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A '''pseudoscience''' is any body of alleged knowledge, methodology, belief, or practice that claims to be scientific but does not follow the [[scientific method]].<ref>"''Pseudoscientific - pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific''", from the ''Oxford American Dictionary'', published by the [[Oxford English Dictionary]].</ref>&nbsp;<ref>http://skepdic.com/pseudosc.html</ref>
A '''pseudoscience''' is any body of alleged knowledge, methodology, belief, or practice that claims to be scientific but does not follow the [[scientific method]].<ref>"''Pseudoscientific - pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific''", from the ''Oxford American Dictionary'', published by the [[Oxford English Dictionary]].</ref>&nbsp;<ref>http://skepdic.com/pseudosc.html</ref>


The term ''pseudoscience'' appears to have been first used in 1843<ref> Magendie, F. (1843). ''An Elementary Treatise on Human Physiology.'' 5th Ed. Tr. John Revere. New York: Harper, p. 150. Magendie refers to phrenology as "''a pseudo-science of the present day''" (note the hyphen).</ref> as a combination of the [[Greek language|Greek]] root ''pseudo'', meaning false, and the [[Latin]] ''scientia'', meaning knowledge or a field of knowledge. It generally has [[pejorative|negative connotations]], because it asserts that things so labeled are inaccurately or deceptively described as science.<ref>However, from the "them vs. us" polarization that its usage engenders, the term may also have a positive function because "''[the] derogatory labeling of others often includes an unstated self-definition'' "(p.266); and, from this, the application of the term also implies "''a unity of science, a privileged tree of knowledge or space from which the pseudoscience is excluded, and the user's right to belong is asserted'' " (p.286) -- Still, A. & Dryden, W., "The Social Psychology of "Pseudoscience": A Brief History", ''Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour'', Vol.34, No.3, (September 2004), pp.265-290.</ref>  As such, those labeled as practicing or advocating a "pseudoscience" normally reject this classification.
The term ''pseudoscience'' appears to have been first used in 1843 <ref>Magendie, F (1843) ''An Elementary Treatise on Human Physiology.'' 5th Ed. Tr. John Revere. New York: Harper, p 150. Magendie refers to phrenology as "''a pseudo-science of the present day''" (note the hyphen).</ref> as a combination of the [[Greek language|Greek]] root ''pseudo'', meaning false, and the [[Latin]] ''scientia'', meaning knowledge or a field of knowledge. It generally has [[pejorative|negative connotations]], because it asserts that things so labeled are inaccurately or deceptively described as science. <ref>However, from the "them vs. us" polarization that its usage engenders, the term may also have a positive function because "''[the] derogatory labeling of others often includes an unstated self-definition'' "(p.266); and, from this, the application of the term also implies "''a unity of science, a privileged tree of knowledge or space from which the pseudoscience is excluded, and the user's right to belong is asserted'' " (p.286) -- Still A & Dryden W (2004) "The Social Psychology of "Pseudoscience": A Brief History", ''J Theory Social Behav'' 34:265-290</ref>  Accordingly, those labeled as practicing or advocating a "pseudoscience" normally reject this classification.
There is considerable disagreement about whether it is possible to distinguish "science" from "pseudoscience" in a reliable and objective way, and about whether attempting to do so has any useful purpose. <ref>The philosopher of science [[Paul Feyeraband]] in particular is associated with the view that attempts to distinguish science from non-science are flawed and pernicious. "The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. ... the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic:"[http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/feyerabe.htm]</ref> Those who believe that characterising some areas as pseudoscientific is useful and valid stress the use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims, over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation, lack of openness to testing by other experts, and a lack of progress in theory development. The term pseudoscience or pseudoscientific is sometimes applied by disputants working in the same field to disparage a competing theory or the form of argument used by a rival, <ref>e.g. according to [[Stephen Hawking]], [[cosmology]] was once considered "pseudoscience where wild speculation was unconstrained by any possible observations". (Hawking SW, ''Hawking on the Big Bang and Black Holes'' (1993) World Scientific Publishing Company, [http://books.google.com/books?id=B18DXurmFZ8C&vid=ISBN9810210787&dq=cosmology+pseudoscience&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&sig=3kUPCUsutTSoxxPQT_-ZnTq7Vqo&q=cosmology+pseudoscience Page 1] See also [http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN140200155X&id=WOjraq3KdeQC&pg=PA75&lpg=PA75&dq=cosmology+pseudoscience&sig=HToMI1FluZxg3A6fYGiav5KKANg] and [http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN140200155X&id=WOjraq3KdeQC&pg=PA75&lpg=PA75&dq=cosmology+pseudoscience&sig=HToMI1FluZxg3A6fYGiav5KKANg]. Science historian Helge Kragh notes that astronomer "[[Herbert Dingle|[Herbert] Dingle]] disliked cosmological principles of any kind and saw in them the main cause of why cosmology had degraded into a state of pseudoscience" [http://www.ivh.au.dk/personale/helge_kragh/home.html] ''Cosmology and Controversy: The Historical Development of Two Theories of the Universe'', (1996) p.[http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN069100546X&id=f6p0AFgzeMsC&pg=PA226&lpg=PA226&vq=pseudoscience&sig=acWgchkljL_Up841MWn1zlNCgIs 226], Publ. Princeton University Press,[http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/titles/5925.html].</ref> sometimes by commentators from outside a field to disparage a whole field, sometimes merely to characterise the fact that a theory published in a popular book has no academic credibility whatsoever, <ref>[http://www.astrosociety.org/education/resources/pseudobib.html][http://www.archaeology.org/0305/etc/web.html]</ref> and sometimes in reference to a theory now discarded. <ref>e.g. phrenology, see [ http://www.theness.com/articles.asp?id=40]</ref>


==Introduction==
==Introduction==
The standards for determining whether a body of alleged [[knowledge]], [[methodology]], or [[practice]] is scientific can vary from field to field, but involve agreed principles including [[reproducibility]] and [[intersubjective verifiability]].<ref>''See, e.g., '' Gauch, Hugh G., Jr., ''Scientific Method in Practice'' (2003) 3-5 ''ff''.</ref> Such principles aim to ensure that relevant evidence can be reproduced and/or measured given the same conditions, which allows further investigation to determine whether a [[hypothesis]] or [[theory]] related to given [[phenomena]] is both [[validity (statistics)|valid]] and [[reliability (statistics)|reliable]] for use by others, including other [[scientists]] and [[researchers]]. [[Scientific method]]s are expected to be applied throughout, and [[bias]] is expected to be controlled or eliminated, by [[double blind|double-blind]] studies, or statistically through fair sampling procedures. All gathered data, including experimental/environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for [[peer review]], thereby allowing further [[experiments]] or [[studies]] to be conducted to confirm or [[falsify]] results, as well as to determine other important factors such as [[statistical significance]], [[confidence interval]]s, and [[margin of error|margins of error]].<ref>Gauch (2003), 191 ''ff'', especially Chapter 6, "Probability", and Chapter 7, "inductive Logic and Statistics"</ref> Fulfillment of these requirements allows others a reasonable opportunity to assess whether to rely upon the reported results in their own scientific work or in a particular field of [[applied science]], [[technology]], [[therapy]], or other form of practice.
The standards for determining whether a body of alleged [[knowledge]], [[methodology]], or [[practice]] is scientific can vary from field to field, but involve agreed principles including [[reproducibility]] and [[intersubjective verifiability]].<ref>''e.g. '' Gauch HG Jr. ''Scientific Method in Practice'' (2003) 3-5 ''ff''</ref> Such principles aim to ensure that relevant evidence can be reproduced and/or measured given the same conditions, which allows further investigation to determine whether a [[hypothesis]] or [[theory]] related to given [[phenomena]] is both [[validity (statistics)|valid]] and [[reliability (statistics)|reliable]] for use by others, including other [[scientists]] and [[researchers]]. [[Scientific method]]s are expected to be applied throughout, and [[bias]] is expected to be controlled or eliminated, by [[double blind|double-blind]] studies, or statistically through fair sampling procedures. All gathered data, including experimental/environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for [[peer review]], thereby allowing further [[experiments]] or [[studies]] to be conducted to confirm or [[falsify]] results, as well as to determine other important factors such as [[statistical significance]], [[confidence interval]]s, and [[margin of error|margins of error]].<ref>Gauch (2003), 191 ''ff'', especially Chapter 6, "Probability", and Chapter 7, "inductive Logic and Statistics"</ref> Fulfillment of these requirements allows others a reasonable opportunity to assess whether to rely upon the reported results in their own scientific work or in a particular field of [[applied science]], [[technology]], [[remediation|therapy]], or other form of practice.


