Recession of 2009: Difference between revisions

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:''(The title of this article reflects the fact that the full intensity of the recession did not develop until 2009 although it starts with a reminder of some of the events that triggered it in the course of the [[crash of 2008]] )''
{|align="center" cellpadding="5" style="background:lightgray; width:95%; border: 1px solid #aaa; margin:10px; font-size: 92%;"
| Supplements to this article include a [[/Related Articles#Glossary|glossary]]; links to reports of the [[/Timelines|major economic events]] in the fourth quarter of 2008 and each of the four quarters of 2009; tabulations of [[/Addendum#Growth rates|GDP growth rates]], [[/Addendum#Unemployment rates|unemployment rates]], [[/Addendum#Public debt|public debt]],  [[/Addendum#Total debt|total debt]], and, [[/Addendum#Fiscal stimulus packages|fiscal stimulus packages]]  
|}


Downturns in economic growth rates were  apparent early in 2008, and the subsequent intensification of the financial [[crash of 2008]] led to a general expectation of worse to come. The resulting loss of confidence by investors and consumers contributed further to the severity of the reduction in world economic growth, and it was apparent by the end of 2008 that the economies of the United States and several European countries had for some time been in recession. An impending collapse of the international financial system was averted by policy actions introduced in the winter of 2008, but credit availability had been only partly restored by the spring of 2009. The world's economic output is expected to fall in 2009, but assuming the restoration of credit availability in the course of 2009, a gradually recovery is forecast to begin in early 2010.  
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The '''recession of 2009''' was the sequel to the financial [[crash of 2008]] that led, in late 2008 and early 2009, to reductions in  the growth rates  of all of the world's emerging economies and to  [[downturn (economic)|downturns]] in all of its mature economies - and that  was to have major repercussions thereafter.  


   
==Introduction==
This article is the third of a series of contemporary accounts of financial and economic events and developments during the period from mid 2007 to the end of 2011. The other articles are:-
:[[Subprime mortgage crisis]] - events surrounding the bursting of a house price [[bubble (economics)|bubble]] in the United States in mid 2007;
:[[Crash of 2008]] - global financial developments from mid 2007 to the end of 2008;
:[[Great Recession]] - an overview of global financial and economic events between mid 2007 and the end of 2011.


::''Supplementary material:
==The downturn==
::''for definitions of terms shown in italics, see the glossary on the [[/Related Articles|Related Articles subpage]];''
Throughout the period from mid-2007 to mid-2008, the growth of the world economy was hampered  by increases in oil and food prices, and by a crisis in the financial markets. Oil prices rose  from  $75  to  $146 a barrel and food prices rose sharply, forcing  householders to cut their spending on other products. On the financial markets, the [[subprime mortgage crisis]]   developed into the [[crash of 2008]], as a result of which the availability of credit to households and businesses was curtailed, leading to further reductions  in household spending and business investment. In the nine months to the middle of 2008, the advanced economies had grown at an annual rate of only one  per cent (compared with two and a half per cent in the previous nine months) and the growth rate of the developing economies had eased from eight per cent to seven and a half per cent. According to the OECD <ref>[http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/54/41812368.pdf ''Economic Survey of the United States'', OECD December 2008]</ref> the US economy was by then already facing substantial difficulties. Households had borrowed at an unprecedented rate during the previous  15 years, and their saving rates had fallen nearly to zero as they  increasingly relied on  housing wealth to finance consumption. With the housing market suffering the severest correction for 50 years,  household wealth was declining, and  with credit conditions getting tighter, households had been forced to reduce their reliance on borrowing, and job losses and mortgage foreclosures were rising.  
::''for forecasts  and a summary of recent economic developments see the [[/Addendum|Addendum subpage]];''
::''for a sequential list of events with links to further information, see [[/Timelines|Timelines subpage]]; and,''
::''for a selection of economic statistics see the [[/Tutorials|Tutorials subpage]].


==Origins==
The prospects of a recession in the United States and of substantial reductions in economic  growth elsewhere  were becoming apparent when the world economy was hit by another shock.  The failure  of  the Lehman Brothers investment bank in September raised doubts about the creditworthiness of major global financial institutions, and the ensuing [[banking panic]]  threatened a collapse of world’s financial system. Attempts by banks to restore their capital adequacy, resulted in capital hoarding, and the resulting [[liquidity]] shortage (or [[credit crunch]]) undermined consumer and business confidence, and triggered a further contraction in demand.   Falls in demand, together with credit shortages led to a massive [[/Addendum#World trade|reduction in world trade]].  
Throughout the period from mid-2007 to mid-2008, the growth of the world economy was hampered  by increases in oil and food prices, and by a crisis in the financial markets. Oil prices rose  from  $75  to  $146 a barrel and food prices rose sharply, forcing  householders to cut their spending on other products. On the financial markets, the [[subprime mortgage crisis]]  developed into the [[crash of 2008]], as a result of which the availability of credit to households and businesses was curtailed, leading to  further reductions  in household spending and business investment. In the nine months to the middle of 2008, the advanced economies had grown at an annual rate of only one  per cent (compared with two and a half per cent in the previous nine months) and the growth rate of the developing economies had eased from eight per cent to seven and a half per cent. According to the OECD <ref>[http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/54/41812368.pdf ''Economic Survey of the United States'', OECD December 2008]</ref> the US economy was by then already facing substantial difficulties. Households had borrowed at an unprecedented rate during the previous  15 years, and their saving rates had fallen nearly to zero as they  increasingly relied on  housing wealth to finance consumption. With the housing market suffering the severest correction for 50 years,  household wealth was declining, and  with credit conditions getting tighter, households had been forced to reduce their reliance on borrowing, and job losses and mortgage foreclosures were rising.  The prospects of a recession in the United States and of severe reductions in economic  growth elsewhere  were becoming apparent when the world economy was hit by another shock.  The failure  of  the Lehman Brothers investment bank in September caused am international ''banking  panic''  that triggered  an intensification of  the credit shortage to the point at which the world’s financial system appeared to be on the verge of collapse. Massive financial support to their banks by the governments of the industrialised countries averted that collapse, but failed to restore the supply  of credit to businesses and householders. By that time, demand reductions had led to reductions in the prices of oil and food, but the resulting  relief of the downward  pressure on demand was being outweighed by the mounting  effects of the credit shortage. By the end of September the United States economy had been in recession for nine months with no apparent prospect of an early recovery and by the end of the year,  most of the industrialised countries had suffered reductions in economic activity. It had  become evident that a world-wide recession was under way.


