Pseudoscience: Difference between revisions

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{{main|Demarcation problem}}
{{main|Demarcation problem}}


After over a century of dialogue among [[philosophy of science|philosophers of science]] and [[scientist]]s in varied [[science|fields]], and despite broad agreement on the basics of [[scientific method]],<ref>Gauch HG Jr (2003)''op cit'' 3-7.</ref> the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated.<ref>Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) ''Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues'', 1-82</ref> This is known as the [[scientific method#Problem of demarcation|problem of demarcation]].  
Despite broad agreement on the basics of [[scientific method]],<ref>Gauch (2003)''op cit'' 3-7</ref> the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated.<ref>Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) ''Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues'' 1-82</ref> This is known as the [[scientific method#Problem of demarcation|problem of demarcation]].  


Many commentators and practitioners of science, as well as supporters of fields of inquiry and practices labeled as pseudoscience, question the rigor of the demarcation{{fact}}, as some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create [[falsifiable]] experiments{{fact}}.
Many commentators and practitioners of science, as well as supporters of fields of inquiry and practices labeled as pseudoscience, question the rigor of the demarcation{{fact}}, as some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create [[falsifiable]] experiments. It has been argued that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. [[Thomas Kuhn]] states that in neither Popper's nor his own theory "can testing play a quite decisive role."<ref>Kuhn TS "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Grim, ''op cit'' p 125</ref> [[Daniel Rothbart]] said that "the defining feature of science does not seem to be experimental success, for most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified."<ref>Rothbart D "Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience", in Grim ''op cit'' p 114</ref> The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". A theory is thus scientific or not depending upon its historical situation; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. "Many domains in ancient Greece, for example, domains that today are called superstition, religion, magic and the occult, were at that time clear cases of legitimate science." This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model.<ref>Rothbart, Daniel, ''op cit'' pp 114-20</ref>


It has been argued by several notable commentators that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. [[Thomas Kuhn]] states that in neither Popper's nor his own theory "can testing play a quite decisive role."<ref>Kuhn TS "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Grim, ''op. cit.'' p. 125</ref> [[Daniel Rothbart]] said that "the defining feature of science does not seem to be experimental success, for most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified."<ref>Rothbart D "Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience", in Grim, ''op. cit.'' pp.114.</ref> The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". A theory is thus scientific or not depending upon its historical situation; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. "Many domains in ancient Greece, for example, domains that today are called superstition, religion, magic and the occult, were at that time clear cases of legitimate science." This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model.<ref>Rothbart, Daniel, ''op. cit.'' pp. 114-20.</ref>
Philosopher of science Larry Laudan has suggested that ''pseudoscience'' has no scientific meaning and mostly describes our emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".<ref>Laudan L (1996) "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse M ''But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy '' pp 337-350</ref>
 
Kuhn postulated that proponents of competing paradigms may resort to [[politics|political]] means (such as [[invective]]) to garner support from a public which lacks the ability to judge competing scientific theories on their merits. Philosopher of science Larry Laudan has suggested that ''pseudoscience'' has no scientific meaning and mostly describes our emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".<ref>Laudan L (1996) "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse, Michael, ''But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy '' pp. 337-350.</ref>


==The ubiquity of pseudoscientific thinking==
==The ubiquity of pseudoscientific thinking==

Revision as of 15:13, 28 October 2006


Phrenology is regarded today as a classic example of pseudoscience.

According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, a pseudoscience is a "system of theories, assumptions, and methods erroneously regarded as scientific" [1]. The term, which combines the Greek root pseudo, meaning false, and the Latin scientia, meaning knowledge, was used in 1843 by Magendie, who referred to phrenology as "a pseudo-science of the present day" [1]

There is considerable disagreement about whether it is possible to distinguish "science" from "pseudoscience" in a reliable and objective way, and about whether attempting to do so is useful. [2] Those who believe that characterising some areas as pseudoscientific is useful stress the use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims, over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation, lack of openness to testing by other experts, and a lack of progress in theory development. The term pseudoscience or pseudoscientific is sometimes applied by disputants working in the same field to disparage a competing theory or the form of argument used by a rival, sometimes by commentators from outside a field to disparage a whole field, sometimes merely to characterise the fact that a theory published in a popular book has no academic credibility whatsoever, [3] and sometimes in reference to a theory now discarded. [4]

Introduction

The standards for determining whether a body of knowledge, methodology, or practice is scientific vary from field to field, but involve agreed principles of reproducibility and intersubjective verifiability.[5] Such principles aim to ensure that relevant evidence can be reproduced and/or measured given the same conditions, which allows further investigation to determine whether a hypothesis or theory is both valid and reliable for use by others. Scientific methods are expected to be applied throughout, and bias to be controlled or eliminated. Data, including experimental/environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for peer review, thereby allowing further experiments to test the results. Fulfilling these requirements allows others an opportunity to assess whether to rely upon the reported results in their own scientific work.