In the mid-20th Century [[Karl Popper]] suggested the additional criterion of [[falsifiability]].<ref>Popper, Karl, "Science, Conjectures and Refutations" (orig. 1963), in Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) ''Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues'', 3-10.</ref> Some theories cannot be proven false under any circumstance, for example, the theory that God created the universe. Such theories may be true or false, but are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of (at least present-day) science; Popper differentiated between mythological, religious or metaphysical formulations (which may prefigure later scientific theories but do not follow a scientific methodology), and pseudoscientific formulations &mdash; though without providing a clear definition of each.<ref>Popper, Karl, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations", reprinted in Grim, Patrick, ''Philosophy of Science and the Occult'', Albany 1990, pp. 104-110.</ref> Popper said a hypothesis or theory must be [[empirical|empirically]] verifiable and that scientific propositions should be limited to statements that are capable of being shown false through experiment. Another criterion applicable to theoretical work is the [[heuristic]] of [[parsimony]], also known as [[Occam's Razor]]. This principle says the most simple explanation for the evidence is preferred over explanations needing additional assumptions.<ref>Gauch (2003) 269 ''ff'', "Parsimony and Efficiency".</ref>
In the mid-20th Century [[Karl Popper]] suggested the criterion of [[falsifiability]] to distinguish science from non-science.<ref>Popper, KR (1959) "[[The Logic of Scientific Discovery]]" (English translation, 1959)[http://www.routledge.com/popper/works/logic_discovery.html].</ref> Theories such as God created the universe may be true or false, but they are not falsifiable, so they are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of science. Popper subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious and/or metaphysical formulations on the one hand, and pseudoscientific formulations on the other &mdash; though without providing clear criteria for the differences.<ref>Popper KR "Science: Conjectures and Refutations", reprinted in Grim P (1990) ''Philosophy of Science and the Occult'', Albany, pp. 104-110</ref> He gave [[astrology]] and [[psychoanalysis]] as examples of pseudoscience, and Einstein's [[theory of relativity]] as an example of science.<ref>Popper KR (1962) [http://karws.gso.uri.edu/JFK/critical_thinking/Science_pseudo_falsifiability.html Science, Pseudo-Science, and Falsifiability]. ''Conjectures and Refutations'' </ref>  More recently, [[Paul Thagard]] (1978) proposed that pseudoscience is primarily distinguishable from science by its lack of progress, and the selective and or lack of attempts by proponents to solve problems with the theory. [[Mario Bunge]] (1984) has suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between science and pseudoscience.


Some historians and philosophers of science (including [[Paul Feyerabend]]) argue, from a [[sociology of knowledge]] perspective, that a distinction between science and pseudoscience is neither possible nor desirable.<ref>Feyerabend, Paul, ''Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge,'' (1975)[http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/feyerabe.htm] </ref>&nbsp;<ref>For a perspective on Feyerabend from within the scientific community, see, e.g., Gauch (2003) at p.4: "Such critiques are unfamiliar to most scientists, although some may have heard a few distant shots from the so-called science wars."</ref> Among the issues which can make the distinction difficult are that both the theories and methodologies of science evolve at differing rates in response to new data.<ref>Thagard, Paul R. "Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, ed PD Asquith and I Hacking (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ff. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."</ref> In addition, the specific standards applicable to one field of science may not be those employed in other fields.<ref>Gauch HG, Jr., Scientific Method in Practice (2003) 3-5 ff.</ref>
Philosopher of science [[Paul Feyerabend]] has argued, from a [[sociology of knowledge]] perspective, that a distinction between science and non-science is neither possible nor desirable.<ref>Feyerabend P ''Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge'' (1975)[http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/feyerabe.htm] </ref>&nbsp;<ref>For a perspective on Feyerabend from within the scientific community, see, e.g., Gauch (2003) at p.4: "Such critiques are unfamiliar to most scientists, although some may have heard a few distant shots from the so-called science wars."</ref> Among the issues which can make the distinction difficult are that both the theories and methodologies of science evolve at differing rates in response to new data.<ref>Thagard PR (1978) "Why astrology is a pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, ed. Asquith PD and Hacking I (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ff. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."</ref> In addition, the specific standards applicable to one field of science may not be those employed in other fields. Thagard (1978) also writes from a sociological perspective and states that "elucidation of how science differs from pseudoscience is the philosophical side of an attempt to overcome public neglect of genuine science."


Some critics of pseudoscience such as [[Richard Dawkins]], [[Mario Bunge]], [[Carl Sagan]], and [[James Randi]] consider all forms of pseudoscience to be harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics generally consider that pseudoscience may occur for a number of reasons, ranging from simple naïveté about the nature of science and the [[scientific method]], to deliberate deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of personal health and safety may be very directly involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy or treatment, or in assessing safety risks. In such instances the potential for direct harm to patients, clients or even the general public may be an issue in assessing pseudoscience. (See also: [[Junk science]].)
Both the [[scientific skepticism|skeptics]] and the [[brights movement]], most prominently represented by [[Richard Dawkins]], [[Mario Bunge]], [[Carl Sagan]] and [[James Randi]], consider all forms of pseudoscience to be harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics generally consider that pseudoscience may occur for a number of reasons, ranging from simple naïveté about the nature of science and the [[scientific method]], to deliberate deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of personal health and safety may be very directly involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy or treatment, or in assessing safety risks. In such instances the potential for direct harm to patients, clients or even the general public may be an issue in assessing pseudoscience. (See also [[Junk science]].)


The concept of pseudoscience as antagonistic to ''bona fide'' science appears to have emerged in the mid-[[19th century]]. The second recorded use of the word "pseudo-science" appears to have been in 1844 in the ''Northern Journal of Medicine'', I 387: "That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognised as a branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles".
The concept of pseudoscience as antagonistic to ''bona fide'' science appears to have emerged in the mid-[[19th century]]. Among the first recorded uses of the word "pseudo-science" was in 1844 in the ''Northern Journal of Medicine'', I 387: "That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognized as a branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles".


==Identifying pseudoscience==
==Identifying pseudoscience==


A field, practice, or body of knowledge is reasonably called pseudoscience or pseudoscientific when (1) it has presented itself as scientific (i.e., as empirically and experimentally verifiable); and (2) it fails to meet the accepted [[norm (sociology)|norms]] of scientific research. <ref>Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) ''Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues'', 1-82.</ref> Within the various expectations of legitimate scientific methodology, by far the most important is that of making data and methodology available for close  scrutiny by other [[scientists]] and [[researchers]], as well as making available any additional relevant information used to arrive at particular results or methods of practice.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' Gauch, Hugh G., Jr. (2003) ''Scientific Method in Practice'', 124 ''ff'', esp. section on "Full Disclosure".</ref> To the degree that thorough documentation of data and method is unavailable for detailed scrutiny by others, a body of knowledge, practice, or field of inquiry will tend, to have some of the characteristics below.
A field, practice, or body of knowledge might reasonably be called pseudoscientific when (1) it is presented as consistent with the accepted [[norm (sociology)|norms]] of scientific research; but (2) it demonstrably fails to meet these norms, most importantly, in misuse of [[scientific method]].<ref>Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) ''Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues'', 1-82</ref> One accepted norm for example is that of making data and methodology available for scrutiny by other [[scientists]] and [[researchers]], as well as making available any additional relevant information used to arrive at particular results or methods of practice.  
 
The following have been proposed to be characteristics of "pseudoscientific" arguments.  


'''Use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims'''
'''Use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims'''
* Assertion of scientific claims that are vague rather than precise, and that lack specific measurements as a basis&nbsp;<ref>See, e.g., Gauch (2003), ''op cit'' at 211 ''ff'' (Probability, "Common Blunders").</ref>. 
* Assertion of scientific claims that are vague rather than precise, and that lack specific measurements.  
* Failure to make use of [[operational definition]]s&nbsp;<ref>For a well-developed explanation of operational definitions, see, e.g., [http://www.wadsworth.com/psychology_d/templates/student_resources/workshops/res_methd/op_def/op_def_01.html]</ref>
* Failure to make use of [[operational definition]]s. (ie. a scientific description of the operational means in which which a range of numeric measurements can be obtained).<ref>Paul Montgomery Churchland, ''Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'' (1999) MIT Press. [http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0262530740&id=_7CBvggqOE4C&pg=PA90&lpg=PA90&dq=%22operational+definitions.%22+pseudoscience&sig=hEPrs8b_et10WtXYwX2t3C2ubLg p.90]. "Most terms in theoretical physics, for example, do not enjoy at least some distinct connections with observables, but not of the simple sort that would permit operational ''definitions'' in terms of these observables. [..] If a restriction in favor of operational definitions were to be followed, therefore, most of theoretical ''physics'' would have to be dismissed as meaningless pseudoscience!"</ref>
* Failure to adhere to the principle of [[parsimony]], i.e. failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when multiple viable explanations are possible (''see'': [[Occam's Razor]])&nbsp;<ref>Gauch, ''op cit'' (2003) 269 ff, "Parsimony and Efficiency"</ref>
* Failure to make reasonable use of the principle of [[parsimony]], i.e. failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when multiple viable explanations are possible (''see'': [[Occam's Razor]])
* Use of [[obscurantist]] language. Many proponents of pseudoscience use grandiose or highly technical jargon in an effort to provide their disciplines with the superficial trappings of science.<ref name=Lilienfeld20/>
* Use of [[obscurantist]] language, and misuse of apparently technical jargon in an effort to give claims the superficial trappings of science.
* Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess boundary conditions (well articulated limitations) under which the predicted phenomena do and do not apply. In contrast, many or most pseudoscientific phenomena are purported to operate across an exceedingly wide range of conditions.<ref>Hines, T. (1988) ''Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence.'' Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. A Skeptical Inquirer Reader.</ref>
* Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess boundary conditions (well articulated limitations) under which the predicted phenomena do and do not apply.  