==Recession in the United States==
Many industrialised and developing  countries suffered  reductions of economic activity. Economies with relatively large financial sectors - such as those of Britain and Iceland  - suffered directly from the banking crisis.  Economies with relatively large export  sectors  - such as those of Japan and Germany  and many developing countries - suffered indirectly  from the reduction in world trade. There were widespread increases in unemployment. Budget deficits grew during the downturn, mainly as a result of the operation of [[automatic stabilisers]] and, to a lesser extent, as a result of discretionary [[fiscal policy]], and  the levels of debt owed by the governments of the industrial governments were forecast to rise to an average of 120 percent of gdp by 2014.


By early 2009, the United States economy was suffering from a severe lack of demand. Three and a half million jobs had been lost in just over a year and businesses were responding to falling demand by laying off workers or cutting back on their hours or wages, causing families to further reduce their demand and businesses to respond with yet more layoffs and cutbacks. The problem was being  made worse by the inability of the financial system  to provide the credit necessary for recovery, and the resulting "credit crunch" was causing more job losses and further declines in business activity, which, in turn, was adding more pressure on the financial system. Two and a half  million families  had faced foreclosure in the previous  year, and the reductions in personal wealth resulting from the fall in  house prices were causing further reductions in demand<ref>Based on Treasury Secretary [http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg50.htm Tim Geithner's statement] to the Senate Finance Committee  March 4 2009</ref>. Reports from the twelve Federal Reserve Districts  in March suggested  that national economic conditions deteriorated further during the reporting period of January through late February. Ten of the twelve reports indicated weaker conditions or declines in economic activity. The deterioration was broad based, with only a few sectors such as basic food production and pharmaceuticals appearing to be exceptions. Looking ahead, contacts from various Districts rate the prospects for near-term improvement in economic conditions as poor, with a significant pickup not expected before late 2009 or early 2010.  The availability of credit generally remained tight. Lenders continued to impose strict standards for all types of loans, with scattered reports of further tightening and particular scrutiny focused on construction projects and commercial real estate transactions.<ref>[http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/beigebook/2009/20090304/fullreport20090304.pdf Federal Reserve "Beige Book", March 2009]</ref>
[[Great Recession#Economic downturn (2007 - 2009)|more]]


==The international recession==
==The policy response==
Massive financial support to their banks in the closing months of 2008 by the governments of the industrialised  countries averted a threatened  collapse of the international financial system, but failed to restore the supply  of credit to businesses and householders, and further action was taken to tackle the growing [[recession]]. In a departure from accepted practice, the governments of the G20 group of major economies agreed to use [[fiscal policy]] in order to stimulate demand by tax cuts and increases of [[public expenditure]]. [[/Addendum#Fiscal stimulus packages|Fiscal stimulus packages]] were adopted that amounted to 4.8 percent of GDP in the US, 3.4 percent in Germany, 1.5 percent in the UK and 1.3 percent in France.  Supportive [[monetary policy]] action was also taken by the major [[central bank]]s by  making massive reductions in their  [[discount rate]]s,  followed - in a further departure from accepted practice -  by  injections of [[liquidity]] into their economies, mainly  by the purchase of securities from their private sectors ([[quantitative easing]] or [[credit easing]]<ref>[http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm Ben Bernanke: ''The Crisis and the Policy Response'', Speech at the London School of Economics, January 13, 2009]</ref>). The [[Federal Reserve Board]] reduced its discount rate to 0 to 0.25 percent and made security  purchases amounting to 12 percent of GDP<ref>[http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20091008a.htm Ben Bernanke: ''The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet: An Update'', Federal Reserve Board Conference on Key Developments in Monetary Policy, Washington, D.C. October 8, 2009 ]</ref>; the [[Bank of England]] reduced its bank rate to 0.5 per cent and made asset purchases amounting to 6 percent of GDP<ref>[http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech405.pdf. Charles Bean: ''Quantitative Easing: An Interim Report'', Speech to the London Society of Chartered Accountants London, 13 October 2009]</ref>.; and the European Central Bank reduced its discount rate to 1.0 percent and made asset purchases amounting to  0.6% of Eurozone GDP<ref>[http://globaleconomydoesmatter.blogspot.com/2009/05/quantitative-easing-lecb.html Claus Vistesen: ''Quantitative Easing à l´ECB'', Global Economy Matters, May 2009]</ref>.


[[Great Recession#Policy response (2008 - 2009)|more]]


===World===
==The economic recovery==
Although in purely technical terms the [[recession]]  ended in most  countries in the course of 2009, levels of activity remained substantially below normal levels and there was considerable uncertainty throughout the year about future prospects. In view of a continuing [[credit crunch]], there were few expectations of an early return to pre-recession growth rates, and there were some fears of a long period of near-stagnation such as that suffered by Japan during the period 1990 to 2005. The American economist Paul Krugman  argued that what happened in Japan may have been due to a reluctance to spend on the part of householders impoverished by collapses of housing and stock market [[Bubble (economics)|bubble]]s<ref>[http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jun/14/economics-globalrecession ''Paul Krugman's fear for lost decade'', Interview with Will Hutton, The Observer, Sunday 14 June 2009]</ref>, and the  Japanese economist, Richard Koo applied  the term "balance sheet recession" to a situation in which companies as well as householders  reduce  spending in order to repay debts and rebuild reserves<ref>[http://www.scribd.com/doc/13970982/Richard-Koo-Presentation Richard Koo: ''The Age of Balance Sheet Recessions'', What post-2008 USA, Europe and China can learn from Japan 1990-2005,  Nomura Research Institute, March 2009]</ref>. Reports of increases in household saving ratios in the United States<ref>[http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2009/el2009-16.html#3 ''U.S. Household Deleveraging and Future Consumption Growth'', Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 2009-16; May 15, 2009]</ref> and Britain<ref>[http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/qnabrief0909.pdf ''Quarterly National Accounts briefing note, 2009 Quarter Two, National Statistics Office]</ref>  tended to add to those fears, but it has been argued that Japan's experience is unlikely to be repeated by the United States or the  other indebted economies because their bubbles were proportionately smaller, their banks tend to be more profitable, and prompter action has been taken to recapitalise their banks<ref>[http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14530146 ''A special report on the world economy'', The Economist, Oct 1st 2009]</ref>.