In the mid-20th Century Karl Popper suggested the criterion of falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science.[6] Theories such as God created the universe may be true or false, but they are not falsifiable, so they are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of science. Popper subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious and/or metaphysical formulations on the one hand, and pseudoscientific formulations on the other — though without providing clear criteria for the differences.[7] He gave astrology and psychoanalysis as examples of pseudoscience, and Einstein's theory of relativity as an example of science.[8] More recently, Paul Thagard proposed that pseudoscience is primarily distinguishable from science by its lack of progress, and the selective and or lack of attempts by proponents to solve problems with the theory. Mario Bunge has suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between science and pseudoscience.

Philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend has argued that a distinction between science and non-science is neither possible nor desirable.[9] [10] Among the issues which can make the distinction difficult are that both the theories and methodologies of science evolve at differing rates in response to new data.[11] In addition, the specific standards applicable to one field of science may not be those employed in other fields. Thagard (1978) also writes from a sociological perspective and states that "elucidation of how science differs from pseudoscience is the philosophical side of an attempt to overcome public neglect of genuine science."

The brights movement, most prominently represented by Richard Dawkins, Mario Bunge, Carl Sagan and James Randi, consider all forms of pseudoscience to be harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics generally consider that pseudoscience may occur for a number of reasons, ranging from simple naïveté about the nature of science and the scientific method, to deliberate deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of personal health and safety may be very directly involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy or treatment, or in assessing safety risks. In such instances the potential for direct harm to patients, clients or even the general public may be an issue in assessing pseudoscience.


The concept of pseudoscience as antagonistic to bona fide science appears to have emerged in the mid-19th century. Among the first recorded uses of the word "pseudo-science" was in 1844 in the Northern Journal of Medicine, I 387: "That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognized as a branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles".

Identifying pseudoscience

A field, practice, or body of knowledge might reasonably be called pseudoscientific if it is presented as consistent with the accepted norms of scientific research, but demonstrably fails to meet these norms, most importantly, in misuse of scientific method.[12] The following have been proposed to be indicative of poor scientific reasoning.

  • Vague, exaggerated or untestable claims
  • Failure to use "operational definitions". [13]
  • Failure to use the principle of parsimony, i.e. failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when multiple viable explanations are possible (Occam's Razor)
  • Use of obscurantist language, and misuse of apparently technical jargon in an effort to give claims the superficial trappings of science.
  • Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess well articulated limitations under which predictions do or do not apply.
  • Assertion of scientific claims that cannot be falsified in the event they are incorrect, inaccurate, or irrelevant [14]
  • Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict [15]
  • Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must be true, and vice versa (see: Argument from ignorance)[16]
  • Over-reliance on testimonials and anecdotes. Testimonial and anecdotal evidence can be useful for discovery (i.e. hypothesis generation) but should not be used in the context of justification (i.e. hypothesis testing). [17]
  • Selective use of experimental evidence: presenting data that seem to support claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with those claims.[18]
  • Reversed burden of proof. In science, the burden of proof rests on the individual making a claim, not on the critic. "Pseudoscientific" arguments may neglect this principle and demand that skeptics demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g. an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than the claimant.[19]
  • Evasion of peer review before publicizing results ("science by press conference"). [20]

Some proponents of theories that contradict accepted scientific theories avoid the often ego-bruising process of peer review, sometimes on the grounds that peer review is biased against claims that contradict established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated using standard scientific methods. By remaining insulated from peer review, these proponents forego constructive feedback from colleagues.[21]

  • Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to reproduce claimed results.[22]
  • Assertion of claims of secrecy or proprietary knowledge in response to requests for review of data or methodology.

Lack of progress

  • Failure to progress towards additional evidence of its claims.[23]
  • Lack of self correction: scientific research programmes make mistakes, but they tend to eliminate these errors over time. [24]

Terrence Hines has identified astrology as a subject that has changed very little in the past two millennia.[25]

Personalization of issues

Some criticisms that lead to the accusation of pseudoscience are also true to some extent of some new genuinely scientific work. These include:

  • claims or theories unconnected to previous experimental results
  • claims which contradict experimentally established results
  • work failing to operate on standard definitions of concepts
  • emotion-based resistance, by the scientific community, to new claims or theories [28]

Science is distinguishable from revelation, theology, or spirituality in that it claims to offer insight into the physical world obtained by "scientific" means. Systems of thought that derive from "divine" or "inspired" knowledge are not considered pseudoscience if they do not claim either to be scientific or to overturn well-established science.

