Internalism and externalism: Difference between revisions
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==Epistemology== | ==Epistemology== | ||
===The ambiguity of epistemological internalism=== | ===The ambiguity of epistemological internalism=== | ||
Within epistemology, internalism is normally understood as a position about the concept of [[justification]], although similar claims are sometimes also made about [[knowledge]]. There are a variety of such positions, described below. | |||
===Accessibilism=== | ===Accessibilism=== |
Revision as of 11:11, 28 May 2008
'Internalism' has a variety of different meanings within philosophy, and for each of these meanings there is a corresponding 'externalist' position which is just the denial of the internalist one. There are different internalist positions in semantics, philosophy of mind, epistemology and ethics.
Epistemology
The ambiguity of epistemological internalism
Within epistemology, internalism is normally understood as a position about the concept of justification, although similar claims are sometimes also made about knowledge. There are a variety of such positions, described below.
Accessibilism
Accessibilism is the position that whether someone's belief is justified supervenes only on facts to which that person has some sort of access.
Mentalism
Mentalism is the position that whether someone's belief is justified supervenes only on their mental states. It is defended by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman.
Philosophy of mind
Within philosophy of mind, internalism is the theory that the content of one's mental states does not depend on the external world.
Semantics
Semantic externalism comes in two varieties, depending on whether meaning is construed cognitively or linguistically. On a cognitive construal, externalism is the thesis that what concepts (or contents) are available to a thinker is determined by their environment, or their relation to their environment. On a linguistic construal, externalism is the thesis that the meaning of a word is environmentally determined. Likewise, one can construe semantic internalism in two ways, as a denial of either of these two theses.
Externalism and internalism in semantics is closely tied to the distinction in philosophy of mind concerning mental content, since the contents of one's thoughts (specifically, intentional mental states) are usually taken to be semantic objects that are truth-evaluable.