Long Reach Operation: Difference between revisions

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'''Long Reach operation''' was conducted by the 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Chu Pong/Ia Drang complex, Central Highlands, Viet Nam from 27 October to 26 November 1965. It is more well-known as '''Pleiku campaign'''. It was executed in three operations: ''All the Way'' conducted by the 1st Brigade from 27 October to November 9; ''Silver Bayonet I'' by the 3rd Brigade from 9 to 18 November; and ''Silver Bayonet II'' by the 2nd Brigade from 18 to 26 November. The ''Battle of Ia Drang'', which included the battles of LZ X-ray (14 to 16 November) and LZ Albany (17 to 18 November), occurred during the Silver Bayonet I operation.<ref>{{citation|last1=Kinnard|first1=William|year=1966|url=http://www.generalhieu.com/pleiku-2.htm|title=Pleiku Campaign, After Action Report}}, p.1</ref>
'''Long Reach operation''' was conducted by the 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Chu Pong/Ia Drang complex, Central Highlands, Viet Nam from 27 October to 26 November 1965. It is more well-known as '''Pleiku campaign'''. It was executed in three operations: ''All the Way'' conducted by the 1st Brigade from 27 October to November 9; ''Silver Bayonet I'' by the 3rd Brigade from 9 to 18 November; and ''Silver Bayonet II'' by the 2nd Brigade from 18 to 26 November. The ''Battle of Ia Drang'', which included the battles of LZ X-ray (14 to 16 November) and LZ Albany (17 to 18 November), occurred during the Silver Bayonet I operation.<ref>{{citation|last1=Kinnard|first1=William|year=1966|url=http://www.generalhieu.com/pleiku-2.htm|title=Pleiku Campaign, After Action Report}}, p.1</ref>


This was an ARVN-US joint operation in which the ARVN II Corps was in charge of the concepts of operation and intelligence and the US 1st Air Cavalry Division was in control of the troops and the logistics.<ref>Vinh Loc>{{citation|author=Vinh Loc|date=1966|url=http://www.generalhieu.com/why_pleime_pdf.htm|title=Why Pleime|publisher=Information Printing Office|location=Viet Nam}}, p.119</ref><ref>{{citation|last1=Knowles|first1=Richard|date=1983|url=http://www.generalhieu.com/lzxray_knowles-2.htm|title=LZ X-Ray Battle}}, p.7</ref>  
This was an ARVN-US joint operation in which the ARVN II Corps was in charge of the concepts of operation and intelligence and the US 1st Air Cavalry Division was in control of the troops and the logistics.<ref name=VinhLoc>{{citation|author=Vinh Loc|date=1966|url=http://www.generalhieu.com/why_pleime_pdf.htm|title=Why Pleime|publisher=Information Printing Office|location=Viet Nam}}, p.119</ref><ref>{{citation|last1=Knowles|first1=Richard|date=1983|url=http://www.generalhieu.com/lzxray_knowles-2.htm|title=LZ X-Ray Battle}}, p.7</ref>  


The II Corps Chief of Staff's operational concept was to use the B-52 airstrikes to destroy the three NVA 32nd, 33rd and 66th Regiments at the moment they were staging a second attack of the Pleime camp in the Chu Pong massif areas.<ref>
The II Corps Chief of Staff's operational concept was to use the B-52 airstrikes to destroy the three NVA 32nd, 33rd and 66th Regiments at the moment they were staging a second attack of the Pleime camp in the Chu Pong massif areas.<ref>
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Normally the planning of a B-52 airstrike was assumed by the J2 and J3 Chiefs of the MACV with the J2 Chief studying and selecting existing targets consisting of rear bases of supplies and/or troops concentration based on intelligence. In the case of Long Reach operation, enemy troops were lured into becoming targets by II Corps based on its own unique intelligence source. The execution involved the following three phases: setting up, fixing and striking.
Normally the planning of a B-52 airstrike was assumed by the J2 and J3 Chiefs of the MACV with the J2 Chief studying and selecting existing targets consisting of rear bases of supplies and/or troops concentration based on intelligence. In the case of Long Reach operation, enemy troops were lured into becoming targets by II Corps based on its own unique intelligence source. The execution involved the following three phases: setting up, fixing and striking.


On 26 October 1965, II Corps requested the help of American troops to conduct an exploitation operation subsequent to the victory achieved at Pleime. The 1st Air Cavalry Division was assigned to reinforce the II Corps force. The join ARVN-US operation was named Long Reach (Trường Chinh in Vietnamese) and conducted under a special operational protocol consisting of "shared intelligence and concept of operations, separate TAOR, command, deployment of forces, conduct of activities and reserve."<ref>Vinh Loc, p.119</ref>
On 26 October 1965, II Corps requested the help of American troops to conduct an exploitation operation subsequent to the victory achieved at Pleime. The 1st Air Cavalry Division was assigned to reinforce the II Corps force. The join ARVN-US operation was named Long Reach (Trường Chinh in Vietnamese) and conducted under a special operational protocol consisting of "shared intelligence and concept of operations, separate TAOR, command, deployment of forces, conduct of activities and reserve."<ref name=VinhLoc />


