Reality
In the conventional view of reality,[1] truth founds itself on sensible reality grounded on perceptions, and reflection concerning such perception, of the world as we experience it. This view is related to, but not identical with, empiricism. Conventional reality has its basis in perspectives and is, accordingly, dependent on a particular point of view. For this reason it is considered to fall within convention since it relies to some extent on shared beliefs concerning experience that in turn rely on individual perceptions. There could be as many perspectives as there are people, these appearing with greater or lesser degrees of refinement with some perspectives being highly organized conceptualizations of the world, for example, scientific theories of reality that use highly specialized methods to verify their findings.
Because of the regress problem, establishing a foundation of truth and reality is a problematic that underlies all disciplines, including mathematics. The regress problem in a nutshell is that every proposition rests upon premises, which in turn are based upon underlying premises, and so on. Thus, the underlying reality is subject to regress.[2] The desire to establish an underlying ground of all or part of reality, that is, to say what reality "really is," has been a long-standing preoccupation of philosophy and the sciences.
Platonic Realism
Plato's philosophy concerns itself with the nature of Being itself, "what is." Platonic philosophy distinguishes between "what is" and material existence. What is Real is "what is" in itself. In Plato, these are the Forms. Here is derived the term "Platonic Realism" which refers to a view of reality that grounds truth, the ultimate Reality, in a Being outside sensible reality, the Forms, and beyond the Forms, in the Good that is beyond Being. The Platonic Theory of Forms does not depend on sensible perception as a means to ascertain truth but, rather, on another form of 'seeing' only possible for the soul[Ψυχή]. In the myth of the charioteer, in the Phaedrus dialogue, Plato argues, "For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being" (249c).[3]
In Plato, Being is itself and nothing but itself. The Form of Justice is simply Justice itself. To define, we use predicates but a Form would have no predicates in the usual sense that we are accustomed to thinking of such things, since a Form's definition would give you something that has the same thing on either side such that Justice=Justice. No matter what predicates you add to a thing itself [the Form], for Plato, it remains the same. On the other hand, when we say that Mary has blue eyes and Bill has brown eyes, we refer to items pertaining to sensibility and particular biological traits.
Given his definition of Reality, it is easier to see why, for Plato, knowledge is not 'acquired' but instead involves anamnesis. Real knowledge involves a vision of the shining of the Beautiful, its Eidos. For one thing, how would we bring something immutable into material life, such that we could acquire it? For another, would we acquire the Being of the Beautiful or merely another image of the Beautiful? Contrary to this, the objects of immanent, sensible experience remind us of the things themselves. We see a bed and this evokes the Idea of a bed, and so on. Knowledge is the extent to which you can connect the bed of experience to the immutable Form of the bed (597a-598b).[4]
So there is a Form of the relation between numbers, the Form of specific numbers, and the Form of the abstraction of 'number' itself. In immanent existence, the forms are all mixed up in matter and predicates abound. But what of the varying degree to which some of us are able to make these relations, to gain knowledge? I may see a beetle climbing on a branch and think about bugs. If I am no entomologist I may not go to the specific Form of beetle, only the form of a beetle in general. My inability to understand the intricacy of number does not prevent me from a vision of the form of 'number' in general or its abstraction but may prevent me from seeing the intricacy of their relationships.
Because the Forms are external to the sensible copies of reality, it does not seem that there can be change in something like Beauty or Justice. Immanent life seems to confirm this finding because objects of sensation appear to be all mixed up together. We see justice and truth in varying degrees, as composed in matter, rather than by themselves. These break, degrade, disperse or scatter. Plato's explanation is that the beautiful we experience is beautiful because it participates in the Form of Beauty, not because it is beautiful in itself. Accordingly, if I want to know if a a sunset is beautiful, I go to the Form that gives the sunset its beauty. The relation of the particular sunset to Beauty remains temporary. The sun goes down although the beauty of the sunset cannot fade. Perception of beauty in this world involves establishment of such a relationship between objects of sensation and that which is truly Beautiful. Unlike finite beauty, the Form of the Beautiful has no beginning or end. When we perceive the beautiful sunset as being present, we are soon dissuaded of this reality when we perceive that the facts have changed and are now otherwise once the sun goes down. Further, in order to understand Plato's conception of Reality, we must get around the idea of causality. The Real does not come to be and cease to be in a material sense. The scientific cause of the 'appearance' of a sunset, the appearance that the sun moves, for us has to do with the movements of bodies in space but from a Platonic view implies a connection to the Form that is the underlying cause of the sun or of a sunset seen in in our experience. The bond to the Beautiful of the sunset or to the Form of the sun itself is real but the objects we think of as sun or sunset do not amount to things in themselves. All we have done in locating these objects is to establish a relation to Reality.
Conventional reality, for Plato, is less than satisfactory and knowledge of this type of reality can be categorized as doxa,the stuff of beliefs and opinions, rather than the act of real knowledge but from this it should not be concluded that Plato rejects all doxa. Including "geometry and the kindred arts," Plato asserts that through the power of dialectic, as he conceives of it reason is able to treat "its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak" (511b)[4].