Some statements and commonly held beliefs in popular science may not meet the criteria of science. "Pop" science may blur the divide between science and pseudoscience among the general public, and may also involve science fiction.[29] Indeed, pop science is disseminated to, and can also easily emanate from, persons not accountable to scientific methodology and expert peer review.

Pseudoscience contrasted with protoscience

Protoscience is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that has not yet been adequately tested, but which is otherwise consistent with existing science or which offers reasonable account of the inconsistency. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a scientific field.[30]. By contrast, "pseudoscience" is reserved to describe theories which are either untestable in practice or in principle, or which are maintained even when tests appear to have refuted them.

It is widely disputed (notably by Feyeraband, see above) whether any clear or meaningful boundaries can be drawn between pseudoscience, protoscience, and "real" science. Especially where there is a significant cultural or historical distance (as, for example, modern chemistry reflecting on alchemy), protosciences can be misinterpreted as pseudoscientific. Often the term pseudoscience is used simply as a pejorative to express a low opinion of a given field, regardless of any objective measures; thus according to McNally, "The term “pseudoscience” has become little more than an inflammatory buzzword for quickly dismissing one’s opponents in media sound-bites." [31].

Demarcation problem and criticisms of the concept of pseudoscience

For more information, see: Demarcation problem.


Despite broad agreement on the basics of scientific method,[32] the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated.[33] This is known as the problem of demarcation.

Many commentators and practitioners of science, as well as supporters of fields of inquiry and practices labeled as pseudoscience, question the rigor of the demarcationTemplate:Fact, as some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create falsifiable experiments. It has been argued that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. Thomas Kuhn states that in neither Popper's nor his own theory "can testing play a quite decisive role."[34] Daniel Rothbart said that "the defining feature of science does not seem to be experimental success, for most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified."[35] The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". A theory is thus scientific or not depending upon its historical situation; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. "Many domains in ancient Greece, for example, domains that today are called superstition, religion, magic and the occult, were at that time clear cases of legitimate science." This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model.[36]

Philosopher of science Larry Laudan has suggested that pseudoscience has no scientific meaning and mostly describes our emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".[37]

The ubiquity of pseudoscientific thinking

The National Science Foundation stated that, in the USA, "pseudoscientific" beliefs became more widespread during the 1990's, peaked near 2001 and mildly declined since; nevertheless, pseudoscientific beliefs remain common in the USA.[38] As a result, according to the NSF report, there is a lack of knowledge of pseudoscientific issues in society and pseudoscientific practices are commonly followed. Bunge (1999) states that "A survey on public knowledge of science in the United States showed that in 1988 '50% of American adults [rejected] evolution, and 88% [believed] astrology is a science'".

Commentators on pseudoscience perceive it in many fields; for example Pseudomathematics is a term used for mathematics-like activity undertaken either by non-mathematicians or mathematicians themselves which does not conform to the rigorous standards usually applied to mathematical theories.

Pseudoscience in psychology

Neurologists and clinical psychologists [39] are concerned about the increasing amount of what they consider pseudoscience promoted in psychotherapy and popular psychology, and also about what they see as pseudoscientific therapies such as Neuro-linguistic programming, Rebirthing, Reparenting, and Primal Scream Therapy being adopted by government and professional bodies and by the public. They state that scientifically unsupported therapies might harm vulnerable members of the public, undermine legitimate therapies, and tend to spread misconceptions about the nature of the mind and brain to society at large. Some psychiatrists and psychologists also perceive pseudoscientific ideas in more popularly accepted branches of psychotherapy, such as co-counselling, Gestalt Therapy, Re-evaluation Counseling and even in the work of Twelve-step program bodies such as Alcoholics Anonymous. There often seems to be an overlap between psychological movements or theories denounced as "pseudoscientific" and those labeled "cults", for example in the case of Dianetics and Scientology.

A typical concept used in some fringe psychotherapies is orgone energy. "There is an increasing degree of overlapping and blending of orgone therapy with New Age and other therapies that manipulate the patient’s biofields, such as Therapeutic Touch and Reiki. 'Biofield' is a pseudoscientific term often used synonymously with orgone energy. Klee states that there is even an organization of psychiatrists which promotes orgone therapy. [40]


Psychological explanations for pseudoscientific beliefs

Pseudoscientific thinking has been explained in terms of psychology and social psychology. The human proclivity for seeking confirmation rather than refutation (confirmation bias) [41], the tendency to hold comforting beliefs, and the tendency to overgeneralize have been proposed as reasons for the common adherence to pseudoscientific thinking. Also, Beyerstein (1991) argues that humans are prone to associations based on resemblances only, and often prone to misattribution in cause-effect thinking.


