User:Nick Gardner /Sandbox: Difference between revisions
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Failures | Failures | ||
Enron Orange County California, Mercury Finance, Pacific Gas & Electric, Enron, WorldCom, Delphi, General Motors and Ford. | Enron November 2001 Orange County California, Mercury Finance, Pacific Gas & Electric, Enron, WorldCom, Delphi, General Motors and Ford. | ||
A former Director of Moodys has attributed their conduct to a drive to retain market share in face of attempts by the major banks to play eacc agency off against the others - a tactic knows as ratings shopping<ref>[http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_on_Oversight/Fons_Testimony.pdf Jerome S. Fons: testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 22, 2008]</ref> | |||
Fons, Jerome, 2008, “Rating Competition and Structured Finance”, Journal of Structured | |||
Finance, Fall 2008. http://www.glgroup.com/News/White-Paper-on-Rating-Competition-and-Structured-Finance-(Part-1)-23549.html | |||
Revision as of 16:29, 1 March 2010
http://v3.moodys.com/researchandratings/methodology/003006001/rating-methodologies/methodology/003006001/4294966628/4294966848/0/0/-/0/rr Moodys rating methodologies
Failures
Enron November 2001 Orange County California, Mercury Finance, Pacific Gas & Electric, Enron, WorldCom, Delphi, General Motors and Ford.
A former Director of Moodys has attributed their conduct to a drive to retain market share in face of attempts by the major banks to play eacc agency off against the others - a tactic knows as ratings shopping[1]
Fons, Jerome, 2008, “Rating Competition and Structured Finance”, Journal of Structured
Finance, Fall 2008. http://www.glgroup.com/News/White-Paper-on-Rating-Competition-and-Structured-Finance-(Part-1)-23549.html
Statement by
Lawrence J. White*
for the
“Roundtable to Examine Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies”
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, DC
April 15, 2009
[1]
(Statements about history)
[2] How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers Frank Partnoy University of San Diego School of Law "Credit rating agencies are not widely respected among sophisticated market participants," Since 1973 credit ratings have been incorporated into hundreds of rules, releases, and regulatory decisions, in various substantive areas including securities, pension, banking, real estate, and insurance regulation
FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS?, Yasuyuki Fuchita, Robert E. Litan, eds., Brookings Institution Press and the Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research, 2006 San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-46
The Paradox of Credit Ratings Frank Partnoy
U San Diego Law & Econ Research Paper No. 20 [3]
Numerous academic studies show that ratings changes lag the market
and that the market anticipates ratings changes.3 The rejoinder to these studies – that
ratings are correlated with actual default experience – is misplaced and inadequate,
because ratings can be both correlated with default and have little informational value.
Accordingly, such correlation proves nothing. Indeed, it would be surprising to find that
ratings – regardless of their informational value – were not correlated with default
- There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the
United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it's not clear sometimes who's more powerful. (Thomas L. Friedman, in an interview ith Jim Lehrer on Newshour, PBS television, Feb. 13, 1996).