Although the [[crash of 2008]] had an adverse effect upon most of the world's economies, but in 2008 it was only the more vulnerable of the industrialised economies that seemed likely to suffer major downturns.  By the spring of 2009, however,  most of  the world's economies had been severely damaged. The  United States and United Kingdom economies had at first  suffered more seriously than most because of collapsing  housing and consumer credit booms but it soon became apparent that more serious downturns were threatening the economies of Japan and Germany. Neither had experienced such booms, but both proved to be  exceptionally vulnerable to reductions in foreign demand for their exports. Most of the other developed  economies (except Spain and Ireland)  were also relatively free of such problems, but  they too were damaged by loss of exports as world trade collapsed. The economies of commodity-exporting countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and South America  suffered mainly from  falls in commodity prices, and some other emerging economies  were also damaged by the withdrawal of capital inflows from the developed economies.
[[Great Recession#Recovery (2009-2010)|more]]


In April 2009, economists at the International Monetary Fund projected a moderation in the  rate of contraction of  world output from the second quarter onward, with a reduction of  1.3 percent in 2009 as a whole followed by a rise of  1.9 percent in 2010<ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf. ''World Economic Outlook'', International Monetary Fund, April 2009]</ref>.
==The policy debate==


===Eurozone===
===Overview===
 
A conflict about [[fiscal policy]] developed towards the end of 2008 between those who feared that the proposed expansion would be insufficient to counter growing [[output gap]]s -  and those who considered a [[fiscal stimulus]] to be unnecessary or ineffectiveAmong the first group were the Nobel prize-winners Paul Krugman <ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/opinion/09krugman.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss Paul Krugman ''The Obama Gap'', New York Times blog 8 January 2009]</ref>, and Joseph Stiglitz <ref>[http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz110/English Joseph Stiglitz "How to Fail to Recover", Project Syndicate, 2009.]</ref>. Among the others were the Chicago School's Eugene Fama, and a group of eminent British economists who argued that "occasional slowdowns are natural and necessary features of a market economy" and that "insofar as they are to be managed at all, the best tools are monetary and not fiscal ones"<ref>[http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=pressArticle&ID=376 ''Keynesian Over-spending Won't Rescue the Economy", Letter by IEA economists in the Sunday Telegraph, 26 October 2008]</ref>. Further controversy developed in the course of 2009 between those who favoured reductions in [national debt]] early in  2010 in order to avert fears of being forced into  [[sovereign default]], and those who advocated the  continuation of fiscal expansion until the recovery was firmly established.
===United Kingdom===
The rapid growth of the British economy in the early years of the 21st century had been partly due to the success of its comparatively large financial sector and to the development of a  comparatively vigorous housing boom, and those factors had a strong influence upon the impact of the recession that followed the collapse of the Lehman Brothers bank in the United States. Even before that collapse, some of its banks had been forced to make large writedowns because of their involvement in the [[subprime mortgages crisis]] and there had been a run on one of them <ref>[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6996136.stm ''Rush on Northern Rock Continues'', BBC News 17 September 2007]</ref>, but the ''banking panic'' that followed the fall of Lehman Brothers, threatened the continued existence of the financial system. In October 2008 the British Government announced a £500 billion rescue scheme <ref>[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7658277.stm Rescue Plan for UK Banks Unveiled, BBC News 8 October 2008]</ref>,  including powers to take equity stakes in ailing banks and an undertaking to guarantee interbank loans. An impending collapse of the UK's financial system was averted, but the surviving banks adopted a policy  of ''deleveraging'' that resulted in a severe ''credit crunch'' followed by a general economic downturn. In the second half of 2008 gdp fell by 2.2  per cent  with falls in financial sector output and  in  housing  and commercial investment.  The effective exchange rate fell by about 20 per cent  during  2008,  but its effect was more than offset by falling overseas demand, and there was also a fall in  exports.  Early fiscal and monetary  action was taken to tackle  the growing recession . A  ''fiscal stimulus''  amounting to 1.4 per cent of GDP was introduced by  the November Pre-Budget Report, including a temporary 2.5 percentage point reduction in value-added tax and a bringing forward of £3 billion of capital investment, and by March 2009 the Bank of England had reduced its  the bank rate  from 5% to 0.5% and begun a programme of  ''quantitative easing''.  The UK’s [[national debt]] had been  comparatively  low at the outset of the recession<ref> See paragraph 3.4 of the [[/Tutorials|tutorials subpage]]</ref>, but there has since been a large increase in the ''budget deficit'', which is expected to rise to over 9 per cent of gdp by the end of 2009, mainly as result of the operation of ''automatic stabilisers''.
The government's policy was endorsed by the IMF, <ref> Statement by the Deputy Managing Director of the IMF that ...''we are confident that the measures being taken... will strengthen the economy... ''[http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article5627450.ece]</ref> but was attacked by domestic critics<ref>[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/conservative/georgeosborne/3275207/George-Osborne-Slash-interest-rates-to-drag-Britain-out-of-economic-nosedive.html George Osborne, as reported in the Daily Telegraph 14 December 2008]</ref> and (at first <ref> The German government subsequently introduced a larger fiscal stimulus - see paragraph 3.3 of the [[/Tutorials|tutorials subpage]]</ref>) by members of other European governments
<ref>[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7776718.stm ''Germany Questions UK Rescue Plan'',  BBC News 11th December 2008]</ref>. The reduction of value-added tax appears to have resulted in an early boost to retail sales <ref>[http://www.cebr.com/OneStopCMS/Core/SearchResults.aspx ''Credit Where Credit’s Due – the VAT Cut is Working'', "Forecasting Eye", Centre for Economic and Business Research, 18 April 2009]</ref>.
 
===Germany===
The international banking panic had an immediate impact on Germany's fragmented banking system and in  October 2008 the government set up a fund to guarantee the  banks' debts and provide for  recapitalisation and  asset purchases. Although there had been falls in national output  earlier in the year, the government did not at first consider further action  to be necessary, but by the end of the year a fall in exports signalled the onset of major downturn, and in January of 2009 it launched a major fiscal stimulus (amounting eventually to 3.5 per cent of gdp) that included reductions in income, and payroll taxes(starting in July) as well as  industrial subsidies and infrastructure investments. Those discretionary actions together with the action of the automatic stabilisers were expected to increase the budget deficit to  7% of GDP by  2010. Forecasters expect the downturn of the German economy to be deeper than those of other major industrialised countries except Japan.
 
