, based on figures given him by MACV, there was 300 percent growth in the number of strategic hamlets, while only 0.2% had been overrun. It should be observed that Mecklin and Phillips had been working in the field, while Krulak took his information from the military headquarters.

On September 12, the National Security Council told Ambassador Lodge to reopen "tough" negotiations with Diem... Robert Kennedy speculated that if the war can be won neither with Diem nor in the event of a disruptive coup, a U.S. a U.S. disengagement should be considered. Robert Kennedy's perspective is representative of the Kennedy administration's position of not making a highly visible U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, in contrast to the situation where the Johnson administration kept escalating, for fear of the political repercussions of "losing".

A brief positive note came when South Vietnam ended martial law on the 16th. The next day, the NSC decided to escalate pressure on Diem, and not agree to Diem and Nhu staying as a team. Both for fact-finding and pressure, the NSC decided to send Secretary McNamara and General Taylor there on a "fact-gathering" mission. In their first meeting with Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins, on the 25th, it was immediately obvious the Embassy and MACV had quite different perceptions.

After more meetings, the two senior officials returned and briefed the NSC on October 2nd. Their report is a military-civilian compromise, confirming military progress but warning of political instability. Greater GVN effort, they believed, was needed in both clear-and-hold operations and securing strategig hamlets. They recommended pressuring Diem by withdrawing 1,000 troops, selectively withholding general aid, and ending all support for the Vietnamese Special Forces (i.e., that carried out the pagoda raids). While McNamara and Taylor recommend against a coup, they do recommend identifying and cultivating alternative leaderhip. Kennedy approved their recommendtions.

On the same day, CIA officer Conein "accidentally" meets General Don, who tells him that a coup is nearly ready; the corps commander for the Saigon area has not yet committed. They schedule another meeting for the 5th.

At that meeting, Conein, with Lodge's approval, meets with Gen. Minh, the potential coup leader. He mentioned three possible plans; one involved assassination. Conein was noncommittal, but, when he reported back to Lodge, Lodge asked Washington that Conein "be authorized to say that the U.S. will not thwart a coup, that we are willing to review plans, and that we will continue support to a successor regime."

Diem overthrown and killed

On October 30, Lodge said the U.S. was powerless to stop the coup, while GEN Harkins strongly disagreed. In a November 1 meeting, even as the coup leaders were mobilizing troops, Lodge, and Admiral Felt (commander, United States Pacific Command) met with Diem; Diem called Lodge to the side, and suggest they talk about options, after Felt left. At this point, the coup was actually in progress. At 1:45PM, Don formally notified Harkins' operations officer. At 4 PM, the generals called and asked Diem and Nhu to surrender; they refused. There is a 4:30 broadcast from the generals, telling the public the coup is in progress, and Diem calls Lodge; Lodge expressed concern for Diem's safety.

At 5, the generals called Diem again, put Col. Tung on the phone, who told Diem that he was a prisoner of the coup leaders. After the call ended, the coup leaders executed Tung. Diem and Nhu stayed on the phones, searching for supporters, and left the Presidential Palace around 8 PM.

In something on an irony given that Diem had ordered, in 1956, that Chinese residents, proud of their heritage, "Vietnamize", a Chinese merchant, in the ethnic Cholon district, gave them refuge. The coup plotters, not knowing the brothers were gone, bombarded the palace all night. Between 6:20 and 6:30 AM, Diem called Don, and offered to surrender without telling Don their location. Diem told the palace guard to surrender. The attack force commander learned Diem's location, received permission to arrest them, and, after finding them briefly escaped to a Catholic church,takes them into custody at 6:50. On the way back to headquarters, the two brothers are shot and killed; the details remain unclear, other than they were in the back of an armored personel carrier, and were actually slain by a relatively low-ranking aide to a Vietnamese general; the aide later died in combat.

The U.S. was aware of the planned coup, and had decided, at a policy level, that Diem could not prevail. They did not warn Diem, and CIA officer Lucien Conein essentially told the coup plotters that the U.S. would not intervene. Both the Embassy and Washington seemed genuinely shocked, however, that Diem had been killed; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge had offered refuge to Diem. Ironically, President John F. Kennedy, who had authorized the U.S. position and did not expect Diem's death, was himself assassinated in the same month. Lyndon Baines Johnson became U.S. commander-in-chief, and Johnson's approach to the war was different than Kennedy's.