'''Over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation'''
'''Over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation'''
* Assertion of scientific claims that cannot be falsified in the event they are incorrect, inaccurate, or irrelevant (''see also'': [[falsifiability]])&nbsp;<ref>Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lacatos, Imre, and Musgrave, Alan. (eds.). ''Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge'' (1970) 91-195.</ref>&nbsp;<ref>Popper, Karl (1959) ''The Logic of Scientific Discovery''.</ref>  
* Assertion of scientific claims that cannot be falsified in the event they are incorrect, inaccurate, or irrelevant (''see also'': [[falsifiability]])<ref>Lakatos I (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos I, Musgrave A (eds) ''Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge'' pp 91-195; Popper KR (1959) ''The Logic of Scientific Discovery''</ref>  
* Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict (''see, e.g.'':[[validity]], [[relevance]], [[Ignoratio elenchi]]; [[Argument from ignorance]])&nbsp;<ref>See, e.g., Gauch (2003), ''op cit'' at 178 ''ff'' (Deductive Logic, "Fallacies"), and at 211 ''ff'' (Probability, "Common Blunders").</ref>&nbsp;<ref>See, e.g., [http://www.skeptics.org.uk/explanation.php?dir=articles/explanations&article=ignoratio_elenchi.php]</ref>&nbsp;<ref>''Macmilllan Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff'', esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi".</ref>
* Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict <ref>
* Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must be true, and vice versa (''see'': [[Argument from ignorance]])&nbsp;<ref>Argument from ignorance is also properly termed "argument to ignorance", "argumentum ad ignorantiam". For a definition, see, e.g.,[http://skepdic.com/ignorance.html]</ref>&nbsp;<ref>''Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff'', esp. 177-178.</ref>
e.g. [http://www.skeptics.org.uk/explanation.php?dir=articles/explanations&article=ignoratio_elenchi.php]
* Overreliance on testimonials and anecdotes. Testimonial and anecdotal evidence can be useful for discovery (i.e., hypothesis generation) but should not be used in the context of justification (i.e., hypothesis testing). Proponents of pseudoscientific claims frequently invoke reports from selected cases as evidence for these claims.<ref>Bunge, Mario (1983) "Demarcating science from pseudoscience," Fundamenta Scientiae 3: 369-388, 381.</ref>
''Macmilllan Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff'', esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi"</ref>
* Selective use of experimental evidence: presentation of data that seems to support its own claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with its claims&nbsp;<ref>Thagard, ''op cit'' (1978) at 227, 228.</ref>
* Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must be true, and vice versa (''see'': [[Argument from ignorance]])<ref>''Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff'' esp. 177-178</ref>
* Reversed burden of proof. In science, the burden of proof rests on the individual making a claim, not on the critic. Proponents of a pseudoscience frequently neglect this principle and demand that [[skeptic]]s demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g., an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than the claimant.<ref>Lilienfeld S.O. (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology. Guilford Press (2004) ISBN 1-59385-070-0</ref>
* Over-reliance on testimonials and anecdotes. Testimonial and anecdotal evidence can be useful for discovery (i.e. hypothesis generation) but should not be used in the context of justification (i.e. hypothesis testing). <ref>Bunge M (1983) Demarcating science from pseudoscience ''Fundamenta Scientiae'' 3:369-388, 381</ref>
* Appeals to [[holism]]:  Proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine, alternative medicine, naturopathy and mental health, often resort to the “mantra of holism” to explain negative findings.<ref>Ruscio, J. (2001) ''Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense'', Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth.</ref>
* Selective use of experimental evidence: presentation of data that seems to support its own claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with its claims.<ref>Thagard (1978)''op cit'' at 227, 228</ref>
* Reversed burden of proof. In science, the burden of proof rests on the individual making a claim, not on the critic. "Pseudoscientific" arguments may neglect this principle and demand that [[skeptic]]s demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g. an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than the claimant.<ref>Lilienfeld SO (2004) ''Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology'' Guildford Press (2004) ISBN 1-59385-070-0</ref>
* Appeals to [[holism]]:  Proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine, alternative medicine, naturopathy and mental health, often resort to the “mantra of holism” to explain negative findings.<ref>Ruscio J (2001) ''Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense'', Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth</ref>


'''Lack of openness to testing by other experts'''
'''Lack of openness to testing by other experts'''
* Evasion of [[peer review]] before publicizing them (called "[[science by press conference]]")&nbsp;<ref>[http://www.senseaboutscience.org.uk/PDF/peerReview.pdf Peer review and the acceptance of new scientific ideas] (''Warning:'' 469 [[kilobyte|kB]] [[Portable Document Format|PDF]])</ref>&nbsp;<ref>*[http://www.jpgmonline.com/article.asp?issn=0022-3859;year=2001;volume=47;issue=3;spage=210;epage=4;aulast=Gitanjali Peer review – process, perspectives and the path ahead]</ref>&nbsp;<ref name=Lilienfeld>Lilienfeld Scott O. (2004) ''Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology.'' Guilford Press (2004)  ISBN 1-59385-070-0</ref>&nbsp;<ref>For an opposing perspective, see, e.g.: [http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/dissent/documents/ss/ss5.html Peer Review as Scholarly Conformity]</ref> Many proponents of pseudoscience avoid subjecting their work to the often ego-bruising process of peer review, sometimes on the grounds that peer review is inherently biased against claims that contradict established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated adequately using standard scientific methods. By remaining insulated from the peer review process, some proponents of pseudoscience forego an invaluable opportunity to obtain corrective feedback from informed colleagues.<ref name=Ruscio>Ruscio, J. (2001) ''Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense.'' Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth.</ref>.
* Evasion of [[peer review]] before publicizing results (called "[[science by press conference]]"). <ref>[http://www.senseaboutscience.org.uk/PDF/peerReview.pdf Peer review and the acceptance of new scientific ideas] (''Warning'' 469 kB [[Portable Document Format|PDF]])*[http://www.jpgmonline.com/article.asp?issn=0022-3859;year=2001;volume=47;issue=3;spage=210;epage=4;aulast=Gitanjali Peer review – process, perspectives and the path ahead]; Lilienfeld (2004) ''op cit'' For an opposing perspective, e.g. [http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/dissent/documents/ss/ss5.html Peer Review as Scholarly Conformity]</ref>  
* Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to [[reproducibility|reproduce]] the claimed results&nbsp;<ref>Gauch, ''op cit'' (2003) at 124 ff, "Full Disclosure"</ref>
 
* Assertion of claims of secrecy or proprietary knowledge in response to requests for review of data or methodology&nbsp;<ref>Gauch, ''op cit'' (2003) at 124 ff, "Full Disclosure"</ref>
Some proponents of theories that contradict accepted scientific theories avoid subjecting their work to the often ego-bruising process of peer review, sometimes on the grounds that peer review is inherently biased against claims that contradict established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated adequately using standard scientific methods. By remaining insulated from the peer review process, these proponents forego the opportunity of corrective feedback from informed colleagues.<ref>Ruscio J (2001) ''Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense.'' Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth</ref>
* Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to [[reproducibility|reproduce]] the claimed results.<ref>Gauch (2003) ''op cit'' 124 ff"</ref>
* Assertion of claims of secrecy or proprietary knowledge in response to requests for review of data or methodology.


'''Lack of progress'''
'''Lack of progress'''
* Failure to progress towards additional evidence of its claims&nbsp;<ref name = Lakatos1>Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos, Imre, and Musgrave, Alan. (eds.). ''Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge'' (1970) 91-195.</ref>&nbsp;<ref>Thagard, Paul R. "Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, edited by P.D. Asquith and I. Hacking (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ''ff''. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."</ref>
* Failure to progress towards additional evidence of its claims.<ref name = Lakatos1>Lakatos I (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos I, Musgrave A (eds.) ''Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge'' 91-195; Thagard (1978) ''op cit'' writes: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."</ref>
* Lack of self correction: both scientific and pseudoscientific research programmes make mistakes, but most scientific research programs tend to eliminate these errors over time, whereas most pseudoscientific research programs do not. Intellectual stagnation is a hallmark of most pseudoscientific research programs.<ref name=Ruscio120>Ruscio, J. (2001) ''Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense.'' Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth, p120.</ref>&nbsp;<ref> In contrast to sciences, in which erroneous claims tend to be gradually ferreted out by a process akin to natural selection, pseudosciences tend to remain stagnant in the face of contradictory evidence. The work ''Scientists Confront Velikovsky'', 1976, Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of Thomas Kuhn, e.g., ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience.</ref>  
* Lack of self correction: scientific research programmes make mistakes, but they tend to eliminate these errors over time. <ref> name=Ruscio120>Ruscio J (2001) ''op cit.'' p120. By contrast, theories may be accused of being pseudoscientific because they have remained unaltered despite contradictory evidence. The work ''Scientists Confront Velikovsky'' (1976) Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of [[Thomas Kuhn]], e.g. ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience.</ref>  


Terrence Hines has identified astrology as a subject that has changed very little in the past two millennia.<ref>See, e.g., [[Terence Hines|Hines T]], ''Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence'', Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1988. ISBN 0-87975-419-2.
Thagard (1978) ''op cit'' 223 ''ff''</ref>


