Free will: Difference between revisions
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== Incompatibilism == | == Incompatibilism == | ||
One | One approach, of course, is simply to accept the fact that human beings are not free, a position termed ''hard'' determinism or ''incompatibilism''.<ref name=Balaguer/> To accept this position is to accept that our actions are caused by things other than our ''will'' –that actions do not originate in ''volition'' (willing), but rather in forces that determine its disposition in one way or another, a view often associated with [[stoicism]].<ref name=stoic/> Hard determinism, however, insofar as it accepts a causal chain of events, means our present actions are determined in the past, and some consider that view to wholly destroy any notion of moral responsibility. Freedom is considered a necessary component of responsibility, for why should anyone be blamed or praised for actions that could not have been otherwise? (Stoics considered that an agent was responsible for thinking through their choices, even though the appearance of choice is illusory.<ref name=stoic/>) | ||
== Libertarianism == | |||
Others have argued that determinism is ''false'', or that at the very least, human actions are a special case and stand outside the requirements of a deterministic universe.<ref name=Balaguer/> [[Augustine of Hippo|Saint Augustine]] held this view, the capacity for ''metaphysical freedom''.<ref name=Augustine/> [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] also subscribed to this view: besides ''nature'' and empirical knowledge, there is the realm of ''things in themselves'' accessible to thought and governed by different rules; a distinction between ''phenomena'' and ''noumena''.<ref name=Kant/> At any given time, in this view, one is indeed free to choose between alternative courses of action, one has ''causal powers''. | |||
== Compatibilism == | == Compatibilism == | ||
An intermediate view has been to soften the requirements of what it means to be free. One accepts the fact that actions have causes, but argues that this does not mean we are not free.<ref name=Balaguer/> | |||
In the approach known as ''soft determinism'', I am still free even though my character, common sense and so forth, strongly support a course of action, because they do not ''compel'' me to act in this way, nor preclude alternatives. Of course freedom understood in this way is not an arbitrary freedom. It is freedom in the sense that nothing stops me from doing otherwise, even though it is unlikely. Put in an extreme form: "A puppet is free as long as he loves his strings".<ref name=Harris/> | |||
==Summary== | ==Summary== | ||
Revision as of 10:04, 25 July 2012
Free will is the notion that human beings are able to choose between different courses of action in any given circumstance,[1] whereas its opposite, determinism, claims that all our mental states and actions are made necessary by preceding causes, and we are therefore not free at all, although we may have the illusion thereof. These diametric extremes, on the one hand we always are in complete control, and on the other that we never are in control, unnecessarily restrict our options, an example of false dichotomy.[2] Reality lies somewhere else, as it is abundantly clear that our actions can be dictated by factors outside our control and outside our awareness,[3] but it is unclear that such factors are decisive in every instance or in the long run.
All of us have subjectively experienced being torn between doing one thing or another –what we would like to do, what we think we should do, or what we think others would appreciate our doing, and so on. We might assume that the decision is up to us, that we are free to do one thing or another, and others may heap blame or praise on us assuming the same thing. This assumption is what is meant by free will –the belief that whatever we may have done in actual fact, could have been otherwise because we might have decided on another course of action, and that before taking the action we were free to choose between alternatives.
At the same time, we realize that some aspects of the world work in ways that can be understood because there are law-like processes that can be deciphered, and that allow us to predict some future events based upon observations of past events. The principle operating here is that future events are governed by physical laws rooted in past events, and the notion that this kind of explanation applies to everything that happens is known as determinism. Some have argued that the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics opens a door to a randomness in human behavior, which is foreign to human experience. Inasmuch as random atomic events are not under our control any more than predetermined events, determinism can be rewritten to include this randomness: All our decisions are either implied by past events, or by random events, that in both cases do not involve us as agents, but we simply witness.[4]
If the world is deterministic, then human actions are either an exception to physical laws, or our feeling that we are free to decide what we like is simply an illusion. However, it is an exaggeration (at least at the moment) to think that science supports determinism.[5]
We have trouble believing all our actions are determined, and that our sense of freedom is totally illusory, but we also have problems thinking that our actions are totally outside the realm of causality. The latter position would make our actions random, and this is not a palatable idea for most of us...