===France===
 
===Italy===
 
===Iceland===
Before the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, Iceland appeared to be in an enviable position among the developed countries. It had a thriving economy, its government had a budgetary surplus, its banks had no toxic assets and its consumers had not indulged in any speculative bubbles. (Although Willem Buiter and Anne SIbert <ref> Willem Buiter and Anne SIbert: ''The Icelandic Banking Crisis and
What To Do About It'', Policy Insight No 26, Centre for Economic Policy Research, October 2008[http://www.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/PolicyInsight26.pdf]</ref>, believe that  its banking model was not viable). A few months later its banking system had collapsed, its government was deeply in debt, its currency had suffered a  65 per cent depreciation, real earnings had fallen by 18 per cent, and its economy was facing a deep and prolonged recession. Those were the consequences of the impact of the international credit crunch on a banking system that had overseas debts amounting to almost ten times the country's GDP. Unable to ''roll over'' their debts, three of its largest banks had to be rescued by the government, and the consequent rise in national debt caused a flight from the national currency that made matters worse. A loan was obtained from the International Monetary Fund and recovery is expected during 2011 <ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08362.pdf ''Country Report No. 08/362'', International Monetary Fund, November 2008]</ref>.
 
===Ireland===
A downturn in the output of the formerly booming Irish construction industry  that started in 2007, intensified and developed into a full-blown  economic recession in the course of 2008 and  construction and property companies  began to default on loans from the banks. News of their defaults made foreign banks and investors, that had been the banks' principal source of short-term finance, reluctant to risk further commitments, and a banking crisis developed.  In an attempt to restore confidence, the Irish government undertook to  guarantee loans to the banks, as a result of which it experienced a large increase in its budgetary deficit. The sums of money involved were so large by comparison with the country's GDP  that foreign investors became wary  of a ''sovereign default'', and the government's ability to finance the deficit was threatened by a general loss of confidence. In April 2009, the government decided that the only way to restore confidence was to take steps to reduce its deficit - and took the extraordinary step of increasing taxation in the midst of a recession <ref>[http://www.budget.gov.ie/2009SupApril09/FinancialStatement.html Budget Statement, Department of Finance, April 7, 2009]</ref>. As Paul Krugman has noted "the Irish government now predicts that this year [2009] GDP will fall more than 10 percent from its peak, crossing the line that is sometimes used to distinguish between a recession and a depression <ref>[http://www.twine.com/item/127048rfq-1s1/op-ed-columnist-paul-krugman-erin-go-broke-nytimes-com Paul Krugman: ''Erin Go Broke'', New York Times, April 18 2009]</ref>
 
Additional steps taken include direct purchase of stock in some banks and the establishment of the '[[National Asset Management Agency]]' - essentially a government-owned bank that will buy [[toxic debt]] from six financial institutions - both steps aimed at improving their balance sheets and freeing up capital.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=5769 |title=Minister for Finance, Mr Brian Lenihan, TD, announces appointment of interim Managing Director of the National Asset Management Agency |accessdate=2009-05-12 |author=Department of Finance, Ireland |authorlink= |coauthors= |date= |year= |month= |format=html |work= |publisher= |pages= |language= |archiveurl= |archivedate= |quote= }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.moneyguideireland.com/nama-national-asset-management-agency.html |title=NAMA - National Asset Management Agency |accessdate=2009-05-12 |author=Money Guide Ireland |authorlink= |coauthors= |date= |year= |month= |format= |work= |publisher= |pages= |language= |archiveurl= |archivedate= |quote= }}</ref>
 
===Japan===
Japan has suffered a much deeper recession than the other large industrialised economies mainly because of its greater reliance upon exports of cars and high-technology products. Output was also restricted by a credit crunch and by the need to reduce high inventory levels <ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0905.pdf Martin Sommer: ''Why Has Japan Been Hit So Hard by the Global Recession?'', Staff Note SPN/09/05, International Monetary Fund, March 18, 2009]</ref>.
 
===China===
 
===Russia===
 
===Developing countries===
According to a World Bank report published in March 2009, 94 out of 116 developing countries have experienced a slowdown in economic growth. Of these countries, 43 have high levels of poverty. To date, the most affected sectors are those that were the most dynamic, typically urban-based exporters, construction, mining, and manufacturing<ref>[http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22093316~menuPK:34463~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html. ''Crisis Reveals Growing Finance Gaps for Developing Countries'', World Bank, 8th March 2009]</ref>.
 
==International coordination==
 
A [[G20 summit]] meeting of the world leaders took place in Washington on 15th November, with the purpose of agreeing a coordinated response to the financial crisis. An ebook was published in advance, with the recommendations of an international group of twenty leading financial economists<ref>[http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2543 '' What G20 leaders must do to stabilise our economy and fix the financial system'', voxeu.org, Centre for Economic Policy Research November 2008]</ref>. They were unanimous on the need for Governments to take urgent action to recapitalise their banks, to guarantee cross-border bank claims, to restructure nonperforming assets, and to extend financial support for crisis countries.
They were also agreed on the need for immediate, substantial, internationally coordinated fiscal stimulus, tailored to the circumstances of each country and taken with a view toward the impact on the rest of the world. There was also unanimity on the need to augment IMF resources immediately so that the institution has adequate firepower, and on the need to strengthen existing arrangements for global governance. Several of them also argued for new approaches to the regulation of large cross-border financial institutions.
 
