King Cotton: Difference between revisions
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'''King Cotton''' was a slogan used in the U.S. by southerners in 1860-61 to support secession by arguing cotton exports would make an independent Confederacy economically prosperous, and--more important--would force Britain and France to support the Confederacy because their industrial economy depended on textiles, which depended on cotton. | '''King Cotton''' was a slogan used in the U.S. by southerners in 1860-61 to support secession by arguing [[cotton]] exports would make an independent [[Confederate States of America|Confederacy]] economically prosperous, and--more important--would force [[Great Britain|Britain]] and [[France]] to support the Confederacy because their industrial economy depended on textiles, which depended on cotton. | ||
==History== | ==History== | ||
Southern slave-based plantations generated three-fourths of the world's cotton supply. In particular, after the invention of the cotton gin the production of cotton soared throughout the deep South, especially South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas. North of these states little cotton was grown, because it needs a long growing season. | Southern [[slavery|slave-based]] plantations generated three-fourths of the world's cotton supply. In particular, after the invention of the cotton gin the production of cotton soared throughout the deep South, especially [[South Carolina]], [[Georgia]], [[Alabama]], [[Mississippi]], [[Louisiana]], [[Arkansas]] and [[Texas]]. North of these states little cotton was grown, because it needs a long growing season. | ||
The rapid growth of cotton production was a response to international demand. The first | The rapid growth of cotton production was a response to international demand. The first [[Europe]]an (and [[New England]]) factories produced textiles, turning cotton (and to a lesser extent wool and linen) into thread and cloth. Cotton production from 720,000 bales in 1830, to 2.85 million bales in 1850, to nearly 5 million in 1860. By the time of the [[American Civil War]], cotton accounted for almost 60% of American exports, representing a total value of nearly $200 million a year. Cotton’s central place in the national economy and its international importance led Senator [[James Henry Hammond]] of South Carolina to make a famous boast in 1858: | ||
:Without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should they make war on us, we could bring the whole world to our feet... What would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years?... England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not to make war on cotton. No power on the earth dares to make war upon it. Cotton is King.}} | :Without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should they make war on us, we could bring the whole world to our feet... What would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years?... England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not to make war on cotton. No power on the earth dares to make war upon it. Cotton is King.}} | ||
Southerners knew their survival depended on the sympathy of Europe to offset the Union's vastly greater industrial power. They believed that cotton was so essential to the European powers that they would intervene in any civil war. | Southerners knew their survival depended on the sympathy of Europe to offset the Union's vastly greater industrial power. They believed that cotton was so essential to the European powers that they would intervene in any civil war. | ||
When war broke out the Confederate people, acting spontaneously without government directed, decided to hold their cotton at home, watching prices soar and economic crisis hit Britain and New England. European states did not intervene because of the risk of the loss of the American market-loss of American grains, loss of Canada, and loss of much of the British and French merchant marine, all in the slim promise of getting more cotton. In spring 1861 warehouses in Europe were bulging with surplus cotton--which soared in price. So the cotton interests made their profits without a war. The Union imposed a blockade, closing all Confederate ports to normal traffic, so the South was unable to move 95% of its cotton. (Some was slipped out by blockade runner, or through Mexico.) Cotton diplomacy, advocated in Great Britain by the Confederate representative James M. Mason, and by John Slidell in France, completely failed because the Confederacy could not deliver its cotton, and the British economy was robust enough to absorb a depression in textiles in 1862-64. | When war broke out the Confederate people, acting spontaneously without government directed, decided to hold their cotton at home, watching prices soar and economic crisis hit Britain and New England. European states did not intervene because of the risk of the loss of the American market-loss of American grains, loss of Canada, and loss of much of the British and French merchant marine, all in the slim promise of getting more cotton. In spring 1861 warehouses in Europe were bulging with surplus cotton--which soared in price. So the cotton interests made their profits without a war. The Union imposed a blockade, closing all Confederate ports to normal traffic, so the South was unable to move 95% of its cotton. (Some was slipped out by blockade runner, or through Mexico.) Cotton diplomacy, advocated in Great Britain by the Confederate representative [[James M. Mason]], and by John Slidell in France, completely failed because the Confederacy could not deliver its cotton, and the British economy was robust enough to absorb a depression in textiles in 1862-64. | ||
As the Union armies moved into cotton regions in 1862, the U.S. purchased all the cotton available, and sent it to the mills. Production of cotton increased in India by a factor of 700% and also in Egypt. | As the Union armies moved into cotton regions in 1862, the U.S. purchased all the cotton available, and sent it to the mills. Production of cotton increased in India by a factor of 700% and also in Egypt. | ||
Revision as of 21:57, 17 May 2007
King Cotton was a slogan used in the U.S. by southerners in 1860-61 to support secession by arguing cotton exports would make an independent Confederacy economically prosperous, and--more important--would force Britain and France to support the Confederacy because their industrial economy depended on textiles, which depended on cotton.
