Gulf of Tonkin incident
The Gulf of Tonkin incident, in August 1964, was the event that led President Lyndon B. Johnson to order air attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and vastly intensify U.S. forces in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Two incidents were described to the Congress, one on the lone destroyer USS Maddox, and the second, on the night of August 4, on the Maddox and the USS C. Turner Joy, which had been sent to reinforce the Maddox. The destroyer patrol also had on-call air support.
Prior to the incidents with the destroyers, under the then-classified CINCPAC Operations Plan (OPPLAN 34A), there had been a series of covert U.S.-RVN attacks on DRV coastal boats and shore installations. The Maddox was conducting a DESOTO PATROL, an operation with two purposes. Its public purpose was to demonstrate that the U.S. did not agree with the 12-mile limit of territorial waters claimed by the DRV. In addition, it had a signals intelligence mission, with intercept equipment and technicians in a van strapped to a destroyer's deck. The SIGINT mission of the Maddox was to record the North Vietnamese signals being generated after the alert from the 34A operation.
In response to a presumed attack, the President requested and received the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing miliary response. While it was claimed that North Vietnamese patrol boats had attacked U.S. warships in the Gulf, there is considerable data, especially recently declassified signals intelligence from the National Security Agency that indicates that there was no second attack.[1].
Covert operations
On 9 September 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approve CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63, which called for MACV and CAS, Saigon to provide advice and assistance to the GVN in certain operations against NVN. Phase I of the plan was to consist of "Psychological Operations"; Phase II of "Hit and Run Attacks." The latter included "amphibious raids using Vietnamese UDT/SEAL Team, Rangers, Airborne, and Marine units against selected targets south of the Tonkin Delta having little or no security." Apparently, the plan was not forwarded to the White House by SecDef. [2]
While the attacks on the DESOTO patrols were explained as attacks on vessels carrying out free passage, and had not provoked the DRV other than to sail inside its claimed 12 mile limit (the US respected a tradional 3 mile limit, "In fact the United States at the time was carrying out a program of covert naval commando attacks against North Vietnam and had been engaged in this effort since its approval by Johnson in January 1964." [3] The NSA report also said the Maddox had first fired warning shots.
There almost certainly was a North Vietnamese attack, on August 2, on the single-destroyer DESOTO patrol being conducted by the USS Maddox'. It is still unclear if the attack was meant as retaliation for the prior 34A raid, or if they regarded the Maddox as a potential attacker, or simply wanted to increase pressure on the U.S. In any event, the President ordered a second destroyer, the USS C. Turner Joy, to join the Maddox.
34-A forces carried out another raid on North Vietnam during the night of August 3/4, when the U.S. destroyers were beginning their run back up the Tonkin Gulf. If Hanoi was responding to the first raid, a second one furnished an equivalent reason to act against the reinforced DeSoto Patrol.[3]
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara discussed, with the President. how the two alleged attacks were to be explained to the Congress.
Secretary McNamara: Right. And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on. And on Friday night, as you probably know, we had four TP [McNamara means PT] boats from Vietnam manned by Vietnamese or other nationals, attack two is lands. And we expended, oh, a thousand rounds of ammunition of one kind or another against them. We probably shot up a radar station and a few other miscellaneous buildings. And following twenty-four hours after that, with this destroyer in that same area, undoubtedly led them to connect the two events.[4]
Retaliatory airstrikes
Operating on his authority as Commander-in-Chief, Johnson had retaliatory strikes launched against the DRV. Whether it was his lack of military experience and his unwillingness to listen to military advisors, or that his concern for domestic politics overrode tactical considerations, he went on national television to announce the airstrikes, while some of them were still inbound to their targets -- which could have been alerted by his broadcast. According to H.R. McMaster, Johnson would not delay his television broadcast because he wanted it to be sure to make the late evening news, and the deadlines for morning newspapers. [5]
Gulf of Tonkin resolution
On August 7, President Johnson addressed the Congress, and asked for and received an authorization for military force against the DRV -- not a formal declaration of war -- which was granted. was addressed by Lyndon B. Johnson as a joint resolution of the U.S. Congress passed on 7 August 1964.[6] House Joint Resolution was framed as an authorization to provide military assistance to any member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), of which the Republic of Vietnam was a member.
References
- ↑ National Security Agency (11/30/2005 and 05/30/2006). Gulf of Tonkin. declassified materials, 2005 and 2006. Retrieved on 2007-10-02.
- ↑ , Chapter 2, "Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, February 1964-January 1965,", The Pentagon Papers. Gravel Edition, Volume 3, Beacon Press, 1971, at 106-268.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Prados, John (4 August 2004), Essay: 40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 132
- ↑ Prados, The White House Tapes, John, LBJ Tapes on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 132
- ↑ McMaster, H. R. (1998), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, Harper Perennial
- ↑ President Johnson's Message to Congress and Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. RES 1145 August 7, 1964