User:Nick Gardner /Sandbox: Difference between revisions

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whether or not co-operation takes root will
whether or not co-operation takes root will
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<ref> Paul Zak and Steven Knack: "Trust and Growth", ''Economic Journal'', April 2001</ref>.
<ref> Paul Zak and Steven Knack: "Trust and Growth", ''Economic Journal'', April 2001</ref>.


<ref>[http://www.econ.ubc.ca/fpatrick/franzabofinal.pdf:  Patrick Francois and  Jan Zabojnik  "Trust, Social Capital and Economic Development", ''Journal of the European Economic Association'', 2005]</ref> (providing a possible explanation of the difficulty of successfully transferring developed countries' production methods to developing countries).
<ref>[http://www.econ.ubc.ca/fpatrick/franzabofinal.pdf:  Patrick Francois and  Jan Zabojnik  "Trust, Social Capital and Economic Development", ''Journal of the European Economic Association'', 2005]</ref> (providing a possible explanation of the difficulty of successfully transferring developed countries' production methods to developing countries).




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habits have
habits have


http://www.nopecjournal.org/NOPEC_1996_a10.pdfFehr, E. and J.-R. Tyran
[http://www.nopecjournal.org/NOPEC_1996_a10.pdf]Fehr, E. and J.-R. Tyran
1996 Institutions and Reciprocal Fairness. Nordic Journal of Political Economy (punishment)
1996 Institutions and Reciprocal Fairness. Nordic Journal of Political Economy (punishment)



Revision as of 07:11, 3 January 2010

whether or not co-operation takes root will depend on the pre-existing set of social and political relations in the community and on the degree of inequality and polarization suffered by society

The topic of the creation of social capital has since been explored at several levels. At the empirical level there have been a number of statistical analyses of the recently-collected data. One such study identified the factors affecting the development of trust as income per person, income distribution, government effectiveness, social cohesion and education [1].

[2] (providing a possible explanation of the difficulty of successfully transferring developed countries' production methods to developing countries).



The size of the resource, technology for exclusion and exploitation of the resource and similar gritty details affect whether cooperation in commons management arises (Ostrom, 1990: 202-204). Ostrom, E. 1990 Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. — 1998 A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action. American Political Science Review 92: 1-22. Scientific findings again correspond well to personal experience. Sometimes we cooperate enthusiastically, sometimes reluctantly, and sometimes not at all. People vary considerably in their willingness to cooperate even under the same environmental conditions. • Institutions matter. People from different societies behave differently because their habits have

[1]Fehr, E. and J.-R. Tyran 1996 Institutions and Reciprocal Fairness. Nordic Journal of Political Economy (punishment)



Social Capital: Explaining Its Origins and Effects on Government Performance CARLES BOIX AND DANIEL N. POSNER British Journal of Political Science (1998)


Ostrom, Elinor, 1990, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press).