February 26, 1936 Incident

Perhaps the most serious coup attempt of Japan, before World War Two in the Pacific, was the February 26, 1936 Incident, a classic incident of ritualized insubordination, or gekokoju. Leaders killed by the radical Army Young Officers included killing Home Minister Makoto Saito, Finance Minister Korekiyo Takayashi, and Army Inspector General of Military Education Jotaro Watanabe.

While it drew initial support, especially from officers associated with the Imperial Way Faction, Emperor Hirohito took a strong position against the rebels, even threatening personally to lead troops against it. After three days, it collapsed. Hirohito refused to send a Palace witness to the ritual suicides of some of the leaders.

Theory

Ikki Kita, wrote, in his book A Plan for the Reorganization of Japan, that the land should follow "state socialism", in which landowners, industrialists, and even some aristocrats were usurpers, interfering with a "gospel of the sword" that could unify "our seven hundred million brothers in China and India", led by Japan.

1931 preamble

Kita's disciple Mitsugi Nishida was a military officer, but resented the materialistic influence of the Three Crows. He supported what the British Embassy termed "the realization of a system of Fascist dictatorship, based on aggressive militarism, chauvinism, and the destruction of all liberal principles of government." He formed a group called the Young Officers, who made their first action in the March 1931 Incident, with the intent of making Sadao Araki the Prime Minister. Araki was head of the Imperial Way faction.

1935 events

Another organization, the National Principle Group organized by two former Army comrades and containing mostly lieutenants and captains, had, in May 1935, sent a pamphlet to Army Chief of Staff (Japan) Prince Kanin, charging that Nagata was involved in the March incident. Kanin, on 30 July 1935, sent War Minister Hayashi to as Hirohito's permission to expel the two leaders from the Army, as opposed to the usual punishment of transfer to the reserves. Prince Chichibu had been monitoring the situation for the Palace, and the plotters felt they had encouraged them.

The defense counsel of Saburo Aizawa, assassin of Tetsuzan Nagata, said at his trial, "If the court fails to understand the spirit which guided Colonel Aizawa, a second Aizawa, and even a third, will appear." Aizawa himself said he was motivated to commit a murder, under gekokujo, because

I came to realize that the senior statesmen, those close to the Throne, powerful financiers and bureaucrats, were attemptimg gradually to corrupt the government and the Army to their selfish interests.

They felt most encouraged by Gen. Tomiyuki Yamashita, a member of Imperial Way and then assigned to the Palace, to investigate the Strike-North Faction. He had agreed to meet with them on December 22, but did not. After the meeting, several members stopped at a police station and gave a report on their own activities. While this might seem odd in Western eyes, it was quite customary, and even regarded as privileged, for radicals to keep the police informed, as part of the maintenance of civil order. Marquis Kido noted some of the plans in his diary:

• 1st Company, 1st Infantry Regiment: capture the Home Minister's residence
• 3rd Company, 3rd Infantry Regiment: kill Prime Minister Keisuke Okada
• 2nd Company, 1st Infantry Regiment: kill the Lord Privy Seal

The plotters were angry that sympathetic General Jinzaburo Mazaki as Inspector General of Military Education had been replaced by Jotaro Watanabe.

1936 operation

Final planning

On the evening of February 22, the leaders met at the home of Lieutenant Yasuhide Kurihara and reviewed the target list:

• Cabinet
  • Prime Minister Keisuke Okada
  • Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi
• Palace advisers
  • Lord Privy Seal Makoto Saito
  • Grand Chamberlain Kantaro Suzuki
  • Nobuaki Makino
  • Kinmochi Saionji, the "last genro"
• Mlitary
  • Inspector General of Military Education Jinzaburo Mazaki

Hirohito's reaction

Emperor Hirohito, in spite of the Imperial Way's idealization of the throne, strongly disapproved and ordered counteraction. He accused Geneal Shigeru Honjo of prior knowledge. Honjo had received a warning from his son-in-law at 5 AM that day, and ordered him to call it off. He also notified the chief of the kempetai and the duty imperial aide-de-camp.

Shortly after 0600, however, Hirohito said to him, "Only you, Chief Aide-de-Camp, worried beforehand there might be such an outbreak." He replied,

The young officers only mean to find a place for their sense of righteousness as individuals in the all-encompassing righteousness of the Emperor. They wish a little fresh air for their ideas to bloom in.

According to the Harrises, Hirohito responded,"Why should we forgive them when these brutal officers kill our right-hand advisers? ... All my most trusted retainers are dead and [the mutineers'] actions are aimed directly at me." In an unprecedented statement for an Emperor traditionally behind the scenes, (emphasis added) he continued, "We ourselves will lead the Imperial Guards and suppress them.

Reactions

Various senior officers weighed in. War Minister Yoshiyuki Kawashima met with rebels, at 0700, who occupied the lower floor of his residence. They gave him their manifesto of demands, and recommended that he consult with several officers: Strike-North Faction leader Mazaki, vice-minister of war Lieutenant General Furusho Mikio, and Major General Tomiyuki Yamashita. They did not know Yamashita had been reporting their discussions to the Palace.

At 0800, Mazaki, of the Imperial Way Faction (kodo-ha) "whom a court-martial was later to credit with advanced knowledge of the uprising", visited the Army Minister, congratulated them, and then discussed a solution. They agreed, without consulting anyone else in the army, to forward a recommendation that a "strong cabinet" be formed.

Aftermath

The leading officers, as well as two civilian theorists, Ikki Kita and Mitsugi Nishida, were executed.