Financial economics: Difference between revisions
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===The efficient markets hypothesis=== | ===The efficient markets hypothesis=== | ||
Long before economic analysis was applied to the problem, investment analysts had been advising their clients about their stock market investments, and fund managers had been taking decisions on their behalf. Some sought to predict future movements of the price of a share from a study of the pattern of its recent price movements (known as “technical analysis”) and some attempted to do so by examining the issuing company’s competitive position and the factors affecting the markets in which it operates (known as "fundamental analysis"). But in 1933, an economist suggested that both might be wasting their time. Applying the concept of a "perfect market"<ref> See the definition of a perfect market in the article on [[markets]]</ref> to the stock exchange, the economist Alfred Cowles asked the question "Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?" <ref> Alfred Cowles, "Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?", ''Econometrica'' July 1933</ref> and gave his answer as "it is doubtful", thereby starting a controversy that has yet to be fully resolved. Cowles argued that in an "efficient market" all of the information upon which a forecast could be based was already embodied in the price of the share in question, subject only to unpredictable fluctuations having the characteristics known to statisticians as a ''random walk''. The question whether stock markets do in fact operate as efficient markets was subsequently explored in studies undertaken and summarised by the economist Eugene Fama<ref>[http://www.e-m-h.org/Fama70.pdf Eugene Fama: "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work", ''Journal of Finance'' Vol 25 No 2]</ref> | Long before economic analysis was applied to the problem, investment analysts had been advising their clients about their stock market investments, and fund managers had been taking decisions on their behalf. Some sought to predict future movements of the price of a share from a study of the pattern of its recent price movements (known as “technical analysis”) and some attempted to do so by examining the issuing company’s competitive position and the factors affecting the markets in which it operates (known as "fundamental analysis"). But in 1933, an economist suggested that both might be wasting their time. Applying the concept of a "perfect market"<ref> See the definition of a perfect market in the article on [[markets]]</ref> to the stock exchange, the economist Alfred Cowles asked the question "Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?" <ref> Alfred Cowles, "Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?", ''Econometrica'' July 1933</ref> and gave his answer as "it is doubtful", thereby starting a controversy that has yet to be fully resolved. Cowles argued that in an "efficient market" all of the information upon which a forecast could be based was already embodied in the price of the share in question, subject only to unpredictable fluctuations having the characteristics known to statisticians as a ''random walk''. The question whether stock markets do in fact operate as efficient markets was subsequently explored in studies undertaken and summarised by the economist Eugene Fama<ref>[http://www.e-m-h.org/Fama70.pdf Eugene Fama: "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work", ''Journal of Finance'' Vol 25 No 2]</ref> | ||
<ref>[http://www.financeprofessor.com/summaries/fama91efficientcapitalmarketsii.htm Eugene Fama: "Efficient Capital Markets II", ''Journal of Finance'', December 1991]</ref> and others. The answer depends upon the construction that is placed upon the term “efficient”. For example, some definitions of efficient markets do not exclude the well-known presence of many irrational ''noise traders''. It has also been argued that the success of Warren Buffet and a few others need not invalidate the proposition that the average investment analyst does not consistently do better than the stock market index. A 1967 study of the average performance of managers of mutual funds indicated that they had not been successful enough to pay their brokers’ fees <ref>[http://ssrn.com/abstract=244153 Michael Jensen: "The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964" . Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 389-416, 1967]</ref>, and subsequent studies have reached similar conclusions. Most economists now accept the hypothesis as being generally true in that sense, despite the occurrence of several large departures from a true valuation, such as the dotcom ''bubble'' of the 1990s and the subsequent [[subprime mortgages panic]]. There are still dissenting voices, however, including the widely-respected Joseph Stiglitz <ref>[http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282(198006)70:3%3C393:OTIOIE%3E2.0.CO;2-6 | <ref>[http://www.financeprofessor.com/summaries/fama91efficientcapitalmarketsii.htm Eugene Fama: "Efficient Capital Markets II", ''Journal of Finance'', December 1991]</ref> and others. The answer depends upon the construction that is placed upon the term “efficient”. For example, some definitions of efficient markets do not exclude the well-known presence of many irrational ''noise traders''. It has also been argued that the success of Warren Buffet and a few others need not invalidate the proposition that the average investment analyst does not consistently do better than the stock market index. A 1967 study of the average performance of managers of mutual funds indicated that they had not been successful enough to pay their brokers’ fees <ref>[http://ssrn.com/abstract=244153 Michael Jensen: "The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964" . Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 389-416, 1967]</ref>, and subsequent studies have reached similar conclusions. Most economists now accept the hypothesis as being generally true in that sense, despite the occurrence of several large departures from a true valuation, such as the dotcom ''bubble'' of the 1990s and the subsequent [[subprime mortgages panic]]. There are still dissenting voices, however, including the widely-respected Joseph Stiglitz <ref>Sanford | ||
Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz,:. ''On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets'', NBER Reprints 0121, 1980[http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282(198006)70:3%3C393:OTIOIE%3E2.0.CO;2-6]</ref>. The paradoxical consequence of market efficiency would seem to be that the more effective are the efforts of the experts to make best use of the relevant information, the less likely they are to benefit from those efforts. | |||
===Risk limitation=== | |||
The value of any investment is definitionally equal to the present value of its future cash flows when discounted at the investor’s time discount rate - a statement that is of limited usefulness in valuing shares because of the uncertainties surrounding the future of the issuing company. It is conceptually possible to allow for those uncertainties by applying subjective probability weightings to each of what are conceived to be the possible outcomes, in order to produce an estimate of the investment’s net present ''expected'' value (see the article on [[net present value]]). If such a calculation were feasible, a rational choice would be to buy if the net present expected value (net, that is to say, of the purchase price) is greater than zero – or, even better, to buy the asset that has the largest positive net present value of all the assets that are on offer. But it would not be rational to devote all of one’s savings to that asset, even if the probable outcome had been correctly estimated. Every investor needs to limit the risk of total loss - and, according to Gambler’s Ruin theory (see the tutorial subpage) even a sequence of small gambles involves some risk of such a loss. The well-known way of limiting such risks is to buy a diversified portfolio – a strategy that was analysed in detail in the 1950s by the economist Harry Markowitz | |||
<ref>[http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1082(195203)7%3A1%3C77%3APS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 Harry Markowitz: "Portfolio Selection", in ''The Journal of Finance'', Vol. 7, No. 1 March , 1952. ]</ref> | |||
<ref>[http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cm/m16/index.htm Harry Markowitz : ''Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments'', Wiley 1959]</ref> | |||
==The financing choices facing corporations== | ==The financing choices facing corporations== |
Revision as of 06:02, 26 February 2008
Financial economics treats the financial system as an open interactive system dealing both in claims upon future goods and services, and in the allocation of the risks that are associated with such claims. It is concerned with the investment choices made by individuals, with the financing choices made by corporations, with the conduct of financial organisations that act as financial intermediaries between individuals and corporations; and with the effects of it all upon the economy.
(See the related articles subpage for definitions of the terms shown in italics in this article)
Financial systems
Common features
The essential functions of a financial system are taken to be to connect prospective investors with investment opportunities, and to allocate risk in accordance with the preferences of prospective risk-takers. Its components are taken be corporations, investors, financial intermediaries and a financial regulator; its instruments are taken to include a variety of types of shareholding, debt instruments and options that are traded, together with financial derivatives, in a variety of financial markets; and its activities are taken to be governed by rules and practices administered by regulatory authorities.
The financial activities of governments are the subject of a separate article on public finance, and investment choices within corporations are the subject of a separate article on business economics.
Effects on economic performance
The evidence strongly suggests that a well-developed financial system is good for economic growth, and although comparisons between systems in which companies raise finance mainly by borrowing from the banks (as in Germany[1] and Japan) with "equity-based systems" in which companies raise it mainly by issuing shares (as in the United States and Britain) have been inconclusive, they suggest that equity-based systems are better at promoting hi-tech growth. [2][3]. Equity-based systems promote economic activity by enabling prospective investors to finance capital investment by purchasing shares offered by corporations. The incentive to do so is increased by a facility to dispose of them at will in financial markets, and that incentive is further increased by the availability of financial derivatives that help the prospective investor to chose his preferred combination of risk and return.