'''Personalization of issues'''
'''Personalization of issues'''
*Tight social groups and [[granfalloon]]s.  [[Authoritarian personality]], [[suppression of dissent]], and [[groupthink]] can enhance the adoption of pseudoscientific beliefs. In attempting to confirm their pseudoscience ([[confirmation bias]]), the group tends to identify critics of the pseudoscience as enemies, whereupon the group generates a set of arguments against critics.<ref name=Devilly>Devilly, Grant J. (2005) "Power Therapies and possible threats to the science of psychology and psychiatry", in Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, Volume 39, Number 6, June 2005, pp. 437-445(9)</ref>
*Tight social groups and [[granfalloon]]s.  [[Authoritarian personality]], [[suppression of dissent]], and [[groupthink]] can enhance the adoption of beliefs that have no rational basis. In attempting to confirm their ([[confirmation bias]]), the group tends to identify their critics as enemies.<ref name=Devilly>Devilly GJ (2005) Power therapies and possible threats to the science of psychology and psychiatry ''Austral NZ J Psych'' 39:437-445(9)</ref>
* Assertion of claims of a conspiracy on the part of the scientific community to suppress the results&nbsp;<ref>An example of such a Web site is [http://archivefreedom.org/ archivefreedom.org] which claims that "The list of suppressed scientists even includes Nobel Laureates!"</ref>
* Assertion of claims of a conspiracy on the part of the scientific community to suppress the results.<ref>e.g. [http://archivefreedom.org/ archivefreedom.org] which claims that "The list of suppressed scientists even includes Nobel Laureates!"</ref>
* Attacking the motives or character of anyone who questions the claims (see [[ad hominem|Ad hominem fallacy]].)&nbsp;<ref name=Devilly>Devilly, Grant J. (2005) "Power Therapies and possible threats to the science of psychology and psychiatry", in Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry (2005) 39 6:437-445</ref>&nbsp;<ref>See, e.g. [http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/person.html]</ref>
* Attacking the motives or character of anyone who questions the claims (see [[ad hominem|Ad hominem fallacy]]).<ref name=Devilly>Devilly (2005) ''op cit.''
e.g. [http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/person.html]</ref>
 
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Subjects may be considered pseudoscientific for various reasons and with an emphasis on particular characteristics; Popper considered [[astrology]] to be pseudoscientific simply because astrologers keep their claims so vague that they could never be refuted, whereas Thagard considers astrology pseudoscientific because its practitioners make little effort to develop the theory, show no concern for attempts to critically evaluate the theory in relation to others, and are selective in considering evidence. More generally, Thagard also stated that pseudoscience tends to focus on resemblances rather than cause-effect relations. "Mistaking correlation for causation is the basis of most superstitious beliefs, including many in the area of [[alternative medicine]]. We have a tendency to assume that when things occur together, they must be causally connected, although obviously they need not be" (Beyerstein 1997).
Subjects may be considered pseudoscientific for various reasons and with an emphasis on particular characteristics; Popper considered [[astrology]] to be pseudoscientific simply because astrologers keep their claims so vague that they could never be refuted, whereas Thagard considers astrology pseudoscientific because its practitioners make little effort to develop the theory, show no concern for attempts to critically evaluate the theory in relation to others, and are selective in considering evidence. More generally, Thagard also stated that pseudoscience tends to focus on resemblances rather than cause-effect relations.  


Some of these characteristics are also true to some extent of some new genuinely scientific work. These include:
Some criticisms that lead to the accusation of pseudoscience are also true to some extent of some new genuinely scientific work. These include:
* claims or theories unconnected to previous experimental results
* claims or theories unconnected to previous experimental results
* claims which contradict experimentally established results
* claims which contradict experimentally established results
* work failing to operate on standard definitions of concepts
* work failing to operate on standard definitions of concepts
* emotion-based resistance, by the scientific community, to new claims or theories&nbsp;<ref>Kuhn, Thomas, ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1962)</ref>
* emotion-based resistance, by the scientific community, to new claims or theories&nbsp;<ref>Kuhn TS (1962) ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions''</ref>
 
Science is also distinguishable from [[revelation]], [[theology]], or [[spirituality]] in that it claims to offer insight into the physical world obtained by "scientific" means. Systems of thought that derive from "divine" or "inspired" knowledge are not considered pseudoscience if they do not claim either to be scientific or to overturn well-established science.


Another class of pseudoscience dubbed [[pseudoskepticism]] by the late professor of sociology, [[Marcello Truzzi]], refers to a non-rigorous [[skepticism]] that is  erroneously presented as skepticism, and taking a stance of ''denial'', rather than ''doubt''.<ref>Marcello Truzzi, Editorial, ''[http://www.anomalist.com/commentaries/pseudo.html Zetetic Scholar]'', 12–13 (1987) 3–4. "Since 'skepticism' properly refers to doubt rather than denial — nonbelief rather than belief — critics who take the negative rather than an agnostic position but still call themselves 'skeptics' are actually  pseudo-skeptics and have, I believed, gained a false advantage by usurping that label."</ref> Truzzi noted that while "Many claims of anomalies are bunk and deserve proper debunking .. those I term scoffers often make judgements without full inquiry"<ref>Marcello Truzzi, "Pseudoscience," in Gordon Stein, editor,  ''Encyclopedia of the Paranormal''. Buffalo,  NY: Prometheus Books. Pp. 560-575. Also described in "[http://skepticalinvestigations.org/anomalistics/perspective.htm Anomalistics]" (1998)</ref> The term "pseudoscience" may also be used by adherents of fields considered pseudoscientific to criticize their mainstream critics and vice versa, in which case the appearance is of two opposing camps both accusing each other of pseudoscience.
Some statements and commonly held beliefs in [[popular science]] may not meet the criteria of science. "Pop" science may blur the divide between science and pseudoscience among the general public, and may also involve [[science fiction]].<ref>[http://www.popularscience.co.uk/features/feat20.htm]</ref> Indeed, pop science is disseminated to, and can also easily emanate from, persons not accountable to [[scientific method|scientific methodology]] and expert [[peer review]].


== Pseudoscience contrasted with protoscience ==  
== Pseudoscience contrasted with protoscience ==  
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Protoscience is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that has not yet been adequately tested by the scientific method, but which is otherwise consistent with existing science or which, where inconsistent, offers reasonable account of the inconsistency. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a scientific field. <ref>Popper, op. cit.</ref> Pseudoscience, in contrast, may even be untestable in principle. If tests appear to contradict its evidence, supporters may insist that the existing scientific results are false. Pseudoscience is often unresponsive to ordinary scientific procedures (for example, peer review, publication in standard journals).  
[[Protoscience]] is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that has not yet been adequately tested by the scientific method, but which is otherwise consistent with existing science or which, where inconsistent, offers reasonable account of the inconsistency. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a scientific field.<ref>Popper KR ''op. cit.''</ref>. By contrast, "pseudoscience"  is reserved to describe theories which are either untestable in practice or in principle, or which are maintained even when tests appear to have refuted them.  


The boundaries between pseudoscience, protoscience, and "real" science are  unclear. Especially where there is a significant cultural or historical distance (as, for example, modern [[chemistry]] reflecting on [[alchemy]]), protosciences can be misinterpreted as pseudoscientific. Many people have tried to offer objective distinctions, with mixed success. Often the term pseudoscience is used simply as a [[pejorative]] to express the speaker's low opinion of a given field, regardless of any objective measures.
It is widely disputed (notably by Feyeraband, see above) whether any clear or meaningful boundaries can be drawn between pseudoscience, protoscience, and "real" science. Especially where there is a significant cultural or historical distance (as, for example, modern [[chemistry]] reflecting on [[alchemy]]), protosciences can be misinterpreted as pseudoscientific. Many people have tried to offer objective distinctions, with mixed success. Often the term pseudoscience is used simply as a [[pejorative]] to express the speaker's low opinion of a given field, regardless of any objective measures; thus according to McNally, "The term “pseudoscience” has become little more than an inflammatory buzzword for quickly dismissing one’s opponents in media sound-bites." <ref> McNally RJ (2003)Is the pseudoscience concept useful for clinical psychology? ''SRHMP'' Vol 2 Number 2 Fall/Winter
[http://srmhp.org/0202/pseudoscience.html]</ref>.


If the claims of a given field can be experimentally tested and methodological standards are upheld, it is real scientific work, however odd, astonishing, or counter-intuitive. If claims made are inconsistent with existing experimental results or established theory, but the methodology is sound, caution should be used; much of science consists of testing hypotheses that turn out to be false. In such a case, the work may be better described as ''as yet unproven'' or ''research in progress''. Conversely, if the claims of any given "science" cannot be experimentally tested or scientific standards are not upheld in these tests, it fails to meet the modern criteria for a science.
If the claims of a given field can be experimentally tested and methodological standards are upheld, it is not "pseudoscience", however odd, astonishing, or counter-intuitive. If claims made are inconsistent with existing experimental results or established theory, but the methodology is sound, caution should be used; much of science consists of testing hypotheses that turn out to be false. In such a case, the work may be better described as ideas that are ''not yet generally accepted''. Conversely, if the claims of any given "science" cannot be experimentally tested or scientific standards are not upheld in these tests, it fails to meet the modern criteria for a science.