==Execution==
==Execution==

Revision as of 08:21, 8 October 2017

Long Reach operation was conducted by the 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Chu Pong/Ia Drang complex, Central Highlands, Viet Nam from 27 October to 26 November 1965. It is more well-known as Pleiku campaign. It was executed in three operations: All the Way conducted by the 1st Brigade from 27 October to November 9; Silver Bayonet I by the 3rd Brigade from 9 to 18 November; and Silver Bayonet II by the 2nd Brigade from 18 to 26 November. The Battle of Ia Drang, which included the battles of LZ X-ray (14 to 16 November) and LZ Albany (17 to 18 November), occurred during the Silver Bayonet I operation.[1]

This was an ARVN-US joint operation in which the ARVN II Corps was in charge of the concepts of operation and intelligence and the US 1st Air Cavalry Division was in control of the troops and the logistics.[2][3]

The II Corps Chief of Staff's operational concept was to use the B-52 airstrikes to destroy the three NVA 32nd, 33rd and 66th Regiments at the moment they were staging a second attack of the Pleime camp in the Chu Pong massif areas.[4] The air force action was supported by the air cavalry ground force in fixing the enemy troops in becoming available targets for B-52 strikes. General Richard Knowles, 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command Post Commander, describes the tactical ground maneuvers of inserting the air cavalry troops at LZ X-Ray as "grab the tiger by its tail" and moving them to LZ Albany as "grab the tiger by its tail from another direction".[5]

Background

After failing to destroy the relief column of the besieged Pleime camp with the 32rd Regiment and overrunning the camp with the 32nd Regiment the NVA B3 Field Front ordered both regiments to withdraw to their rear bases in the Chu Pong massif area. These two units were to rejoin with the 66th Regiment and together all three would stage for a second attack of the Pleime camp with this time, the 66th as the main force reinforced by one 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns battalion and one 120mm mortars battalion.[6]

II Corps obtained these vital information through a unique intelligence source consisting in intercepts of radio communications between the Chinese advisors embedded in the NVA units at regimental level[7] and the Chinese advisors headquarters established in Phnom Penn to assist the B3 Field Front in logistics.[8] The Chinese advisors conversed freely and openly in Mandarin,[9] not realizing that their conversations were monitored by the ARVN side. This source of intelligence was kept under wraps; both the NVA and the US sides thought it was "ARVN special agents". [10][11] It allowed for the planning of every aspect of the operations on "current(real-time) intelligence" as well as for the successful scheduling of the five-day B-52 strikes.[12] Colonel Hieu stated that this "solid intelligence on the enemy situation had permitted the battle to develop to maximum degree and scale and at the same token lead to the biggest victory ever achieved by the ARVN and its Allied."[13]

Normally the planning of a B-52 airstrike was assumed by the J2 and J3 Chiefs of the MACV with the J2 Chief studying and selecting existing targets consisting of rear bases of supplies and/or troops concentration based on intelligence. In the case of Long Reach operation, enemy troops were lured into becoming targets by II Corps based on its own unique intelligence source. The execution involved the following three phases: setting up, fixing and striking.

On 26 October 1965, II Corps requested the help of American troops to conduct an exploitation operation subsequent to the victory achieved at Pleime. The 1st Air Cavalry Division was assigned to reinforce the II Corps force. The join ARVN-US operation was named Long Reach (Trường Chinh in Vietnamese) and conducted under a special operational protocol consisting of "shared intelligence and concept of operations, separate TAOR, command, deployment of forces, conduct of activities and reserve."[2]

Execution

References

  1. ↑ Kinnard, William (1966), Pleiku Campaign, After Action Report, p.1
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Vinh Loc (1966), Why Pleime, Viet Nam: Information Printing Office, p.119
  3. ↑ Knowles, Richard (1983), LZ X-Ray Battle, p.7
  4. ↑ McChristian, J.A. (1966), Intelligence Aspects of Pleime/Chupong Campaign, J2/MACV, p.6
  5. ↑ Knowles, p.6
  6. ↑ Vinh Loc, p.80
  7. ↑ Mohr, Charles, Three Prisoners Tell Of Aid From China North Vietnamese Also Say Cambodians Helped Them, The New York Times, (16 November 1965): Captured North Vietnamese soldiers said today that their units had received assistance from Cambodian "militiamen" during their infiltration into South Vietnam and that each infiltrated regiment had one Chinese Communist adviser.
  8. ↑ Vĩnh Lộc (1966), Pleime Trận Chiến Lịch Sử, Viet Nam: Bộ Thông Tin p.124
  9. ↑ Moore, Harold G. & Joseph L. Galloway (1992), We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young — Ia Drang: the battle that changed the war in Vietnam, New York, New York: Harper Perennial, ISBN 0-06-097576-8, p.64
  10. ↑ Kinnard, p.46
  11. ↑ Coleman, J.D. (1988), Pleiku, The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam, New York: St.Martin's Press, p.119"
  12. ↑ McChristian, p.2
  13. ↑ Vĩnh Lộc, p.94
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