This dilemma born of idealized positions is what in philosophy is known as the problem of free will (or sometimes referred to by its flip-side as the dilemma of determinism), and it is a problem because whichever road one chooses to go down seems to lead to conclusions that we would have trouble accepting.
Incompatibilism
One approach, of course, is simply to accept the fact that human beings are not free, a position termed hard determinism or incompatibilism.[4] To accept this position is to accept that our actions are caused by things other than our will –that actions do not originate in volition (willing), but rather in forces that determine its disposition in one way or another, a view often associated with stoicism.[6] Hard determinism, however, insofar as it accepts a causal chain of events, means our present actions are determined in the past, and some consider that view to wholly destroy any notion of moral responsibility. Freedom is considered a necessary component of responsibility, for why should anyone be blamed or praised for actions that could not have been otherwise? (Stoics considered that an agent was responsible for thinking through their choices, even though the appearance of choice is illusory.[6])
Libertarianism
Others have argued that determinism is false, or that at the very least, human actions are a special case and stand outside the requirements of a deterministic universe.[4] Saint Augustine held this view, the capacity for metaphysical freedom.[7] Kant also subscribed to this view: besides nature and empirical knowledge, there is the realm of things in themselves accessible to thought and governed by different rules; a distinction between phenomena and noumena.[8] At any given time, in this view, one is indeed free to choose between alternative courses of action, one has causal powers.
Compatibilism
An intermediate view has been to soften the requirements of what it means to be free. One accepts the fact that actions have causes, but argues that this does not mean we are not free.[4]
In the approach known as soft determinism, I am still free even though my character, common sense and so forth, strongly support a course of action, because they do not compel me to act in this way, nor preclude alternatives. Of course freedom understood in this way is not an arbitrary freedom. It is freedom in the sense that nothing stops me from doing otherwise, even though it is unlikely. Put in an extreme form: "A puppet is free as long as he loves his strings".[3]
Summary
The various notions of free will conflict, but involve many of the same elements. Their incompatibility appears to rest upon adoption of extreme positions in the interest of logical constructions, while reality appears not to observe these idealistic boundaries.
References
- ↑ Historically, "free will" has had a number of definitions, some tied to religious notions of being able to choose between "right" and "wrong". The definition here is that described as the "common notion" by evangelical thinker Gordon H. Clark (1961). Religion, reason, and revelation. Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co, pp. 202-203. “Free will has been defined as the ability under given circumstances, to choose either of two courses of action... Whatever motives or inclinations a man might have, or whatever inducements may be laid before him, that might seem to turn him in a given direction, he may at a moment disregard them all and do the opposite.”
- ↑ The offering of only a pair of contrary alternatives that do not exhaust the possibilities. See Sylvan Barnet, Hugo Bedau (2010). Critical Thinking, Reading, and Writing: A Brief Guide to Argument, 7th ed. Macmillan, p. 376. ISBN 0312601603.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Sam Harris (2012). Free Will. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 1451683405.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Mark Balaguer (2009). “Introduction”, Free Will As an Open Scientific Problem. MIT Press, pp. 1 ff. ISBN 0262013541.
- ↑ The view of scientific determinism goes back to Laplace: "We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state". However, the necessary underlying assumption of complete knowledge by an observer, including exact knowledge of the observer themselves, is an extreme idealization that renders any such claim unverifiable. See John T Roberts (2006). “Determinism”, Sahotra Sarkar, Jessica Pfeifer, Justin Garson, eds: The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. N-Z, Indeks, Volume 1. Psychology Press, pp. 197 ff. ISBN 0415939275.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Ricardo Salles (2005). The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 0754639762.
- ↑ Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo (1993). “Introduction by translator”, On Free Choice Of The Will, Translation by Thomas Williams of Augustine's work of AD 391-395. Hackett Publishing, p. 12. ISBN 0872201880.
- ↑ Allen W Wood (1998). Patricia Kitcher, ed: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays. Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 240 ff. ISBN 0847689174.