==Demarcation problem and criticisms of the concept of pseudoscience==
==Demarcation problem and criticisms of the concept of pseudoscience==
{{main|Demarcation problem}}
{{main|Demarcation problem}}


After over a century of dialogue among [[philosophy of science|philosophers of science]] and [[scientist]]s in varied [[science|fields]], and despite broad agreement on the basics of [[scientific method]],<ref>Gauch, Hugh G., Jr., ''Scientific Method in Practice'' (2003) 3-7.</ref> the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated.<ref>Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) ''Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues'', 1-82.</ref> This is known as the [[scientific method#Problem of demarcation|problem of demarcation]].  
After over a century of dialogue among [[philosophy of science|philosophers of science]] and [[scientist]]s in varied [[science|fields]], and despite broad agreement on the basics of [[scientific method]],<ref>Gauch HG Jr (2003)''op cit'' 3-7.</ref> the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated.<ref>Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) ''Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues'', 1-82</ref> This is known as the [[scientific method#Problem of demarcation|problem of demarcation]].  


Many commentators and practitioners of science, as well as supporters of fields of inquiry and practices labelled as pseudoscience, question the rigor of the demarcation{{fact}}, as some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create [[falsifiable]] experiments. Many accepted scientific concepts including: [[plate tectonics]],<ref>http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/geology/techist.html , regarding plate techtonics' early reception.</ref> and the [[Big Bang]],<ref>http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/m_uni/uni_101bb1.html , regarding the Big Bang.</ref> were criticized by some as being pseudoscientific when first proposed.  
Many commentators and practitioners of science, as well as supporters of fields of inquiry and practices labeled as pseudoscience, question the rigor of the demarcation{{fact}}, as some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create [[falsifiable]] experiments{{fact}}.


It has been argued that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. [[Thomas Kuhn]] states that in neither Popper's nor his own theory "can testing play a quite decisive role."<ref>Kuhn, Thomas, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Grim, op. cit., p. 125.</ref> [[Daniel Rothbart]] said that "the defining feature of science does not seem to be experimental success, for most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified."<ref>Rothbart, Daniel, "Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience", in Grim, op. cit., pp. 114.</ref> The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". A theory is thus scientific or not depending upon its historical situation; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. "Many domains in ancient Greece, for example, domains that today are called superstition, religion, magic and the occult, were at that time clear cases of legitimate science." This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model.<ref>Rothbart, Daniel, op. cit., pp. 114-20.</ref>  
It has been argued by several notable commentators that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. [[Thomas Kuhn]] states that in neither Popper's nor his own theory "can testing play a quite decisive role."<ref>Kuhn TS "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Grim, ''op. cit.'' p. 125</ref> [[Daniel Rothbart]] said that "the defining feature of science does not seem to be experimental success, for most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified."<ref>Rothbart D "Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience", in Grim, ''op. cit.'' pp.114.</ref> The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". A theory is thus scientific or not depending upon its historical situation; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. "Many domains in ancient Greece, for example, domains that today are called superstition, religion, magic and the occult, were at that time clear cases of legitimate science." This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model.<ref>Rothbart, Daniel, ''op. cit.'' pp. 114-20.</ref>  


Kuhn postulated that proponents of competing paradigms may resort to [[politics|political]] means (such as [[invective]]) to garner support from a public which lacks the ability to judge competing scientific theories on their merits. Philosopher of science Larry Laudan has suggested that ''pseudoscience'' has no scientific meaning and mostly describes our emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".<ref>Laudan, Larry, "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse, Michael, ''But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy '' (1996) 337-350.</ref>
Kuhn postulated that proponents of competing paradigms may resort to [[politics|political]] means (such as [[invective]]) to garner support from a public which lacks the ability to judge competing scientific theories on their merits. Philosopher of science Larry Laudan has suggested that ''pseudoscience'' has no scientific meaning and mostly describes our emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".<ref>Laudan L (1996) "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse, Michael, ''But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy '' pp. 337-350.</ref>


==The ubiquity of pseudoscientific thinking==
==The ubiquity of pseudoscientific thinking==
"A survey on public knowledge of science in the United States showed that in 1988 “50% of American adults [rejected] evolution, and 88% [believed] astrology is a science" (Bunge 1989). The National Science Foundation indicated that public belief in pseudoscience rose during the 1990's, peaked near 2001 and has mildly declined since. Nevertheless, pseudoscientific beliefs remain ubiquitous. <ref>[http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c7/c7s2.htm] National Science Board. 2006. ''Science and Engineering Indicators 2006.'' Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (volume 1, NSB-06-01; NSB 06-01A).</ref>
The [[National Science Foundation]] stated that, in the USA, "pseudoscientific" beliefs became more widespread during the 1990's, peaked near 2001 and mildly declined since; nevertheless, pseudoscientific beliefs remain common in the USA.<ref>[http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c7/c7s2.htm] National Science Board. 2006. ''Science and Engineering Indicators 2006'' Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (volume 1, NSB-06-01; NSB 06-01A)</ref> As a result, according to the NSF report, there is a lack of knowledge of pseudoscientific issues in society and pseudoscientific practices are commonly followed. Bunge (1999) states that "A survey on public knowledge of science in the United States showed that in 1988 '50% of American adults [rejected] evolution, and 88% [believed] astrology is a science'". 
 
Commentators on pseudoscience perceive it in many fields; for example [[Pseudomathematics]] is a term used for mathematics-like activity undertaken either by non-mathematicians or mathematicians themselves which does not conform to the rigorous standards usually applied to mathematical theories.
 
==Pseudoscience in psychology==


Pseudoscientific thinking has been explained in terms of [[psychology]] and [[social psychology]].  The human proclivity for seeking confirmation rather than refutation ([[confirmation bias]]) (Devilly 2005:439), the tendency to hold comforting beliefs, and the tendency to overgeneralize have been proposed as reasons for the common adherence to pseudoscientific thinking. Also, similar to Thagard’s notions of pseudoscience, humans are prone to associations based on resemblances only, and often prone to misattribution in cause-effect thinking. (Beyerstein 1991).
Neurologists and clinical psychologists <ref> e.g. Drenth (2003) [http://www.allea.org/pdf/17.pdf]; Herbert JD, ''et al.'' (2000)
Science and pseudoscience in the development of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing: implications for clinical psychology. ''Clin Psychol Rev.'' 20:945-71 [PMID 11098395])</ref>
are concerned about the increasing amount of what they consider pseudoscience promoted in [[psychotherapy]] and popular [[psychology]], and also about what they see as pseudoscientific therapies such as [[Neuro-linguistic programming]], [[Rebirthing]], Reparenting, and Primal Scream Therapy being adopted by government and professional bodies and by the public. They state that scientifically unsupported therapies might harm vulnerable members of the public, undermine legitimate therapies, and tend to spread misconceptions about the nature of the mind and brain to society at large. Some psychiatrists and psychologists also perceive pseudoscientific ideas in more popularly accepted branches of psychotherapy, such as [[co-counselling]], [[Gestalt Therapy]], [[Re-evaluation Counseling]] and even in the work of [[Twelve-step program]] bodies such as [[Alcoholics Anonymous]]. There often seems to be an overlap between psychological movements or theories denounced as "pseudoscientific" and those labeled "cults", for example in the case of [[Dianetics]] and [[Scientology]].


A typical concept used in some fringe psychotherapies is [[Wilhelm Reich|orgone energy]]. "There is an increasing degree of overlapping and blending of orgone therapy with New Age and other therapies that manipulate the patient’s ''biofields'', such as [[Therapeutic Touch]] and [[Reiki]]. 'Biofield' is a pseudoscientific term often used synonymously with ''orgone energy''. Klee states that there is even an organization of [[psychiatry|psychiatrists]] which promotes orgone therapy. <ref>Klee GD (2005) The Resurrection of Wilhelm Reich and Orgone Therapy ''The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice'' (Vol. 4, No. 1)" [http://www.srmhp.org/0401/orgone-therapy.html | available online]</ref>


==Pseudoscience in psychotherapy and popular psychology==
==Dangers of pseudoscience in health care==  
Neurologists and clinical psychologists such as Drenth (2003:38) <ref>[http://www.allea.org/pdf/17.pdf]</ref>, Lilienfeld (2004:20) and Beyerstein (1991:34) are concerned about the increasing amount of what they consider pseudoscience promoted in [[psychotherapy]] and popular [[psychology]], and are also concerned about what they see as pseudoscientific therapies such as [[Neuro-linguistic programming]], [[Rebirthing]], [[Reparenting]], and [[Primal Scream Therapy]] being adopted by government and professional bodies and by the public. They state that scientifically unsupported therapies may harm vulnerable members of the public, undermine legitimate therapies, and tend to spread misconceptions about the nature of the mind and brain to society at large. Some psychiatrists and mainstream psychologists also perceive psuodoscientific ideas in more popularly accepted branches of psychotherapy, such as [[co-counselling]], [[Gestalt Therapy]], [[Re-evaluation Counseling]] and even in the work of [[Twelve-step program]] bodies such as [[Alcoholics Anonymous]].  
{{copyedit}}
Lilienfeld (2004) states that there are dangers in using pseudoscientific health systems. [[Rebirthing therapy]] has even led to the death of a juvinile. According to Ostrander et al (2004), shark cartilage is marketed as a cancer cure and as a result, patients have been diverted from acceptable cancer treatment[http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2843/is_3_29/ai_n13676376]. Ostrander et al (2004) state as a solution that "the evidence-based mechanisms of evaluation used daily by the scientific community should be added to the training of media and governmental professionals".