References


External links

  1. ↑ Magendie, F (1843) An Elementary Treatise on Human Physiology. 5th Ed. Tr. John Revere. New York, Harper, p 150
  2. ↑ The philosopher of science Paul Feyeraband in particular is associated with the view that attempts to distinguish science from non-science are flawed and pernicious. "The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. ... the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic:"[2]
  3. ↑ [3][4]
  4. ↑ e.g. phrenology, see [ http://www.theness.com/articles.asp?id=40]
  5. ↑ e.g. Gauch HG Jr (2003) Scientific Method in Practice 3-5 ff
  6. ↑ Popper, KR (1959) "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (English translation, 1959)[5].
  7. ↑ Popper KR "Science: Conjectures and Refutations"
  8. ↑ Popper KR (1962) Science, Pseudo-Science, and Falsifiability. Conjectures and Refutations
  9. ↑ Feyerabend P (1975) Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge [6]
  10. ↑ For a perspective on Feyerabend from within the scientific community, see Gauch (2003) at p.4: "Such critiques are unfamiliar to most scientists, although some may have heard a few distant shots from the so-called science wars."
  11. ↑ Thagard PR (1978) "Why astrology is a pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, ed. Asquith PD and Hacking I (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ff. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."
  12. ↑ Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82
  13. ↑ (ie. a scientific description of the operational means by which measurements can be made). Paul Montgomery Churchland, Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (1999) MIT Press. p.90. "Most terms in theoretical physics, for example, do not enjoy at least some distinct connections with observables, but not of the simple sort that would permit operational definitions in terms of these observables. [..] If a restriction in favor of operational definitions were to be followed, therefore, most of theoretical physics would have to be dismissed as meaningless pseudoscience!"
  14. ↑ Lakatos I (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos I, Musgrave A (eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge pp 91-195; Popper KR (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery
  15. ↑ e.g. [7] Macmilllan Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff, esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi"
  16. ↑ Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff esp. 177-178
  17. ↑ Bunge M (1983) Demarcating science from pseudoscience Fundamenta Scientiae 3:369-388, 381
  18. ↑ Thagard (1978)op cit at 227, 228
  19. ↑ Lilienfeld SO (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology Guildford Press (2004) ISBN 1-59385-070-0
  20. ↑ Peer review and the acceptance of new scientific ideas (Warning 469 kB PDF)*Peer review – process, perspectives and the path ahead; Lilienfeld (2004) op cit For an opposing perspective, e.g. Peer Review as Scholarly Conformity
  21. ↑ Ruscio J (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth
  22. ↑ Gauch (2003) op cit 124 ff"
  23. ↑ Lakatos I (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos I, Musgrave A (eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 91-195; Thagard (1978) op cit writes: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."
  24. ↑ name=Ruscio120>Ruscio J (2001) op cit. p120. By contrast, theories may be accused of being pseudoscientific because they have remained unaltered despite contradictory evidence. The work Scientists Confront Velikovsky (1976) Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of Thomas Kuhn, e.g. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience.
  25. ↑ See, e.g., Hines T, Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1988. ISBN 0-87975-419-2. Thagard (1978) op cit 223 ff
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Devilly GJ (2005) Power therapies and possible threats to the science of psychology and psychiatry Austral NZ J Psych 39:437-445(9) Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Devilly" defined multiple times with different content
  27. ↑ e.g. archivefreedom.org which claims that "The list of suppressed scientists even includes Nobel Laureates!"
  28. ↑ Kuhn TS (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
  29. ↑ [8]
  30. ↑ Popper KR op. cit.
  31. ↑ McNally RJ (2003)Is the pseudoscience concept useful for clinical psychology? SRHMP Vol 2 Number 2 Fall/Winter [9]
  32. ↑ Gauch (2003)op cit 3-7
  33. ↑ Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues 1-82
  34. ↑ Kuhn TS "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Grim, op cit p 125
  35. ↑ Rothbart D "Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience", in Grim op cit p 114
  36. ↑ Rothbart, Daniel, op cit pp 114-20
  37. ↑ Laudan L (1996) "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse M But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy pp 337-350
  38. ↑ [10] National Science Board. 2006. Science and Engineering Indicators 2006 Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (volume 1, NSB-06-01; NSB 06-01A)
  39. ↑ e.g. Drenth (2003) [11]; Herbert JD, et al. (2000) Science and pseudoscience in the development of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing: implications for clinical psychology. Clin Psychol Rev. 20:945-71 [PMID 11098395])
  40. ↑ Klee GD (2005) The Resurrection of Wilhelm Reich and Orgone Therapy The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice (Vol. 4, No. 1)" | available online
  41. ↑ (Devilly 2005:439)
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