Kichisaburo Nomura: Difference between revisions
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'''Kichisaburo Nomura''' was an [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] admiral, who became Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. in 1941. With Foreign Minister [[Yosuke Matsuoka]], also in Washington, he tried to avert [[World War Two in the Pacific]]. | {{subpages}} | ||
'''Kichisaburo Nomura''' was an [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] admiral, who became Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. in 1941, following service as Foreign Minister. With Foreign Minister [[Yosuke Matsuoka]], also in Washington, he tried to avert [[World War Two in the Pacific]]. | |||
==Early career== | |||
He was a graduate of the [[Japanese Naval Academy]], who served as naval attache to the U.S. in 1916-1918. | |||
==Mission to the U.S.== | |||
According to Pacific Fleet intelligence officer [[Edwin Layton]], "Nomura was one of the few senior Japanese officials I knew who had real affinity for and understanding of the United States. His appointment at this critical time was a signal of Tokyo's intent to calm American concern. If anyone could have done it, Nomura was the man." <ref name=Layton>{{citation | According to Pacific Fleet intelligence officer [[Edwin Layton]], "Nomura was one of the few senior Japanese officials I knew who had real affinity for and understanding of the United States. His appointment at this critical time was a signal of Tokyo's intent to calm American concern. If anyone could have done it, Nomura was the man." <ref name=Layton>{{citation | ||
| title = "And I was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway: Breaking the Secrets | | title = "And I was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway: Breaking the Secrets | ||
| Line 6: | Line 9: | ||
| publisher = William Morrow & Company | year = 1985 | isbn=0688948838 | | publisher = William Morrow & Company | year = 1985 | isbn=0688948838 | ||
}}, p. 81</ref> Layton, however, considered Nomura naive in proposing ideas that his government, which would have been unacceptable to the Japanese military leadership. Nomura reported that there was special American sensitivity over [[French Indochina]]. | }}, p. 81</ref> Layton, however, considered Nomura naive in proposing ideas that his government, which would have been unacceptable to the Japanese military leadership. Nomura reported that there was special American sensitivity over [[French Indochina]]. | ||
After a February 7, 1941, conversation with Nomura, an old friend from Zacharias' stay in Japan in the 1920s, "During what Zacharias termed an "amazingly frank" discussion with Nomura, the ambassador appeared to be deeply fearful of the growing power concentrated in the hands of the Japanese war extremists. Nomura believed that a conflict with the United States would ruin or destroy the Japanese empire, but he appeared resigned that such a war appeared to be inevitable, especially now after the signing of the Axis Pact."<ref name=Pfeiffer>{{citation | |||
| title = Sage Prophet or Loose Cannon? Skilled Intelligence Officer in World War II Foresaw Japan's Plans, but Annoyed Navy Brass | |||
| author = David A. Pfeiffer | |||
| journal = Prologue (U.S. National Archives) | |||
| date = Summer 2008 | |||
| url = http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2008/summer/zacharias.html}}</ref> | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
Revision as of 18:58, 2 September 2010
Kichisaburo Nomura was an Imperial Japanese Navy admiral, who became Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. in 1941, following service as Foreign Minister. With Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, also in Washington, he tried to avert World War Two in the Pacific.
Early career
He was a graduate of the Japanese Naval Academy, who served as naval attache to the U.S. in 1916-1918.
Mission to the U.S.
According to Pacific Fleet intelligence officer Edwin Layton, "Nomura was one of the few senior Japanese officials I knew who had real affinity for and understanding of the United States. His appointment at this critical time was a signal of Tokyo's intent to calm American concern. If anyone could have done it, Nomura was the man." [1] Layton, however, considered Nomura naive in proposing ideas that his government, which would have been unacceptable to the Japanese military leadership. Nomura reported that there was special American sensitivity over French Indochina.
After a February 7, 1941, conversation with Nomura, an old friend from Zacharias' stay in Japan in the 1920s, "During what Zacharias termed an "amazingly frank" discussion with Nomura, the ambassador appeared to be deeply fearful of the growing power concentrated in the hands of the Japanese war extremists. Nomura believed that a conflict with the United States would ruin or destroy the Japanese empire, but he appeared resigned that such a war appeared to be inevitable, especially now after the signing of the Axis Pact."[2]
References
- ↑ Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau and John Costello (1985), "And I was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway: Breaking the Secrets, William Morrow & Company, ISBN 0688948838, p. 81
- ↑ David A. Pfeiffer (Summer 2008), "Sage Prophet or Loose Cannon? Skilled Intelligence Officer in World War II Foresaw Japan's Plans, but Annoyed Navy Brass", Prologue (U.S. National Archives)