==Policy debate==


===Overview===
===Fiscal policy===
As the recession deepened, budget deficits widened, mainly as a result of the operation of ''automatic stabilisers'', but  also as a result of discretionary ''fiscal stimuluses''. A widening conflict has developed between those who fear that the resulting  fiscal expansion may be insufficient to counter growing ''output gaps'' - and those who consider fiscal policy to be unnecessary or ineffective - or who fear the possibility of ''sovereign default''. Among the first group were the Nobel prize-winners  Paul Krugman <ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/opinion/09krugman.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss Paul Krugman ''The Obama Gap'', New York Times blog  8 January 2009]</ref>, and Joseph Stiglitz <ref>[http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz110/English Joseph Stiglitz "How to Fail to Recover", Project Syndicate, 2009.]</ref>. Among the others were the Chicago School's Eugene Fama, and a group of eminent British economists who argued that "occasional slowdowns are natural and necessary features of a market economy" and that "insofar as they are to be managed at all, the best tools are monetary and not fiscal ones"<ref>[http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=pressArticle&ID=376 ''Keynesian Over-spending Won't Rescue the Economy", Letter by IEA economists in the Sunday Telegraph, 26 October 2008]</ref>.  
====The consensus view====
By October 2008, policy-makers in most industrialised countries had accepted that in order to avoid the development of  persistent and unmanageable [[deflation]] such as occurred in the [[Great Depression]], early corrective  action would have to be taken, going beyond the necessary restoration of activity in the financial system.  Most countries had long abandoned the  use of reductions of taxation and increases in public expenditure to ward off economic downturns in favour of the use of [[monetary policy]] targeted on the [[output gap]], but there were doubts whether  monetary policy would be sufficiently powerful, or sufficiently quick-acting in view if the severity and imminence of the current [[deflation]]ary threat. In the United States, in particular, the federal discount rate had already been reduced to 1 per cent - leaving little scope for further reductions, but banks there and elsewhere had become reluctant to pass on central bank reductions of interest rates.
The consensus view among economists, as expressed by  the Chief Economist of the OECD was that :
:Against the backdrop of a deep economic downturn, additional macroeconomic stimulus is needed. In normal times, monetary rather than fiscal policy would be the instrument of choice for macroeconomic stabilisation. But these are not normal times. Current conditions of extreme financial stress have weakened the monetary transmission mechanism. In this unusual situation, fiscal policy stimulus over and above the support provided through [[automatic stabilisers]] has an important role to play<ref>[http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/50/39739655.pdf Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel: ''A Long Recession" ,Editorial to OECD Observer No 270, December 2008]</ref>.
The International Monetary Fund noted that fiscal policy can quickly boost spending power, whereas  monetary policy acts with  long and uncertain lags
<ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/pdf/c5.pdf ''Fiscal Policy as a Countercyclical  Tool'', IMF World Economic Outlook, Chapter 5 ,  October 2008]</ref>, and a 2009 IMF Staff  Position Note demonstrated that an internationally coordinated programme of fiscal expansion, combined with accommodative monetary policies, could have significant multiplier effects on the world economy <ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0903.pdf Charles Freedman, Michael Kumhof, Douglas Laxton, and Jaewoo Lee: ''The Case for Global Fiscal Stimulus'', IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/03, International Monetary Fund, March 6 2009]</ref>. However, the IMF also advised that fiscal expansion could do more harm than good  in heavily indebted countries such as Japan and Italy stimulus,  and suggested that further expansion should be confined to countries with more modest levels of national debt,  such as the United Kingdom, China, France, Germany, and the United States <ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020109.pdf Mark Horton and Anna Ivanova: "The Size of the Fiscal Expansion: An Analysis for the Largest ountries", IMF Fiscal Department Note, February 2009]</ref>.  
After some early misgivings, the case for fiscal expansion  gained near-universal political acceptance, and by early 2009, nearly all the G20 countries had introduced fiscal stimulus programmes <ref>[http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/03_g20_stimulus_prasad.aspx Eswar Prasad: ''Assessing the G-20 Stimulus Plans: A Deeper Look'', Brookings Institution May 2009]</ref>.


===The case for fiscal expansion===
In 2009, as signs of impending recovery began to emerge, the debate about the future of fiscal policy was resumed and, although there was general recognition of the eventual need for an offsetting fiscal contractionviews differed about the timing of such action. In October 2009 the IMF cautioned against haste:   
By October 2008, policy-makers in most industrialised countries had accepted that in order to avoid the development of persistent and unmanageable [[deflation]] such as occurred in the pre-war [[great depression]], early corrective action would have to be takengoing beyond the necessary restoration of activity in the financial system. Most countries had long abandoned the use of reductions of taxation and increases in public expenditure to ward off economic downturns in favour of the use of interest rate reductions <ref>For an account of the reasons for  use of interest rates  for economic stabilisation, see the paragraph on monetary policy in the article on [[macroeconomics]], and for a description of the techniques that are employed, see paragraph 3 of the article on [[banking]]., and in other</ref>, but there were doubts whether monetary policy would be sufficiently powerful, or sufficiently  quick-acting in view if the severity and imminence of the current deflationary threat. In the United States, in particular, the ''federal interest rate'' had already been reduced to 1 per cent - leaving little scope for further reductions, and banks there and elsewhere had become reluctant to pass on central bank reductions of interest rates.  
:"Notwithstanding already large deficits and rising public debt in many countries, fiscal stimulus needs to be sustained until the recovery is on a firmer footing and may even need to be amplified or extended beyond current plans if downside risks to growth materialize"[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf].
The outcome of that debate in most industrialised countries was a decision to postpone further fiscal expansion unless and until the need became apparent, and to develop medium-term plans for fiscal contraction in 2011 and beyond
<ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/030609.pdf "The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis" IMF March 6 2009]</ref>.


The consensus view among economists, as expressed by  the Chief Economist of the OECD is that :
====Objections====
:Against the backdrop of a deep economic downturn, additional macroeconomic stimulus is needed. In normal times, monetary rather than ''fiscal'' policy would be the instrument of choice for macroeconomic stabilisation. But these are not normal times. Current conditions of extreme financial stress have weakened the monetary ''transmission mechanism''. Moreover, in some countries the scope for further reductions in policy rates is limited. In this unusual situation, fiscal policy stimulus over and above the support provided through ''automatic stabilisers'' has an important role to play. Fiscal stimulus packages, however, need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in those countries where room for budgetary manoeuvre exists. It is vital that any discretionary action be timely and temporary and designed to ensure maximum effectiveness.<ref>[http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/50/39739655.pdf Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel: ''A Long Recession" ,Editorial to OECD Observer No 270, December 2008]
Professor Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago  argued that consumers do not respond to tax cuts  because of awareness that they will eventually be paid for by tax increases (the argument known to economists as [[Ricardian equivalence]]. He also argues that all forms of fiscal stimulus are ineffective because they merely move resources from private investment to government investment or from investment to consumption, with no effect on total current resources in the system or on total employment <ref>[http://www.dimensional.com/famafrench/2009/01/bailouts-and-stimulus-plans.html. Eugene Fama: ''Bailouts and Stimulus Plans'' January 2009]</ref> (the process known as [[crowding out]]). Others have argued that the danger  of incurring unsustainable debt <ref> The conditions for [[fiscal sustainability]] are set out in paragraph 4.1 of the article on [[national debt]] [http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/National_Debt#Fiscal_sustainability]</ref>, makes fiscal stimulus a risky option, especially for countries with high levels of national debt. There is also a danger that even relatively modest levels of debt can become unsustainable if investors perceive a risk of default on its repayment, because they would then add to the problem by adding a risk premium to the interest rates needed to finance the debt. Another objection arises from the fear that expansionary fiscal and  monetary policies would not be reversed in time to avoid [[inflation]] (that objection was expressed by the economist Allan Meltzer  <ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/opinion/04meltzer.html Allan Meltzer: ''Inflation Nation'', New York Times op-ed, 3rd May 2009]</ref> in the same issue of the New York Times in which the economist Paul Krugman was advocating a further stimulus in order to avert the danger of [[deflation]] <ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/opinion/04krugman.html Paul Krugman: ''Falling Wage Syndrome'', New York Times op-ed, 3rd May 2009]</ref>).
</ref>
In its 2008 ''World Economic Outlook'', the  International Monetary Fund has also noted that fiscal policy can quickly boost spending power, whereas monetary policy acts with  long and  uncertain lags
<ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/pdf/c5.pdf ''Fiscal Policy as a Countercyclical  Tool'', IMF World Economic Outlook, Chapter 5 ,  October 2008]</ref>, and a 2009 IMF Staff  Position Note demonstrates that an internationally  coordinated programme of fiscal expansion, combined with accommodative monetary policies, can have significant multiplier effects on the world economy <ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0903.pdf Charles Freedman, Michael Kumhof, Douglas Laxton, and Jaewoo Lee: ''The Case for Global Fiscal Stimulus'', IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/03, International Monetary Fund, March 6 2009]</ref>.