History
Southern slave-based plantations generated three-fourths of the world's cotton supply. In particular, after the invention of the cotton gin the production of cotton soared throughout the deep South, especially South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas. North of these states little cotton was grown, because it needs a long growing season.
The rapid growth of cotton production was a response to international demand. The first European (and New England) factories produced textiles, turning cotton (and to a lesser extent wool and linen) into thread and cloth. Cotton production from 720,000 bales in 1830, to 2.85 million bales in 1850, to nearly 5 million in 1860. By the time of the American Civil War, cotton accounted for almost 60% of American exports, representing a total value of nearly $200 million a year. Cotton’s central place in the national economy and its international importance led Senator James Henry Hammond of South Carolina to make a famous boast in 1858:
- Without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should they make war on us, we could bring the whole world to our feet... What would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years?... England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not to make war on cotton. No power on the earth dares to make war upon it. Cotton is King.}}
Southerners knew their survival depended on the sympathy of Europe to offset the Union's vastly greater industrial power. They believed that cotton was so essential to the European powers that they would intervene in any civil war.
When war broke out the Confederate people, acting spontaneously without government directed, decided to hold their cotton at home, watching prices soar and economic crisis hit Britain and New England. European states did not intervene because of the risk of the loss of the American market-loss of American grains, loss of Canada, and loss of much of the British and French merchant marine, all in the slim promise of getting more cotton. In spring 1861 warehouses in Europe were bulging with surplus cotton--which soared in price. So the cotton interests made their profits without a war. The Union imposed a blockade, closing all Confederate ports to normal traffic, so the South was unable to move 95% of its cotton. (Some was slipped out by blockade runner, or through Mexico.) Cotton diplomacy, advocated in Great Britain by the Confederate representative James M. Mason, and by John Slidell in France, completely failed because the Confederacy could not deliver its cotton, and the British economy was robust enough to absorb a depression in textiles in 1862-64.
As the Union armies moved into cotton regions in 1862, the U.S. purchased all the cotton available, and sent it to the mills. Production of cotton increased in India by a factor of 700% and also in Egypt.
Surdam (1998) asks, "Did the world demand for American-grown raw cotton fall during the 1860s, even though total demand for cotton increased?" Previous researchers have asserted that the South faced stagnating or falling demand for its cotton. Surdam's more complete model of the world market for cotton, combined with additional data, shows that the reduction in the supply of American-grown cotton induced by the Civil War distorts previous estimates of the state of demand for cotton. In the absence of the drastic disruption in the supply of American-grown cotton, the world demand for such cotton would have remained strong.
Lebergott (1983) shows the South blundered during the war because it clung too long to faith in King Cotton. Because the South's long-range goal was a world monopoly of cotton, it devoted valuable land and slave labor to growing cotton instead of urgently needed foodstuffs.
The result was King Cotton was a delusion that misled the South into a hopeless war.
References
- Blumenthal, Henry. "Confederate Diplomacy: Popular Notions and International Realities." Journal of Southern History 1966 32(2): 151-171. Issn: 0022-4642 Fulltext: in Jstor
- Lebergott, Stanley. "Why the South Lost: Commercial Purpose in the Confederacy, 1861-1865." Journal of American History 1983 70(1): 58-74. Issn: 0021-8723 Fulltext: in Jstor and Ebsco
- Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign relations of the Confederate States of America (1931, revised 1959) Continues to be the standard source.
- Surdam, David G. "King Cotton: Monarch or Pretender? The State of the Market for Raw Cotton on the Eve of the American Civil War." Economic History Review 1998 51(1): 113-132. Issn: 0013-0117 Fulltext: in Swetswise, Ingenta, Jstor and Ebsco
External links