The investment choices facing individuals
The efficient markets hypothesis
Long before economic analysis was applied to the problem, investment analysts had been advising their clients about their stock market investments, and fund managers had been taking decisions on their behalf. Some sought to predict future movements of the price of a share from a study of the pattern of its recent price movements (known as “technical analysis”) and some attempted to do so by examining the issuing company’s competitive position and the factors affecting the markets in which it operates (known as "fundamental analysis"). But in 1933, an economist suggested that both might be wasting their time. Applying the concept of a "perfect market"[4] to the stock exchange, the economist Alfred Cowles asked the question "Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?" [5] and gave his answer as "it is doubtful", thereby starting a controversy that has yet to be fully resolved. Cowles argued that in an "efficient market" all of the information upon which a forecast could be based was already embodied in the price of the share in question, subject only to unpredictable fluctuations having the characteristics known to statisticians as a random walk. The question whether stock markets do in fact operate as efficient markets was subsequently explored in studies undertaken and summarised by the economist Eugene Fama[6] [7] and others. The answer depends upon the construction that is placed upon the term “efficient”. For example, some definitions of efficient markets do not exclude the well-known presence of many irrational noise traders. It has also been argued that the success of Warren Buffet and a few others need not invalidate the proposition that the average investment analyst does not consistently do better than the stock market index. A 1967 study of the average performance of managers of mutual funds indicated that they had not been successful enough to pay their brokers’ fees [8], and subsequent studies have reached similar conclusions. Most economists now accept the hypothesis as being generally true in that sense, despite the occurrence of several large departures from a true valuation, such as the dotcom bubble of the 1990s and the subsequent subprime mortgages panic. There are still dissenting voices, however, including the widely-respected Joseph Stiglitz [9]. The paradoxical consequence of market efficiency would seem to be that the more effective are the efforts of the experts to make best use of the relevant information, the less likely they are to benefit from those efforts.
Risk limitation
The value of any investment is definitionally equal to the present value of its future cash flows when discounted at the investor’s time discount rate - a statement that is of limited usefulness in valuing shares because of the uncertainties surrounding the future of the issuing company. It is conceptually possible to allow for those uncertainties by applying subjective probability weightings to each of what are conceived to be the possible outcomes, in order to produce an estimate of the investment’s net present expected value (see the article on net present value). If such a calculation were feasible, a rational choice would be to buy if the net present expected value (net, that is to say, of the purchase price) is greater than zero – or, even better, to buy the asset that has the largest positive net present value of all the assets that are on offer. But it would not be rational to devote all of one’s savings to that asset, even if the probable outcome had been correctly estimated. Every investor needs to limit the risk of total loss - and, according to Gambler’s Ruin theory (see the tutorial subpage) even a sequence of small gambles involves some risk of such a loss. The well-known way of limiting such risks is to buy a diversified portfolio – a strategy that was analysed in detail in the 1950s by the economist Harry Markowitz [10] [11]
The financing choices facing corporations
The activities of the financial intermediaries
The roles of financial regulators
How it all works out
References
- ↑ Colin Mayer and Ian Alexander: Banks and Securities Markets: Corporate Financing in Germany and the UK, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 433, June 1990.
- ↑ Wendy Carlin and Colin Meyer: How do Financial Systems affect Economic Performance?, Said Business School University of Oxford 1999
- ↑ Robert Carpenter and Bruce Petersen: Capital Market Imperfection: High-tech Investment and New Equity Financing, Economic Journal 2002
- ↑ See the definition of a perfect market in the article on markets
- ↑ Alfred Cowles, "Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?", Econometrica July 1933
- ↑ Eugene Fama: "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work", Journal of Finance Vol 25 No 2
- ↑ Eugene Fama: "Efficient Capital Markets II", Journal of Finance, December 1991
- ↑ Michael Jensen: "The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964" . Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 389-416, 1967
- ↑ Sanford Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz,:. On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, NBER Reprints 0121, 1980[1]
- ↑ Harry Markowitz: "Portfolio Selection", in The Journal of Finance, Vol. 7, No. 1 March , 1952.
- ↑ Harry Markowitz : Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments, Wiley 1959