===The need for fiscal space===
===Monetary policy===
However, the IMF also advise that a  ''fiscal stimulus'' can do more harm than good if it makes debt unsustainable, and suggest (in another note) that further stimuli should be confined to countries with more  fiscal space to expand,  such as the United Kingdom, China, France, Germany, and the United States <ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020109.pdf Mark Horton and Anna Ivanova: "The Size of the Fiscal Expansion: An Analysis for the Largest Countries", IMF Fiscal Department Note, February 2009]</ref>, as compared, for example with Japan and Italy. In another paper they warn that a spread in fears of government insolvency could hamper recovery.
====The consensus view====
A perceived risk that governments find it more convenient to repudiate their debt could lead to an increase in the cost of borrowing that could further add to government debts in an unstable  "snowballing" effect. The IMF have noted some signs of an increase in such fears and, although the perceived risk is so far small, they consider it important that governments  should reassure markets that fiscal solvency is not at risk  by presenting their fiscal policies in medium-term  frameworks that envisage a gradual fiscal correction as economic conditions improve.<ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/030609.pdf "The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis" IMF March 6 2009]</ref>
The use of security purchases to increase central bank liabilities as an auxiliary monetary policy after interest rate actions are exhausted (usually referred to as quantitative easing) had been explained by Ben Bernanke in 2004<ref>[http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200401033/default.htm. Ben Bernanke: ''Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates'', Paper presented to the American Economic Association at San Diego, California, January 3, 2004]</ref> and had been used by the Japanese central bank in the 1990s.
====Objections====
Although the policy of [[credit easing]] that was adopted by the Federal Reserve Bank in 2008 was not new, it received a mixed reception, and press references to it as "printing money" raised fears of inflation. The policy was vigorously attacked by German Chancellor Angela Merkel <ref>[http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2da17b26-4f9c-11de-a692-00144feabdc0.html Bertrand Benoit Ralph Atkins: ''Berlin breaks the unwritten rule'', Financial Times, June 2 2009]</ref><ref>[http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2009/06/merkel-derides-the-bank-of-englands-little-line/ Tony Barber: ''Merkel derides the Bank of England’s "little line”'', Financial Times Brussels Blog, June 5, 2009][http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/nn_4900/Content/DE/Rede/2009/06/2009-06-02-merkel-insm.html]</ref>, but the President of the Bundesbank defended it, while warning of the need for its timely reversal<ref>[http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601068&sid=aHSuftdUo.F4 Gabi Thesing: ''Weber Sees Subdued Inflation, ‘Protracted’ Recovery '', Bloomberg, September 8 2009]</ref>.


===Objections===
==Aftermath==
Professor Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago  argues that consumers do not respond to tax cuts  because of awareness that they will eventually be paid for by tax increases (the argument known to economists as ''Ricardian Equivalence''). He also argues that all forms of ''fiscal stimulus'' are ineffective because they merely move resources from private investment to government investment or from investment to consumption, with no effect on total current resources in the system or on total employment <ref>[http://www.dimensional.com/famafrench/2009/01/bailouts-and-stimulus-plans.html. Eugene Fama: ''Bailouts and Stimulus Plans'' January 2009]</ref> (the argument known as ''crowding-out''). Others have argued that the danger of incurring unsustainable debt <ref> The conditions for ''fiscal sustainability'' are set out in paragraph 4.1 of the article on national debt [http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/National_Debt#Fiscal_sustainability]</ref>, makes fiscal stimulus a risky option, especially  for countries with high levels of national debt. There have  been warnings of resulting  disaster, even for countries with modest ratios of national debt to GDP.  Another objection arises from the fear that expansionary fiscal and  monetary policies would not be reversed in time to avoid [[inflation]] (that objection was expressed by the economist Allan Meltzer <ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/opinion/04meltzer.html Allan Meltzer: ''Inflation Nation'', New York Times op-ed, 3rd May 2009]</ref> in the same issue of the New York Times in which the economist Paul Krugman was advocating a further stimulus in order to avert the danger of [[deflation]] <ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/opinion/04krugman.html Paul Krugman: ''Falling Wage Syndrome'', New York Times op-ed, 3rd May 2009]</ref>).
As the world economy started to recover, a variety of measures designed to avert a repetition of its underlying financial crisis were proposed, and some were implemented. Accounts of those  measures will be available as they develop in the articles on [[financial regulation]], [[banking]]  and [[bank failures and rescues]].


==References==
==References==
<references/>
{{reflist|2}}[[Category:Suggestion Bot Tag]]

Latest revision as of 11:00, 10 October 2024

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This editable Main Article is under development and subject to a disclaimer.
Supplements to this article include a glossary; links to reports of the major economic events in the fourth quarter of 2008 and each of the four quarters of 2009; tabulations of GDP growth rates, unemployment rates, public debt, total debt, and, fiscal stimulus packages

The recession of 2009 was the sequel to the financial crash of 2008 that led, in late 2008 and early 2009, to reductions in the growth rates of all of the world's emerging economies and to downturns in all of its mature economies - and that was to have major repercussions thereafter.

