Long Reach Operation: Difference between revisions
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== Background == | == Background == | ||
After failing to destroy the relief column of the besieged Pleime camp with the 32rd Regiment and overrunning the camp with the 32nd Regiment the NVA B3 Field Front ordered both regiments to withdraw to their rear bases in the Chu Pong massif area. These two units were to rejoin with the 66th Regiment and together all three would stage for a second attack of the Pleime camp with this time, the 66th as the main force reinforced by one 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns battalion and one 120mm mortars battalion.<ref>Vinh Loc, p.80</ref> | After failing to destroy the relief column of the besieged Pleime camp with the 32rd Regiment and overrunning the camp with the 32nd Regiment the NVA B3 Field Front ordered both regiments to withdraw to their rear bases in the Chu Pong massif area. These two units were to rejoin with the 66th Regiment and together all three would stage for a second attack of the Pleime camp with this time, the 66th as the main force reinforced by one 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns battalion and one 120mm mortars battalion.<ref>Vinh Loc, p.80</ref> | ||
II Corps obtained these vital information through a unique intelligence source consisting in intercepts of radio communications between the Chinese advisors embedded in the NVA units at regimental level<ref>Mohr, Charles (16 November 1965). "Three Prisoners Tell Of Aid From China North Vietnamese Also Say Cambodians Helped Them": ''Captured North Vietnamese soldiers said today that their units had received assistance from Cambodian "militiamen" during their infiltration into South Vietnam and that each infiltrated regiment had one Chinese Communist adviser. ''The New York Times.</ref> | |||
and the Chinese advisors headquarters established in Phnom Penn to assist the B3 Field Front in logistics.<ref>{{citation|author=Vĩnh Lộc|date=1966|url=http://www.generalhieu.com/pleime_sach.htm|title=Pleime Trận Chiến Lịch Sử| publisher=Bộ Thông Tin|location=Viet Nam}}</ref> | |||
== References == | == References == | ||
<references/> | <references/> | ||
Revision as of 15:45, 5 October 2017
Long Reach operation was conducted by the 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Chu Pong/Ia Drang complex, Central Highlands, Viet Nam from 27 October to 26 November 1965. It is more well-known as Pleiku campaign. It was executed in three phases: All the Way conducted by the 1st Brigade from 27 October to November 9; Silver Bayonet I by the 3rd Brigade from 9 to 18 November; and Silver Bayonet II by the 2nd Brigade from 18 to 26 November. The Battle of Ia Drang, which included the battles of LZ X-ray (14 to 16 November) and LZ Albany (17 to 18 November), occurred during the Silver Bayonet I phase.[1]
This was an ARVN-US joint operation in which the ARVN II Corps was in charge of the concepts of operation and intelligence and the US 1st Air Cavalry Division was in control of the troops and the logistics.[2][3]
The II Corps Chief of Staff's operational concept was to use the B-52 airstrikes to destroy the three NVA 32nd, 33rd and 66th Regiments at the moment they were staging a second attack of the Pleime camp in the Chu Pong massif areas.[4] The air force action was supported by the air cavalry ground force in fixing the enemy troops in becoming available targets for B-52 strikes. General Richard Knowles, 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command Post Commander, describes the tactical ground maneuvers of inserting the air cavalry troops at LZ X-Ray as "grab the tiger by its tail" and moving them to LZ Albany as "grab the tiger by its tail from another direction".[5]
Background
After failing to destroy the relief column of the besieged Pleime camp with the 32rd Regiment and overrunning the camp with the 32nd Regiment the NVA B3 Field Front ordered both regiments to withdraw to their rear bases in the Chu Pong massif area. These two units were to rejoin with the 66th Regiment and together all three would stage for a second attack of the Pleime camp with this time, the 66th as the main force reinforced by one 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns battalion and one 120mm mortars battalion.[6]
II Corps obtained these vital information through a unique intelligence source consisting in intercepts of radio communications between the Chinese advisors embedded in the NVA units at regimental level[7] and the Chinese advisors headquarters established in Phnom Penn to assist the B3 Field Front in logistics.[8]
References
- ↑ Kinnard, William (1966), Pleiku Campaign, After Action Report, p.1
- ↑ Vinh Loc (1966), Why Pleime, Viet Nam: Information Printing Office, p.119
- ↑ Knowles, Richard (1983), LZ X-Ray Battle, p.7
- ↑ McChristian, J.A. (1966), Intelligence Aspects of Pleime/Chupong Campaign, J2/MACV, p.6
- ↑ Knowles, p.6
- ↑ Vinh Loc, p.80
- ↑ Mohr, Charles (16 November 1965). "Three Prisoners Tell Of Aid From China North Vietnamese Also Say Cambodians Helped Them": Captured North Vietnamese soldiers said today that their units had received assistance from Cambodian "militiamen" during their infiltration into South Vietnam and that each infiltrated regiment had one Chinese Communist adviser. The New York Times.
- ↑ Vĩnh Lộc (1966), Pleime Trận Chiến Lịch Sử, Viet Nam: Bộ Thông Tin