Model-dependent realism
The Platonic approach described above is of very broad scope. A much more restricted concept of "reality" in science is limited to the explanations of observations or measurements, probably a view of reality that Plato would discount. Plato would require that "reality" transcends any feeble attempt to confine it to a particular set of observations, particularly as this reality changes with the introduction of additional observations admitted to explanation as technology evolves.
Physicists Stephen W. Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, in their book, The Grand Design, assert that there cannot be a theory-independent , or picture-independent, concept of reality.[5] They point out:
- that either an earth-centered (Ptolemaic) or a sun-centered (Copernican) picture of reality can be made consistent with the motion of celestial bodies;
- that goldfish physicists living in a curved bowl, though observing curved paths of motion of bodies that we observe as linear, could still formulate predictive laws governing motion as they see it;
- that we cannot know whether we live in a simulated world, a virtual reality, one that the simulators rendered self-consistent.
Each of those concepts of reality are picture- or theory-dependent.
Instead, they articulate a view of reality they call model-dependent realism:
we will adopt a view that we will call model-dependent realism: the idea that a physical theory or world picture is a model (generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the model to observations. This provides a framework with which to interpret modern science.[6]
In adopting model-dependent realism, "it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation" (p. 46). If two different models agree with the observations, it does not make sense to consider one more true than the other, that one gives a truer picture of reality than the other, though one or the other may be more convenient, or otherwise more advantageous, to employ in a given situation.
A model-dependent realist might prefer one model over another if it is thought more 'elegant', if it is found more convenient, if it has fewer arbitrary or adjustable components, if it explains all described and agreed-upon observations, and if it can make predictions that if found not to hold would show the model untenable.[5]
Again, Hawking and Mlodinow maintain that no concept of reality that we can adopt escapes dependence on a model with elements following a set of rules explaining observations in terms of those rule-bound elements.
Theory and reality
The definition of reality given by Hawking and Mlodinow is pretty straightforward if one has in mind a particular set of data to explain. Either the theory explains the data or it doesn't, and if two theories explain the data differently, one cannot claim the concepts employed by either as the more true of "reality", although one might find one set of ideas more pleasing than the other.
The matter is less clear when one considers the selection of just what "data" must be explained. Our senses are limited, and we accept that we cannot see and hear everything that comprises reality. So we supplement the senses, for example, by using a telescope or a microscope. Historically the issue arose as to whether such instruments deceived us, and gradually they have been accepted as extensions of our natural capacities.[7][8]
The gathering of "data" supplementing our senses has gone far beyond the primitive telescope to its modern version (for example, the Hubble telescope) and the microscope to its modern version (for example, the scanning tunneling microscope).[9][10] Today experiments may require expensive apparatus not available to all, involving observations not even interpretable by many. Examples are the colliders of high-energy physics,[11] and the sophisticated electronic image acquisition of modern astronomy, guided by elaborate computer processing and filtering.[12] One might reasonably ask how well the acquisition of "data" is separated from the "theory" that explains how the acquisition process works, and that often suggests where to look for new "data". The process by which data is allowed into the theory influences what is incorporated into "reality"
Those issues are complicated by the limited access to these data-acquisition instruments, both in a required training that could be seen as indoctrination (not necessarily deliberate, but de facto), and in limitations upon who, and what investigations, are worthy to use the instruments, as determined by various funding agencies and corporate laboratories. Although censorship is not the motivation directing government and corporate support, a preoccupation with popular and/or commercially attractive projects draws resources and talent away from less conspicuous goals potentially of more significance to a comprehensive "reality".[13][14][15] In effect, the expense and expertise of modern research result in blinkers.[16][17][18]
To a limited degree, the shaping of "reality" based upon modeling of selected data is a public enterprise, with all the foibles that implies. "All theories have metaphorical dimensions...that give depth and meaning to scientific ideas, that add to their persuasiveness and color the way we see reality."[19] As a result, the public engages at a metaphorical level. This involvement is particularly evident in arenas such as gene research and genetically altered organisms, and investigations of stem cells, where the public is actively engaged.[20] Another example is archaeology and the limitations exerted upon examination of burial sites.[21][22] In some cases public participation leads to simple clamor, as in the case of global warming.[23][24] This engagement facilitates censorship by fanatics, resembling that found in the times of Vesalius and Galileo although lacking the institutional authority.[25]
References
- ↑ The New Oxford American Dictionary gives this definition of reality: 1. the world or the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them: he refuses to face reality | Laura was losing touch with reality. | 2. (Philosophy) existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions. (2010) Angus Stevenson and Christine A. Lindberg, eds.: New Oxford American Dictionary, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195392884.
- ↑ Scott Aikin (2011). Epistemology and the Regress Problem, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. Routledge. ISBN 0415878004.
