Kichisaburo Nomura: Difference between revisions
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'''Kichisaburo Nomura''' was an [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] admiral, who became Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. in 1941. | '''Kichisaburo Nomura''' was an [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] admiral, who became Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. in 1941. With Foreign Minister [[Yosuke Matsuoka]], also in Washington, he tried to avert [[World War Two in the Pacific]]. | ||
According to Pacific Fleet intelligence officer [[Edwin Layton]], "Nomura was one of the few senior Japanese officials I knew who had real affinity for and understanding of the United States. His appointment at this critical time was a signal of Tokyo's intent to calm American concern. If anyone could have done it, Nomura was the man." <ref name=Layton>{{citation | According to Pacific Fleet intelligence officer [[Edwin Layton]], "Nomura was one of the few senior Japanese officials I knew who had real affinity for and understanding of the United States. His appointment at this critical time was a signal of Tokyo's intent to calm American concern. If anyone could have done it, Nomura was the man." <ref name=Layton>{{citation | ||
Revision as of 17:07, 2 September 2010
Kichisaburo Nomura was an Imperial Japanese Navy admiral, who became Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. in 1941. With Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, also in Washington, he tried to avert World War Two in the Pacific.
According to Pacific Fleet intelligence officer Edwin Layton, "Nomura was one of the few senior Japanese officials I knew who had real affinity for and understanding of the United States. His appointment at this critical time was a signal of Tokyo's intent to calm American concern. If anyone could have done it, Nomura was the man." [1] Layton, however, considered Nomura naive in proposing ideas that his government, which would have been unacceptable to the Japanese military leadership. Nomura reported that there was special American sensitivity over French Indochina.
References
- ↑ Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau and John Costello (1985), "And I was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway: Breaking the Secrets, William Morrow & Company, ISBN 0688948838, p. 81