Introduction

This article is the third of a series of contemporary accounts of financial and economic events and developments during the period from mid 2007 to the end of 2011. The other articles are:-

Subprime mortgage crisis - events surrounding the bursting of a house price bubble in the United States in mid 2007;
Crash of 2008 - global financial developments from mid 2007 to the end of 2008;
Great Recession - an overview of global financial and economic events between mid 2007 and the end of 2011.

The downturn

Throughout the period from mid-2007 to mid-2008, the growth of the world economy was hampered by increases in oil and food prices, and by a crisis in the financial markets. Oil prices rose from $75 to $146 a barrel and food prices rose sharply, forcing householders to cut their spending on other products. On the financial markets, the subprime mortgage crisis developed into the crash of 2008, as a result of which the availability of credit to households and businesses was curtailed, leading to further reductions in household spending and business investment. In the nine months to the middle of 2008, the advanced economies had grown at an annual rate of only one per cent (compared with two and a half per cent in the previous nine months) and the growth rate of the developing economies had eased from eight per cent to seven and a half per cent. According to the OECD [1] the US economy was by then already facing substantial difficulties. Households had borrowed at an unprecedented rate during the previous 15 years, and their saving rates had fallen nearly to zero as they increasingly relied on housing wealth to finance consumption. With the housing market suffering the severest correction for 50 years, household wealth was declining, and with credit conditions getting tighter, households had been forced to reduce their reliance on borrowing, and job losses and mortgage foreclosures were rising.

The prospects of a recession in the United States and of substantial reductions in economic growth elsewhere were becoming apparent when the world economy was hit by another shock. The failure of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in September raised doubts about the creditworthiness of major global financial institutions, and the ensuing banking panic threatened a collapse of world’s financial system. Attempts by banks to restore their capital adequacy, resulted in capital hoarding, and the resulting liquidity shortage (or credit crunch) undermined consumer and business confidence, and triggered a further contraction in demand. Falls in demand, together with credit shortages led to a massive reduction in world trade.

Many industrialised and developing countries suffered reductions of economic activity. Economies with relatively large financial sectors - such as those of Britain and Iceland - suffered directly from the banking crisis. Economies with relatively large export sectors - such as those of Japan and Germany and many developing countries - suffered indirectly from the reduction in world trade. There were widespread increases in unemployment. Budget deficits grew during the downturn, mainly as a result of the operation of automatic stabilisers and, to a lesser extent, as a result of discretionary fiscal policy, and the levels of debt owed by the governments of the industrial governments were forecast to rise to an average of 120 percent of gdp by 2014.

more

The policy response

Massive financial support to their banks in the closing months of 2008 by the governments of the industrialised countries averted a threatened collapse of the international financial system, but failed to restore the supply of credit to businesses and householders, and further action was taken to tackle the growing recession. In a departure from accepted practice, the governments of the G20 group of major economies agreed to use fiscal policy in order to stimulate demand by tax cuts and increases of public expenditure. Fiscal stimulus packages were adopted that amounted to 4.8 percent of GDP in the US, 3.4 percent in Germany, 1.5 percent in the UK and 1.3 percent in France. Supportive monetary policy action was also taken by the major central banks by making massive reductions in their discount rates, followed - in a further departure from accepted practice - by injections of liquidity into their economies, mainly by the purchase of securities from their private sectors (quantitative easing or credit easing[2]). The Federal Reserve Board reduced its discount rate to 0 to 0.25 percent and made security purchases amounting to 12 percent of GDP[3]; the Bank of England reduced its bank rate to 0.5 per cent and made asset purchases amounting to 6 percent of GDP[4].; and the European Central Bank reduced its discount rate to 1.0 percent and made asset purchases amounting to 0.6% of Eurozone GDP[5].

more

The economic recovery

Although in purely technical terms the recession ended in most countries in the course of 2009, levels of activity remained substantially below normal levels and there was considerable uncertainty throughout the year about future prospects. In view of a continuing credit crunch, there were few expectations of an early return to pre-recession growth rates, and there were some fears of a long period of near-stagnation such as that suffered by Japan during the period 1990 to 2005. The American economist Paul Krugman argued that what happened in Japan may have been due to a reluctance to spend on the part of householders impoverished by collapses of housing and stock market bubbles[6], and the Japanese economist, Richard Koo applied the term "balance sheet recession" to a situation in which companies as well as householders reduce spending in order to repay debts and rebuild reserves[7]. Reports of increases in household saving ratios in the United States[8] and Britain[9] tended to add to those fears, but it has been argued that Japan's experience is unlikely to be repeated by the United States or the other indebted economies because their bubbles were proportionately smaller, their banks tend to be more profitable, and prompter action has been taken to recapitalise their banks[10].

more

The policy debate

Overview

A conflict about fiscal policy developed towards the end of 2008 between those who feared that the proposed expansion would be insufficient to counter growing output gaps - and those who considered a fiscal stimulus to be unnecessary or ineffective. Among the first group were the Nobel prize-winners Paul Krugman [11], and Joseph Stiglitz [12]. Among the others were the Chicago School's Eugene Fama, and a group of eminent British economists who argued that "occasional slowdowns are natural and necessary features of a market economy" and that "insofar as they are to be managed at all, the best tools are monetary and not fiscal ones"[13]. Further controversy developed in the course of 2009 between those who favoured reductions in [national debt]] early in 2010 in order to avert fears of being forced into sovereign default, and those who advocated the continuation of fiscal expansion until the recovery was firmly established.

Fiscal policy

The consensus view

By October 2008, policy-makers in most industrialised countries had accepted that in order to avoid the development of persistent and unmanageable deflation such as occurred in the Great Depression, early corrective action would have to be taken, going beyond the necessary restoration of activity in the financial system. Most countries had long abandoned the use of reductions of taxation and increases in public expenditure to ward off economic downturns in favour of the use of monetary policy targeted on the output gap, but there were doubts whether monetary policy would be sufficiently powerful, or sufficiently quick-acting in view if the severity and imminence of the current deflationary threat. In the United States, in particular, the federal discount rate had already been reduced to 1 per cent - leaving little scope for further reductions, but banks there and elsewhere had become reluctant to pass on central bank reductions of interest rates. The consensus view among economists, as expressed by the Chief Economist of the OECD was that :

Against the backdrop of a deep economic downturn, additional macroeconomic stimulus is needed. In normal times, monetary rather than fiscal policy would be the instrument of choice for macroeconomic stabilisation. But these are not normal times. Current conditions of extreme financial stress have weakened the monetary transmission mechanism. In this unusual situation, fiscal policy stimulus over and above the support provided through automatic stabilisers has an important role to play[14].