A typical pseudoscientific concept used in some fringe psychotherapies is [[Wilhelm Reich|orgone energy]]. "There is an increasing degree of overlapping and blending of orgone therapy with New Age and other therapies that manipulate the patient’s ''biofields'', such as [[Therapeutic Touch]] and [[Reiki]]. 'Biofield' is a pseudoscientific term often used synonymously with ''orgone energy''. Klee states that "there is even an organization of [[psychiatry|psychiatrists]] which promotes the theories and methods of orgone therapy. <ref>Gerald D. Klee, M.D, "The Resurrection of Wilhelm Reich and Orgone Therapy", The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice  Summer 2005 (Vol. 4, No. 1)." [http://www.srmhp.org/0401/orgone-therapy.html | available online]</ref>
==Psychological explanations for pseudoscientific beliefs==


Pseudoscientific thinking has been explained in terms of [[psychology]] and [[social psychology]]. The human proclivity for seeking confirmation rather than refutation ([[confirmation bias]]) <ref>(Devilly 2005:439)</ref>, the tendency to hold comforting beliefs, and the tendency to overgeneralize have been proposed as reasons for the common adherence to pseudoscientific thinking. Also, Beyerstein (1991) argues that humans are prone to associations based on resemblances only, and often prone to misattribution in cause-effect thinking.


==Scientific theories once criticized as pseudoscience==
==Scientific theories once criticized as pseudoscience==
A number of presently accepted scientific theories were once rejected by mainstream scientists and mathematicians of their time as pseudoscientific, irrational or obviously false. None of these fields are generally considered as pseudoscientific any more. These include:
A number of presently accepted scientific theories were once criticised by some as being pseudoscientific. [[Continental drift]] theory was once considered pseudoscientific (Williams 2000:58), but is now part of mainstream science especially since the [[paleomagnetism|paleomagnetic evidence]] was discovered that supported [[plate tectonics]].


*[[Big Bang theory]]&nbsp;<ref>EOP</ref>
Fields can also repudiate notions that some consider to be pseudoscientific in favour of more conventional element(s) of their field. For example, Atwood (2004) suggested that "[[osteopathy]] has, for the most part, repudiated its pseudoscientific beginnings and joined the world of rational healthcare.<ref name="atwood">Atwood KC (2004) Naturopathy, pseudoscience, and medicine: myths and fallacies vs truth. ''Medscape Gen Med''6:e53 [http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1140750 available online]</ref>
*[[Black holes]]<ref>EOP, p. 156</ref>
*[[Continental drift]]&nbsp;<ref>EOP</ref>
*[[Cosmology]]&nbsp;<ref>Stephen Hawking, [http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN9810210787&id=B18DXurmFZ8C&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&dq=pseudoscience+cosmology&sig=VURMRSztTu0NSk-GlLaZ91Zv6ZM Hawking on the Big Bang and Black Holes] (1993) World Scientific, ISBN 981-02-1078-7. "Cosmology was thought of as pseudoscience where wild speculation was unconstrained by any possible observations".</ref>
*[[Electromagnetic fields]]&nbsp;<ref>Albert Einstein: "It is possible that there exist emanations that are still unknown to us. Do you remember how electrical currents and 'unseen waves' were laughed at?"</ref>
*[[Meteors]]<ref>[http://www4.nau.edu/meteorite/Meteorite/Book-Heritage.html See here]</ref>


At the time these theories were not accepted, each was backed up by varying levels of evidence, or none at all. Fields can also reject their pseudoscientific notions in favour of the more limited range of scientifically supported element/s of their field. For example, Atwood (2004) suggested that "[[osteopathy]] has, for the most part, repudiated its pseudoscientific beginnings and joined the world of rational healthcare.".
At times, scientists use the descriptor "pseudoscience" to distinguish between even mainstream investigations of varying rigor. As observational evidence and theoretical descriptions improve and fields develop, disciplines criticized for having pseudoscientific aspects may become more respected by the [[scientific community]]. The field of [[physical cosmology]] has had such a history.<ref name=Hawking1>Stephen W. Hawking, ''Hawking on the Big Bang and Black Holes'' (1993) World Scientific Publishing Company, [http://books.google.com/books?id=B18DXurmFZ8C&vid=ISBN9810210787&dq=cosmology+pseudoscience&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&sig=3kUPCUsutTSoxxPQT_-ZnTq7Vqo&q=cosmology+pseudoscience Page 1] See also [http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN140200155X&id=WOjraq3KdeQC&pg=PA75&lpg=PA75&dq=cosmology+pseudoscience&sig=HToMI1FluZxg3A6fYGiav5KKANg] and [http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN140200155X&id=WOjraq3KdeQC&pg=PA75&lpg=PA75&dq=cosmology+pseudoscience&sig=HToMI1FluZxg3A6fYGiav5KKANg].</ref> Currently, [[string theory]] has been criticized by certain researchers as suffering from the same problems <ref>For example: Smolin L ''The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next''. Houghton Mifflin Company. (2006) ISBN: 0618551050</ref>


==See also==
* [[Bad science]]
* [[Cargo cult science]]
* ''[[The Demon-Haunted World]]''
* [[Junk science]] 
* [[Pathological science]]
* [[Pathological skepticism]] (or Pseudoskepticism)
* [[Quackery]]
* [[Sokal Affair]]


===People===
===People===

Revision as of 11:35, 28 October 2006


Phrenology is regarded today as a classic example of pseudoscience.

A pseudoscience is any body of alleged knowledge, methodology, belief, or practice that claims to be scientific but does not follow the scientific method.[1] [2]

The term pseudoscience appears to have been first used in 1843 [3] as a combination of the Greek root pseudo, meaning false, and the Latin scientia, meaning knowledge or a field of knowledge. It generally has negative connotations, because it asserts that things so labeled are inaccurately or deceptively described as science. [4] Accordingly, those labeled as practicing or advocating a "pseudoscience" normally reject this classification. There is considerable disagreement about whether it is possible to distinguish "science" from "pseudoscience" in a reliable and objective way, and about whether attempting to do so has any useful purpose. [5] Those who believe that characterising some areas as pseudoscientific is useful and valid stress the use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims, over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation, lack of openness to testing by other experts, and a lack of progress in theory development. The term pseudoscience or pseudoscientific is sometimes applied by disputants working in the same field to disparage a competing theory or the form of argument used by a rival, [6] sometimes by commentators from outside a field to disparage a whole field, sometimes merely to characterise the fact that a theory published in a popular book has no academic credibility whatsoever, [7] and sometimes in reference to a theory now discarded. [8]

Introduction

The standards for determining whether a body of alleged knowledge, methodology, or practice is scientific can vary from field to field, but involve agreed principles including reproducibility and intersubjective verifiability.[9] Such principles aim to ensure that relevant evidence can be reproduced and/or measured given the same conditions, which allows further investigation to determine whether a hypothesis or theory related to given phenomena is both valid and reliable for use by others, including other scientists and researchers. Scientific methods are expected to be applied throughout, and bias is expected to be controlled or eliminated, by double-blind studies, or statistically through fair sampling procedures. All gathered data, including experimental/environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for peer review, thereby allowing further experiments or studies to be conducted to confirm or falsify results, as well as to determine other important factors such as statistical significance, confidence intervals, and margins of error.[10] Fulfillment of these requirements allows others a reasonable opportunity to assess whether to rely upon the reported results in their own scientific work or in a particular field of applied science, technology, therapy, or other form of practice.

In the mid-20th Century Karl Popper suggested the criterion of falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science.[11] Theories such as God created the universe may be true or false, but they are not falsifiable, so they are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of science. Popper subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious and/or metaphysical formulations on the one hand, and pseudoscientific formulations on the other — though without providing clear criteria for the differences.[12] He gave astrology and psychoanalysis as examples of pseudoscience, and Einstein's theory of relativity as an example of science.[13] More recently, Paul Thagard (1978) proposed that pseudoscience is primarily distinguishable from science by its lack of progress, and the selective and or lack of attempts by proponents to solve problems with the theory. Mario Bunge (1984) has suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between science and pseudoscience.

Philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend has argued, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, that a distinction between science and non-science is neither possible nor desirable.[14] [15] Among the issues which can make the distinction difficult are that both the theories and methodologies of science evolve at differing rates in response to new data.[16] In addition, the specific standards applicable to one field of science may not be those employed in other fields. Thagard (1978) also writes from a sociological perspective and states that "elucidation of how science differs from pseudoscience is the philosophical side of an attempt to overcome public neglect of genuine science."

Both the skeptics and the brights movement, most prominently represented by Richard Dawkins, Mario Bunge, Carl Sagan and James Randi, consider all forms of pseudoscience to be harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics generally consider that pseudoscience may occur for a number of reasons, ranging from simple naïveté about the nature of science and the scientific method, to deliberate deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of personal health and safety may be very directly involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy or treatment, or in assessing safety risks. In such instances the potential for direct harm to patients, clients or even the general public may be an issue in assessing pseudoscience. (See also Junk science.)

The concept of pseudoscience as antagonistic to bona fide science appears to have emerged in the mid-19th century. Among the first recorded uses of the word "pseudo-science" was in 1844 in the Northern Journal of Medicine, I 387: "That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognized as a branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles".