- ↑ Plato (1999). Plato: Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library ed. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-99040-1. Macmillan edition of 1892 at Google books.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Plato (2005). Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds: The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters, Bollingen Series LXXI. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-09718-3.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Hawking SW, Mlodinow L. (2010). The Grand Design, Kindle edition. New York: Bantam Books. ISBN 978-0-553-90707-0.
- ↑ Hawking SW, Mlodinow L.. “Chapter 3: What is reality?”, cited work, pp. 42-43. ISBN 0553805371.
- ↑ Initially, many refused to believe the results of the telescope. Kepler wrote to Galileo that such persons were "stuck in a world of paper" , blind not by force of circumstance but of their own foolish will. Dan Hofstadter (2009). “Chapter 2: The telescope; or seeing”, The Earth Moves: Galileo and the Roman Inquisition. W W Norton & Co, pp. 53 ff. ISBN 978-0-393-06650-0.
- ↑ Cautions abound concerning the deceptive nature of the microscope. For example, see Hermann Schacht (1855). The microscope: and its application to vegetable anatomy and physiology, 2nd ed. S. Highley, p. 57. “Seeing, as Schleiden justly observes, is a difficult art, and seeing with the microscope is yet more difficult...”
- ↑ Hubble space telescope. NASA. Retrieved on 2011-07-30.
- ↑ The scanning tunneling microscope. Nobelprize.org. Retrieved on 2011-07-30.
- ↑ The large hadron collider. CERN. Retrieved on 2011-07-26.
- ↑ Most telescopic images are collected today using the charge-coupled device or CCD, and computer processed. See, for example, Steve B. Howell (2006). Handbook of CCD astronomy, Volume 5 of Cambridge observing handbooks for research astronomers; 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521617626. In addition, the telescope itself is aimed and adjusted using computer programs.
- ↑ For example, even in the very liberal environment of Bell Laboratories engaged in "fundamental research", experiments following discovery of the cosmic background radiation by Arno Penzias and Robert Woodrow Wilson were frowned upon. So was much of the research underlying the modern integrated circuit, research that had to be conducted in the wee hours of the morning, so as not to interfere with "important" corporate research.
- ↑ As Wilson gently recalled matters: "local management here decided that we had had our fun doing astronomy and that now we really ought to contribute something to the telephone company too". Quoted in Jeremy Bernstein (August 20, 1984). "Profiles: Three degrees above zero". The New Yorker: p. 56.
- ↑ Concerning the environment at Bell, see for example, Michael Riordan, Lillian Hoddeson (1997). Crystal fire: the birth of the information age. W. W. Norton & Company, p. 179. ISBN 0393041247. “But because they could not get even a small laboratory dedicated to them, they put it on a set of wheels so that it could be rolled into and out of a storage closet in the metallurgical lab. Working on their own time,..., they managed to "bootleg" their crystal growing program into existence.” Corporate official "history" has glossed over these problems to present a view of great wisdom and encouragement.
- ↑ Derek J.De Solla Price (1986). Little Science, Big Science and beyond. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231049560.
- ↑ Lee Smolin (2007). “Chapter 16: How do you fight sociology”, The trouble with physics: the rise of string theory, the fall of a science, and what comes next. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, pp. 261 ff. ISBN 061891868X.
- ↑ Peter Woit (2006). “Chapter 16: The only game in town: the power and the glory of string theory”, Not even wrong: the failure of string theory and the search for unity in physical law. Basic Books, pp. 221 ff. ISBN 0465092756.
- ↑ Brian Goodwin (2001). “The myth behind the metaphors”, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity, Reprint with a new preface of 1994 ed. Princeton University Press, p. 33. ISBN 0691088098. Title links to Google Books preview.
- ↑ Gregory Pence (2007). “Chapter 7: Recreating nature: Patenting human genes?”, Re-Creating Medicine: Ethical Issues at the Frontiers of Medicine. Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 137 ff. ISBN 084769691X.
- ↑ David Hurst Thomas (2001). Skull Wars: Kennewick Man, Archaeology, and the Battle for Native American Identity. Basic Books. ISBN 046509225X.
- ↑ Robert L. Kelly, David Hurst Thomas (2009). Archaeology, 5th ed. Cengage Learning, p. xxxiii. ISBN 0495602914. “How can we pursue this laudable goal if the very act of conducting research offends the living descendents of the ancient people being studied?”
- ↑ For a discussion by a proponent of intelligent design, see for example Roy W. Spencer (2010). Climate Confusion: How global warming hysteria leads to bad science, pandering politicians and misguided policies that hurt the poor, Paperback version of 2008 ed. Encounter Books. ISBN 1594033455.
- ↑ James Hoggan, Richard D. Littlemore (2009). Climate cover-up: the crusade to deny global warming. Greystone Books. ISBN 1553654854.
- ↑ Andrew Dickson White (1896). A history of the warfare of science with theology in Christendom, Volume 2. D. Appleton & Co..