The International Monetary Fund noted that fiscal policy can quickly boost spending power, whereas monetary policy acts with long and uncertain lags [15], and a 2009 IMF Staff Position Note demonstrated that an internationally coordinated programme of fiscal expansion, combined with accommodative monetary policies, could have significant multiplier effects on the world economy [16]. However, the IMF also advised that fiscal expansion could do more harm than good in heavily indebted countries such as Japan and Italy stimulus, and suggested that further expansion should be confined to countries with more modest levels of national debt, such as the United Kingdom, China, France, Germany, and the United States [17]. After some early misgivings, the case for fiscal expansion gained near-universal political acceptance, and by early 2009, nearly all the G20 countries had introduced fiscal stimulus programmes [18].

In 2009, as signs of impending recovery began to emerge, the debate about the future of fiscal policy was resumed and, although there was general recognition of the eventual need for an offsetting fiscal contraction, views differed about the timing of such action. In October 2009 the IMF cautioned against haste:

"Notwithstanding already large deficits and rising public debt in many countries, fiscal stimulus needs to be sustained until the recovery is on a firmer footing and may even need to be amplified or extended beyond current plans if downside risks to growth materialize"[3].

The outcome of that debate in most industrialised countries was a decision to postpone further fiscal expansion unless and until the need became apparent, and to develop medium-term plans for fiscal contraction in 2011 and beyond [19].

Objections

Professor Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago argued that consumers do not respond to tax cuts because of awareness that they will eventually be paid for by tax increases (the argument known to economists as Ricardian equivalence. He also argues that all forms of fiscal stimulus are ineffective because they merely move resources from private investment to government investment or from investment to consumption, with no effect on total current resources in the system or on total employment [20] (the process known as crowding out). Others have argued that the danger of incurring unsustainable debt [21], makes fiscal stimulus a risky option, especially for countries with high levels of national debt. There is also a danger that even relatively modest levels of debt can become unsustainable if investors perceive a risk of default on its repayment, because they would then add to the problem by adding a risk premium to the interest rates needed to finance the debt. Another objection arises from the fear that expansionary fiscal and monetary policies would not be reversed in time to avoid inflation (that objection was expressed by the economist Allan Meltzer [22] in the same issue of the New York Times in which the economist Paul Krugman was advocating a further stimulus in order to avert the danger of deflation [23]).

Monetary policy

The consensus view

The use of security purchases to increase central bank liabilities as an auxiliary monetary policy after interest rate actions are exhausted (usually referred to as quantitative easing) had been explained by Ben Bernanke in 2004[24] and had been used by the Japanese central bank in the 1990s.

Objections

Although the policy of credit easing that was adopted by the Federal Reserve Bank in 2008 was not new, it received a mixed reception, and press references to it as "printing money" raised fears of inflation. The policy was vigorously attacked by German Chancellor Angela Merkel [25][26], but the President of the Bundesbank defended it, while warning of the need for its timely reversal[27].

Aftermath

As the world economy started to recover, a variety of measures designed to avert a repetition of its underlying financial crisis were proposed, and some were implemented. Accounts of those measures will be available as they develop in the articles on financial regulation, banking and bank failures and rescues.

References

  1. Economic Survey of the United States, OECD December 2008
  2. Ben Bernanke: The Crisis and the Policy Response, Speech at the London School of Economics, January 13, 2009
  3. Ben Bernanke: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet: An Update, Federal Reserve Board Conference on Key Developments in Monetary Policy, Washington, D.C. October 8, 2009
  4. Charles Bean: Quantitative Easing: An Interim Report, Speech to the London Society of Chartered Accountants London, 13 October 2009
  5. Claus Vistesen: Quantitative Easing à l´ECB, Global Economy Matters, May 2009
  6. Paul Krugman's fear for lost decade, Interview with Will Hutton, The Observer, Sunday 14 June 2009
  7. Richard Koo: The Age of Balance Sheet Recessions, What post-2008 USA, Europe and China can learn from Japan 1990-2005, Nomura Research Institute, March 2009
  8. U.S. Household Deleveraging and Future Consumption Growth, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 2009-16; May 15, 2009
  9. Quarterly National Accounts briefing note, 2009 Quarter Two, National Statistics Office
  10. A special report on the world economy, The Economist, Oct 1st 2009
  11. Paul Krugman The Obama Gap, New York Times blog 8 January 2009
  12. Joseph Stiglitz "How to Fail to Recover", Project Syndicate, 2009.
  13. Keynesian Over-spending Won't Rescue the Economy", Letter by IEA economists in the Sunday Telegraph, 26 October 2008
  14. Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel: A Long Recession" ,Editorial to OECD Observer No 270, December 2008
  15. Fiscal Policy as a Countercyclical Tool, IMF World Economic Outlook, Chapter 5 , October 2008
  16. Charles Freedman, Michael Kumhof, Douglas Laxton, and Jaewoo Lee: The Case for Global Fiscal Stimulus, IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/03, International Monetary Fund, March 6 2009
  17. Mark Horton and Anna Ivanova: "The Size of the Fiscal Expansion: An Analysis for the Largest ountries", IMF Fiscal Department Note, February 2009
  18. Eswar Prasad: Assessing the G-20 Stimulus Plans: A Deeper Look, Brookings Institution May 2009
  19. "The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis" IMF March 6 2009
  20. Eugene Fama: Bailouts and Stimulus Plans January 2009
  21. The conditions for fiscal sustainability are set out in paragraph 4.1 of the article on national debt [1]
  22. Allan Meltzer: Inflation Nation, New York Times op-ed, 3rd May 2009
  23. Paul Krugman: Falling Wage Syndrome, New York Times op-ed, 3rd May 2009
  24. Ben Bernanke: Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates, Paper presented to the American Economic Association at San Diego, California, January 3, 2004
  25. Bertrand Benoit Ralph Atkins: Berlin breaks the unwritten rule, Financial Times, June 2 2009
  26. Tony Barber: Merkel derides the Bank of England’s "little line”, Financial Times Brussels Blog, June 5, 2009[2]
  27. Gabi Thesing: Weber Sees Subdued Inflation, ‘Protracted’ Recovery , Bloomberg, September 8 2009