Identifying pseudoscience

A field, practice, or body of knowledge might reasonably be called pseudoscientific when (1) it is presented as consistent with the accepted norms of scientific research; but (2) it demonstrably fails to meet these norms, most importantly, in misuse of scientific method.[17] One accepted norm for example is that of making data and methodology available for scrutiny by other scientists and researchers, as well as making available any additional relevant information used to arrive at particular results or methods of practice.

The following have been proposed to be characteristics of "pseudoscientific" arguments.

Use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims

  • Assertion of scientific claims that are vague rather than precise, and that lack specific measurements.
  • Failure to make use of operational definitions. (ie. a scientific description of the operational means in which which a range of numeric measurements can be obtained).[18]
  • Failure to make reasonable use of the principle of parsimony, i.e. failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when multiple viable explanations are possible (see: Occam's Razor)
  • Use of obscurantist language, and misuse of apparently technical jargon in an effort to give claims the superficial trappings of science.
  • Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess boundary conditions (well articulated limitations) under which the predicted phenomena do and do not apply.

Over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation

  • Assertion of scientific claims that cannot be falsified in the event they are incorrect, inaccurate, or irrelevant (see also: falsifiability)[19]
  • Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict [20]
  • Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must be true, and vice versa (see: Argument from ignorance)[21]
  • Over-reliance on testimonials and anecdotes. Testimonial and anecdotal evidence can be useful for discovery (i.e. hypothesis generation) but should not be used in the context of justification (i.e. hypothesis testing). [22]
  • Selective use of experimental evidence: presentation of data that seems to support its own claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with its claims.[23]
  • Reversed burden of proof. In science, the burden of proof rests on the individual making a claim, not on the critic. "Pseudoscientific" arguments may neglect this principle and demand that skeptics demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g. an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than the claimant.[24]
  • Appeals to holism: Proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine, alternative medicine, naturopathy and mental health, often resort to the “mantra of holism” to explain negative findings.[25]

Lack of openness to testing by other experts

Some proponents of theories that contradict accepted scientific theories avoid subjecting their work to the often ego-bruising process of peer review, sometimes on the grounds that peer review is inherently biased against claims that contradict established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated adequately using standard scientific methods. By remaining insulated from the peer review process, these proponents forego the opportunity of corrective feedback from informed colleagues.[27]

  • Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to reproduce the claimed results.[28]
  • Assertion of claims of secrecy or proprietary knowledge in response to requests for review of data or methodology.

Lack of progress

  • Failure to progress towards additional evidence of its claims.[29]
  • Lack of self correction: scientific research programmes make mistakes, but they tend to eliminate these errors over time. [30]

Terrence Hines has identified astrology as a subject that has changed very little in the past two millennia.[31]

Personalization of issues


Subjects may be considered pseudoscientific for various reasons and with an emphasis on particular characteristics; Popper considered astrology to be pseudoscientific simply because astrologers keep their claims so vague that they could never be refuted, whereas Thagard considers astrology pseudoscientific because its practitioners make little effort to develop the theory, show no concern for attempts to critically evaluate the theory in relation to others, and are selective in considering evidence. More generally, Thagard also stated that pseudoscience tends to focus on resemblances rather than cause-effect relations.

Some criticisms that lead to the accusation of pseudoscience are also true to some extent of some new genuinely scientific work. These include:

  • claims or theories unconnected to previous experimental results
  • claims which contradict experimentally established results
  • work failing to operate on standard definitions of concepts
  • emotion-based resistance, by the scientific community, to new claims or theories [34]

Science is also distinguishable from revelation, theology, or spirituality in that it claims to offer insight into the physical world obtained by "scientific" means. Systems of thought that derive from "divine" or "inspired" knowledge are not considered pseudoscience if they do not claim either to be scientific or to overturn well-established science.

Some statements and commonly held beliefs in popular science may not meet the criteria of science. "Pop" science may blur the divide between science and pseudoscience among the general public, and may also involve science fiction.[35] Indeed, pop science is disseminated to, and can also easily emanate from, persons not accountable to scientific methodology and expert peer review.

Pseudoscience contrasted with protoscience

Template:Verify Protoscience is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that has not yet been adequately tested by the scientific method, but which is otherwise consistent with existing science or which, where inconsistent, offers reasonable account of the inconsistency. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a scientific field.[36]. By contrast, "pseudoscience" is reserved to describe theories which are either untestable in practice or in principle, or which are maintained even when tests appear to have refuted them.

It is widely disputed (notably by Feyeraband, see above) whether any clear or meaningful boundaries can be drawn between pseudoscience, protoscience, and "real" science. Especially where there is a significant cultural or historical distance (as, for example, modern chemistry reflecting on alchemy), protosciences can be misinterpreted as pseudoscientific. Many people have tried to offer objective distinctions, with mixed success. Often the term pseudoscience is used simply as a pejorative to express the speaker's low opinion of a given field, regardless of any objective measures; thus according to McNally, "The term “pseudoscience” has become little more than an inflammatory buzzword for quickly dismissing one’s opponents in media sound-bites." [37].

If the claims of a given field can be experimentally tested and methodological standards are upheld, it is not "pseudoscience", however odd, astonishing, or counter-intuitive. If claims made are inconsistent with existing experimental results or established theory, but the methodology is sound, caution should be used; much of science consists of testing hypotheses that turn out to be false. In such a case, the work may be better described as ideas that are not yet generally accepted. Conversely, if the claims of any given "science" cannot be experimentally tested or scientific standards are not upheld in these tests, it fails to meet the modern criteria for a science.

Demarcation problem and criticisms of the concept of pseudoscience

For more information, see: Demarcation problem.


After over a century of dialogue among philosophers of science and scientists in varied fields, and despite broad agreement on the basics of scientific method,[38] the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated.[39] This is known as the problem of demarcation.

Many commentators and practitioners of science, as well as supporters of fields of inquiry and practices labeled as pseudoscience, question the rigor of the demarcationTemplate:Fact, as some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create falsifiable experimentsTemplate:Fact.

It has been argued by several notable commentators that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. Thomas Kuhn states that in neither Popper's nor his own theory "can testing play a quite decisive role."[40] Daniel Rothbart said that "the defining feature of science does not seem to be experimental success, for most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified."[41] The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". A theory is thus scientific or not depending upon its historical situation; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. "Many domains in ancient Greece, for example, domains that today are called superstition, religion, magic and the occult, were at that time clear cases of legitimate science." This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model.[42]

Kuhn postulated that proponents of competing paradigms may resort to political means (such as invective) to garner support from a public which lacks the ability to judge competing scientific theories on their merits. Philosopher of science Larry Laudan has suggested that pseudoscience has no scientific meaning and mostly describes our emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".[43]

The ubiquity of pseudoscientific thinking

The National Science Foundation stated that, in the USA, "pseudoscientific" beliefs became more widespread during the 1990's, peaked near 2001 and mildly declined since; nevertheless, pseudoscientific beliefs remain common in the USA.[44] As a result, according to the NSF report, there is a lack of knowledge of pseudoscientific issues in society and pseudoscientific practices are commonly followed. Bunge (1999) states that "A survey on public knowledge of science in the United States showed that in 1988 '50% of American adults [rejected] evolution, and 88% [believed] astrology is a science'".

Commentators on pseudoscience perceive it in many fields; for example Pseudomathematics is a term used for mathematics-like activity undertaken either by non-mathematicians or mathematicians themselves which does not conform to the rigorous standards usually applied to mathematical theories.

Pseudoscience in psychology

Neurologists and clinical psychologists [45] are concerned about the increasing amount of what they consider pseudoscience promoted in psychotherapy and popular psychology, and also about what they see as pseudoscientific therapies such as Neuro-linguistic programming, Rebirthing, Reparenting, and Primal Scream Therapy being adopted by government and professional bodies and by the public. They state that scientifically unsupported therapies might harm vulnerable members of the public, undermine legitimate therapies, and tend to spread misconceptions about the nature of the mind and brain to society at large. Some psychiatrists and psychologists also perceive pseudoscientific ideas in more popularly accepted branches of psychotherapy, such as co-counselling, Gestalt Therapy, Re-evaluation Counseling and even in the work of Twelve-step program bodies such as Alcoholics Anonymous. There often seems to be an overlap between psychological movements or theories denounced as "pseudoscientific" and those labeled "cults", for example in the case of Dianetics and Scientology.

A typical concept used in some fringe psychotherapies is orgone energy. "There is an increasing degree of overlapping and blending of orgone therapy with New Age and other therapies that manipulate the patient’s biofields, such as Therapeutic Touch and Reiki. 'Biofield' is a pseudoscientific term often used synonymously with orgone energy. Klee states that there is even an organization of psychiatrists which promotes orgone therapy. [46]

Dangers of pseudoscience in health care

Template:Copyedit Lilienfeld (2004) states that there are dangers in using pseudoscientific health systems. Rebirthing therapy has even led to the death of a juvinile. According to Ostrander et al (2004), shark cartilage is marketed as a cancer cure and as a result, patients have been diverted from acceptable cancer treatment[17]. Ostrander et al (2004) state as a solution that "the evidence-based mechanisms of evaluation used daily by the scientific community should be added to the training of media and governmental professionals".

Psychological explanations for pseudoscientific beliefs

Pseudoscientific thinking has been explained in terms of psychology and social psychology. The human proclivity for seeking confirmation rather than refutation (confirmation bias) [47], the tendency to hold comforting beliefs, and the tendency to overgeneralize have been proposed as reasons for the common adherence to pseudoscientific thinking. Also, Beyerstein (1991) argues that humans are prone to associations based on resemblances only, and often prone to misattribution in cause-effect thinking.

Scientific theories once criticized as pseudoscience

A number of presently accepted scientific theories were once criticised by some as being pseudoscientific. Continental drift theory was once considered pseudoscientific (Williams 2000:58), but is now part of mainstream science especially since the paleomagnetic evidence was discovered that supported plate tectonics.

Fields can also repudiate notions that some consider to be pseudoscientific in favour of more conventional element(s) of their field. For example, Atwood (2004) suggested that "osteopathy has, for the most part, repudiated its pseudoscientific beginnings and joined the world of rational healthcare.[48]

At times, scientists use the descriptor "pseudoscience" to distinguish between even mainstream investigations of varying rigor. As observational evidence and theoretical descriptions improve and fields develop, disciplines criticized for having pseudoscientific aspects may become more respected by the scientific community. The field of physical cosmology has had such a history.[49] Currently, string theory has been criticized by certain researchers as suffering from the same problems [50]


People

Lists

Notes

  1. "Pseudoscientific - pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific", from the Oxford American Dictionary, published by the Oxford English Dictionary.
  2. http://skepdic.com/pseudosc.html
  3. Magendie, F (1843) An Elementary Treatise on Human Physiology. 5th Ed. Tr. John Revere. New York: Harper, p 150. Magendie refers to phrenology as "a pseudo-science of the present day" (note the hyphen).
  4. However, from the "them vs. us" polarization that its usage engenders, the term may also have a positive function because "[the] derogatory labeling of others often includes an unstated self-definition "(p.266); and, from this, the application of the term also implies "a unity of science, a privileged tree of knowledge or space from which the pseudoscience is excluded, and the user's right to belong is asserted " (p.286) -- Still A & Dryden W (2004) "The Social Psychology of "Pseudoscience": A Brief History", J Theory Social Behav 34:265-290
  5. The philosopher of science Paul Feyeraband in particular is associated with the view that attempts to distinguish science from non-science are flawed and pernicious. "The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. ... the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic:"[1]
  6. e.g. according to Stephen Hawking, cosmology was once considered "pseudoscience where wild speculation was unconstrained by any possible observations". (Hawking SW, Hawking on the Big Bang and Black Holes (1993) World Scientific Publishing Company, Page 1 See also [2] and [3]. Science historian Helge Kragh notes that astronomer "[Herbert] Dingle disliked cosmological principles of any kind and saw in them the main cause of why cosmology had degraded into a state of pseudoscience" [4] Cosmology and Controversy: The Historical Development of Two Theories of the Universe, (1996) p.226, Publ. Princeton University Press,[5].
  7. [6][7]
  8. e.g. phrenology, see [ http://www.theness.com/articles.asp?id=40]
  9. e.g. Gauch HG Jr. Scientific Method in Practice (2003) 3-5 ff
  10. Gauch (2003), 191 ff, especially Chapter 6, "Probability", and Chapter 7, "inductive Logic and Statistics"
  11. Popper, KR (1959) "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (English translation, 1959)[8].
  12. Popper KR "Science: Conjectures and Refutations", reprinted in Grim P (1990) Philosophy of Science and the Occult, Albany, pp. 104-110
  13. Popper KR (1962) Science, Pseudo-Science, and Falsifiability. Conjectures and Refutations
  14. Feyerabend P Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (1975)[9]
  15. For a perspective on Feyerabend from within the scientific community, see, e.g., Gauch (2003) at p.4: "Such critiques are unfamiliar to most scientists, although some may have heard a few distant shots from the so-called science wars."
  16. Thagard PR (1978) "Why astrology is a pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, ed. Asquith PD and Hacking I (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ff. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."
  17. Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82
  18. Paul Montgomery Churchland, Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (1999) MIT Press. p.90. "Most terms in theoretical physics, for example, do not enjoy at least some distinct connections with observables, but not of the simple sort that would permit operational definitions in terms of these observables. [..] If a restriction in favor of operational definitions were to be followed, therefore, most of theoretical physics would have to be dismissed as meaningless pseudoscience!"
  19. Lakatos I (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos I, Musgrave A (eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge pp 91-195; Popper KR (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery
  20. e.g. [10] Macmilllan Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff, esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi"
  21. Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff esp. 177-178
  22. Bunge M (1983) Demarcating science from pseudoscience Fundamenta Scientiae 3:369-388, 381
  23. Thagard (1978)op cit at 227, 228
  24. Lilienfeld SO (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology Guildford Press (2004) ISBN 1-59385-070-0
  25. Ruscio J (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense, Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth
  26. Peer review and the acceptance of new scientific ideas (Warning 469 kB PDF)*Peer review – process, perspectives and the path ahead; Lilienfeld (2004) op cit For an opposing perspective, e.g. Peer Review as Scholarly Conformity
  27. Ruscio J (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth
  28. Gauch (2003) op cit 124 ff"
  29. Lakatos I (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos I, Musgrave A (eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 91-195; Thagard (1978) op cit writes: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."
  30. name=Ruscio120>Ruscio J (2001) op cit. p120. By contrast, theories may be accused of being pseudoscientific because they have remained unaltered despite contradictory evidence. The work Scientists Confront Velikovsky (1976) Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of Thomas Kuhn, e.g. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience.
  31. See, e.g., Hines T, Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1988. ISBN 0-87975-419-2. Thagard (1978) op cit 223 ff
  32. 32.0 32.1 Devilly GJ (2005) Power therapies and possible threats to the science of psychology and psychiatry Austral NZ J Psych 39:437-445(9) Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Devilly" defined multiple times with different content
  33. e.g. archivefreedom.org which claims that "The list of suppressed scientists even includes Nobel Laureates!"
  34. Kuhn TS (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
  35. [11]
  36. Popper KR op. cit.
  37. McNally RJ (2003)Is the pseudoscience concept useful for clinical psychology? SRHMP Vol 2 Number 2 Fall/Winter [12]
  38. Gauch HG Jr (2003)op cit 3-7.
  39. Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82
  40. Kuhn TS "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Grim, op. cit. p. 125
  41. Rothbart D "Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience", in Grim, op. cit. pp.114.
  42. Rothbart, Daniel, op. cit. pp. 114-20.
  43. Laudan L (1996) "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse, Michael, But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy pp. 337-350.
  44. [13] National Science Board. 2006. Science and Engineering Indicators 2006 Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (volume 1, NSB-06-01; NSB 06-01A)
  45. e.g. Drenth (2003) [14]; Herbert JD, et al. (2000) Science and pseudoscience in the development of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing: implications for clinical psychology. Clin Psychol Rev. 20:945-71 [PMID 11098395])
  46. Klee GD (2005) The Resurrection of Wilhelm Reich and Orgone Therapy The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice (Vol. 4, No. 1)" | available online
  47. (Devilly 2005:439)
  48. Atwood KC (2004) Naturopathy, pseudoscience, and medicine: myths and fallacies vs truth. Medscape Gen Med6:e53 available online
  49. Stephen W. Hawking, Hawking on the Big Bang and Black Holes (1993) World Scientific Publishing Company, Page 1 See also [15] and [16].
  50. For example: Smolin L The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next. Houghton Mifflin Company. (2006) ISBN: 0618551050

People

References

Literature

  • The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice[1] is a mental health journal whose stated purpose is "to facilitate improved research and thinking about critical questions on the fringes of present scientific knowledge concerning mental health."
  • Beyerstein BL (1990) Brainscams: Neuromythologies of the New Age. Int'l. J. of Mental Health, 19(3):27-36.[18]
  • Georges Charpak (2004) Debunked!, Johns Hopkins University Press [ISBN 0801878675]
  • Derksen, AA, (1993) The seven sins of pseudo-science J Gen Phil Sci 24:17-42. [19]
  • Derksen AA (2001) The seven strategies of the sophisticated pseudo-scientist: a look into Freud's rhetorical toolbox,J Gen Phil Sci 32:329-50
  • Gardner M (1983) Science – Good, Bad and Bogus Oxford University Press, Oxford
  • Hansson SO (1996) Defining pseudoscience Philosophia naturalis 33:169-76
  • Joseph J (2002) Twin studies in psychiatry and psychology: science or pseudoscience? Psychiatric Quarterly 73:71-82[20]
  • Martin M (1994) Pseudoscience, the paranormal, and science education Science & Education 3:1573-901 [21]
  • Ostrander.G.K, Cheng,K.C, Wolf.J.C. WolfeM.J. Shark Cartilage, Cancer and the Growing Threat of Pseudoscience. Cancer Research 64, 8485-8491, December 1, 2004
  • Sampson W, Beyerstein BL (1996) Traditional medicine and pseudoscience in China Skeptical Inquirer Sept-Oct
  • Shermer M (2002) Why People Believe Weird Things – Pseudoscience, superstition, and other confusions of our time New York
  • Wilson F (2000) The Logic and Methodology of Science and Pseudoscience, Canadian Scholars Press [ISBN 1-55130-175-X]

External links